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The United Nations, as an organisation created by equal sovereign states and built
upon a single set of principles as the UN Charter, has the capacity and responsibility
to deal with matters in the sphere of international peace and security. The Cold War
put an obstacle in the way of the Organisation to use its delegated powers in conflict
resolution within the few years of its establishment. As a result, and because of the
necessity to deal with international conflicts, the institution of peace-keeping emerged
with the aim of deploying forces not to end the aggression, breach of or threat to the
peace, but for supervision of cease-fires or providing an interposition force between
the belligerents, characterised by impartiality and a limited military capability.
The demise of the Cold War offered the opportunity to the Organisation, especially to
the Security Council, to use its powers to implement law and order among nations. In
the post-Cold War era, the Security Council extended its interpretation of the notion
of "threat to the peace" and restricted the principle of "domestic jurisdiction". The
Council has authorised an individual state or a group of states to use force for
humanitarian purposes and human rights concerns.
To study the role of the United Nations in the field of international peace and
security, and to investigate its developments, legality of actions, successes and
failures, it is necessary to gain a clear understanding of what was originally intended
by the founders of the Organisation. This thesis examines initially the provisions of
the Charter on the role of the UN organs in maintaining and restoring international
peace and security with reference to the discussions at the San Francisco Conference.
Since the institution of peace-keeping was not envisaged in the Charter, an
investigation is carried out on its constitutional and legal basis, referring to the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and Chapters VI and VII of the
Charter.
A distinction is drawn between peace-keeping, observation and humanitarian
operations and the cases dealt with by the UN are distinguished accordingly. The facts
of the disputes are briefly described and the constitutional basis of the operations are
analysed, followed by an assessment of their effectiveness. It is stressed that peace-
keeping forces should be given achievable mandates, the period of their presence
should be kept to a minimum, and peaceful efforts to settle the disputes should
accompany peace-keeping. In humanitarian crises, a balanced humanitarian, political
and peace-keeping presence by the UN should be more successful than a dominant
military intervention.
Two conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Iraq-Iran war of 1980 and the Kuwait crisis of
1990, are considered separately as the two extremes of the Council's approach toward
aggression that represent the spectrum of measures taken by the UN in restoring
international peace and security. The background of the disputes and the position of
the parties are examined, and the constitutional basis of the UN operations is
analysed. In the case of Kuwait, a discussion is made on the legal basis of UN
economic sanctions and the authorisation of the enforcement action against Iraq,
which has necessitated a comparative study of the cases of Korea and Haiti. The
legality of the intervention by the UN and individual states on humanitarian grounds
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The United Nations was founded in the wake of World War II with the expectation of
saving future generations from the scourge of war, and maitaining peace and security
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. The first draft of the
United Nations Charter prepared by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the
United States, with some input from China, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, was
not pure invention. In fact, the United Nations was structured on the basis of the same
general type of institution as the League of Nations and shared many characteristics
with its predecessor, endowed with more power for maintaining and restoring peace,
through combining the negative function of preventive or punitive nature, and the
positive function of promoting peaceful relations among nations. Making decision on
these matters needed a positive vote of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council.
Shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, the essential condition of co-
operation among the Council's members was clearly not present, and relations
between them seemed to be based on mistrust and disagreement. Consequently, the
provisions of the Unied Nations Charter on peace and security, particularly in relation
to coercive measures, could not be fully applied. As a result of this failure, a new
institution has emerged as peace-keeping which was not envisaged in the UN Charter.
The analysis of the discussions made at the San Francisco Conference provides a
necessary background for the development of the role of the United Nations with
regard to international peace and security since its establishment.
The United Nations' own comprehensive definition of peace-keeping is as follows: "a
peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military
personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help2
maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These
operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation. While they
involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of
arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under
Article 42."1
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace defines peace-
keeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the
consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well."2
Peace-keeping is distinct from peacemaking and enforcement action. Peacemaking in
An Agenda for Peace has been defined as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement.
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the
Charter of the United Nations". 3 Regarding enforcement action, the Secretary-General
asserted "[o]ne of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to
empower the Organisation to take enforcement action against those responsible for
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression". 4 Furthermore, the
International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in Certain Expenses case
recognised peace-keeping operations as a non-enforcement measure which, not only
could be established by the Security Council, but also by the General Assembly. 5 This
opinion became a legal and supportive basis for developing peace-keeping and
observation operations.
I- The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Department of Public
Information, New York, 1990), pp. 4-5.
2- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy. Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 17 June 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, para. 20.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 Jan. 1995, A/50/60-
S/1995/1, para. 77.
5- Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. (1962), pp. 165-6.3
Thus, peace-keeping is neither UN involvement in an operational effort and military
action to terminate an armed conflict and to punish an aggressor, nor is it a peaceful
means to resolve a dispute. Observer forces are similarly not designed to defend a
territory or to end a dispute by negotiation. Peace-keeping and observer forces share
basic elements of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence.
Yet, there are differences between peace-keeping and observer forces. Observer
missions may be deployed before a cease-fire to consider the possibility of deploying
peace-keeping forces. They may be stationed on either side of the conflict and only
observe the cease-fire. Besides, observers are not usually large enough in numbers to
create a buffer zone between the belligerents, a function that has been performed in
some occasions by peace-keeping forces. In addition, while observers are not
equipped to perform activities such as guarding border areas or checking vehicles for
weapons, peace-keeping forces are often stationed as an interposition force between
the belligerents. Peace-keeping forces may be authorised to use force, not only for
self-defence, but also for performing their mandates.
During the life of the United Nations, peace-keeping and observing have been the
most concerted efforts by the Organisation in dealing with international peace and
security. The UN has increasingly deployed these forces with varying scope, duration
and degree of success. There has been 42 United Nations peace-keeping operations
since 1945, out of which 16 operations are currently operative. 6 The Security Council
has created 29 operations in the years between 1988 and 1996, compared to only 13
operations between 1945 and 1988.7 This demonstrates the enhanced role of the
United Nations peace-keeping in the recent years.
6- United Nations Department of Public Information, UN Homepage: http://www.un.org , under UN
News.4
By the demise of the Cold War and dramatic events that occurred since then, peace-
keeping forces have been deployed in intra-state conflicts, in most cases without the
consent of the parties concerned, behaved in a manner that was perceived to be partial,
and used force to protect humanitarian efforts. The cases of Bosnia and Somalia
exemplify such operations. An Agenda for Peace considers that "existing peace-
keeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and
therefore could not be combined with existing mandates requiring the consent of the
parties, impartiality and the non-use of force".8 However, as the practice of the UN
demonstrates, use of peace-keeping in the absence of the main principles would not be
successful, since the idea of peace-keeping flows from the legal, political and military
requirements which are distinct from peace-enforcement.
Since the concept of peace-keeping was not defined in the Charter, it is difficult to
give a clear constitutional definition for peace-keeping actions and make an absolute
distinction between observer missions and peace-keeping forces. Furtheremore,
peace-keeping forces may be involved also in actions relating to humanitarian
purposes. In practice, the United Nations has dealt with various crises having different
characteristics which necessitated special and ad hoc mandates to be given to the UN
forces. The appropriate approach to analysing the legal and practical aspects of these
missions seems to be the study of each case separately.
An occurrence since the end of the Cold War has been the use of Chapter VII in both
inter-state and intra-state conflicts by the Security Council. In fact, during the Cold
War period, use of the veto power by one of the permanent members could prevent
the Council's involvement in an internal conflict. In the post-Cold War era,
humanitarian crises and human rights violations have been recognised as a "threat to
the peace" requiring UN action. As a result of the broad interpretation of the concept
of "threat to the peace", the principle of domestic jurisdiction of states, the subject of
8- An Agenda for Peace, (1995), op. cit., para. 35.5
Article 2(7), has been applied narrowly. This necessitates a discussion on the
Council's determination of "threat to the peace" during and after the Cold War, and on
the principle of domestic jurisdiction of states.
In fact, the drafters of the Charter considered the domestic jurisdiction clause as one
of the principles of the Organisation. In this regard, An Agenda for Peace states that,
although the respect for states' fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to
any common international progress, the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty
has passed.9 However, the Secretary-General emphasised that "principles of the
Charter must be applied consistently, not selectively, for if the perception should be of
the latter, trust will wane and with it the moral authority which is the greatest and
most unique quality of that instrument".10
Another development of the role of the United Nations in respect of international
peace and security has been the states' authorisation for enforcement action in
response to aggression as in the case of Kuwait in 1990, or to restore democracy as in
the case of Haiti in 1994. During the Cold War era, in the case of Korea in 1950, the
Council recommended a group of willing states to undertake enforcement action. It is
important to analyse and compare the legal basis of these actions, and to respond to
this question whether they can be considered as enforcement actions under Article 42
in Chapter VII of the Charter or as an application of the traditional right of collective
self-defence.
Although an act of aggression in some cases received a rapid and effective response
by the United Nations, the extreme example being the case of Iraq-Kuwait, in some
other cases the United Nations played a reduced role in dealing with the conflicts, the
notable example being the case of Iraq-Iran war as the other extreme where the scope
9-An Agenda for Peace, (1992), op. cit„ para. 17.
10-A/471277, S/24111, 17 June 1992, p. 23.6
of the war and the use of prohibited weapons was a clear breach of international peace
and security. The matter merits a full analysis; at the least it is deemed necessary to
consider the facts of the conflicts and compare the nature of the United Nations
response in the cases of Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Kuwait wars as the two cases represent the
spectrum of the role of the UN in respect of international peace and security.
The purpose of this thesis is to study the role of the United Nations regarding
international peace and security of the Organisation through a legal and practical
analysis. It is intended to investigate the United Nations practice in conflict resolution,
consider the legal basis of its actions in respect of maintenance and restoration of
international peace and security, and evaluate the outcomes of its actions. This study
offers an assessment of the decisions and actions of the United Nations during and
after the Cold War era in the fundamental areas of international peace and security.
The provisions of the United Nations Charter will first be examined with reference to
the discussions of delegates at the San Francisco Conference, followed by an analysis
of some developments of the UN's role in relation to international peace and security
as the Organisation confronted with numerous threats to or breach of the peace. A
comparative and analytical study will be carried out on the cases dealt with by the
United Nations in maintaining or restoring international peace and security, discussing
both the establishment of peace-keeping/obsevation forces and authorisation of the
use of force. Althogh the provisions of the Charter on peaceful settlement of disputes
are considered together with other means of conflict management, peaceful settlement
of disputes is not the focus of the thesis. The present study is divided into eight main
chapters.
In the first Chapter, the constitutional basis of provisions for peace and security in the
UN Charter is analysed by examining the intentions of the drafters of the UN Charter
at the Dombarton Oaks and San Francisco Conference. The proposals and the points7
of view of delegations presented at the latter conference will be discussed as relate to
international peace and security. The role of the Security Council, the General
Assembly, the Secretary-General and regional arrangements in conflict management
by peaceful and forceful means will be investigated in the light of relevant articles in
the Charter.
In Chapter Two some main developments of the role of the United Nations relating to
international peace and security in the years after its establishment will be examined.
Chapter Two will discuss the emergence of the institution of peace-keeping with
consideration of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in  Certain
Expenses case regarding the legality of this institution. The legal basis of peace-
keeping will be investigated by reference to Chapters VI and VII of the Charter,
particularly Articles 40 to 42, followed by an examination of the basic principles of
peace-keeping. A discussion will be made on the enlargement of the concept of "threat
to the peace" with a comparative study of the Council's determinations during and
after the Cold War. The general nature of Article 2(7) will be studied and an
evaluation made of UN practice concerning domestic jurisdiction. The question of
reviewing Security Council's decisions on matters relating to international peace and
security will be examined. Finally, a discussion will be made on the development of
the role of the Secretary-General regarding conflict management during the life of the
Organisation.
Chapters Three and Four focus on the constitutional basis of UN peace-keeping and
observation operations. A distinction is initially made between the two types of
operations. The facts of the disputes are described in brief, their failure or success is
assessed, and the legal basis of the establishment of each operation is analysed. Both
chapters will conclude with a general discussion on the significant aspects of the
missions.8
Chapter Five will investigate the nature and the constitutional basis of humanitarian
forces in cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. This chapter will
discuss the legal basis of peace-keeping/peace-enforcing operations and establishment
of safe areas with reference to Security Council's resolutions. The authorisation of
regional organisations and individual states to use force to support humanitarian aid,
and the legality of arms embargo in the case of Bosnia will be discussed. Furthermore,
an evaluation is made of the outcome of mixed operations of peace-keeping and
peace-enforcement. The general conclusions drawn from these cases will finally be
presented.
In Chapter Six, the Iraq-Iran war of 1980 is analysed as an example of the reduced
role of the Security Council in restoring international peace and security. It examins
the facts of this dispute as the longest war in the history of the United Nations, and
investigates the UN response to this conflict, and refers to the unlawful acts
committed during the war. The constitutional basis of the UN peace-keeping operation
is described and considered as a successful mission. Finally, the results of inaction of
the Security Council and the role of the Secretary-General are discussed, and
comparison is made between the response of the United Nations to the Iraq-Iran war
and the Kuwait crisis.
In Chapter Seven, an analysis is carried out of the Kuwait crisis of 1990. The reason
that the conflicts of 1980 and 1990 in the Persian Gulf are examined separately is that
they are two extremes of the Council's approach toward aggression where two
distinctive courses of action were taken by the Security Council in attempting to
restore international peace and security. An analytical discussion is made of the legal
basis of UN economic sanctions and the authorisation of the enforcement action
against Iraq, with a comparative study of the Council's recommendation of use of
force in the case of Korea and authorisation of use of force in the case of Haiti. The
constitutional basis of peace-keeping operations in Iraq and Kuwait is then9
considered. Following an examination of the legality of the intervention by the United
Nations and individual states on the humanitarian grounds, the legality of no-fly zones
in Iraq by coalition is finally discussed.
Among the UN operations around the world, this study has deliberately ornmited
several cases because no important legal point arose in these cases with direct
relevance to the subject of this thesis, e.g. monitoring referenda" or human rights 12, or
where there existed a similarity between a number of cases, e.g. cease-fire
observationi3 or implementation of peace agreements.14
IL MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, SC Res. 690, 29 Apr.
1991; UNTAC, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, SC Res. 745,28 Feb. 1992.
12- ONUSAL, United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, SC Res. 693, 20 May 1991, for
monitoring the human rights situation in EL Salvador, promoting human rights in the country;
ONUMOZ, United Nations Operation in Mozambique, SC Res. 797, 16 Dec. 1992, with political,
military, electoral and humanitarian mandate.
13-UNOMIG, United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, SC Res. 858, 24 Aug. 1993, to verify
compliance with the cease-fire agreement and to investigate reports of cease-fire violations; ONUCA,
The United Nations Observer Group in Centeral America, SC Res. 644, 7 Nov. 1989, to verify
compliance with security commitments undertaken by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; UNAMIC, United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia, SC
Res. 717, 16 Oct.1991, to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the cease-fire.
14-UNOMIL, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, SC Res. 866, 22 Sep. 1993, to implement
the Cotonou Peace Agreement; UNMOT, United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, SC Res
968, 16 Dec. 1994, to assist the Joint Commission to minitor the implementation of the Agreement on a
Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Borderand within
the Country for the Duration of the Talks.CHAPTER ONE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF PROVISIONS FOR
PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE UN CHARTER
The main aim of the United Nations, as stated in its Charter, is to maintain
international peace and security.' In this chapter the constitutional basis of provisions
for peace and security in the Charter is examined by considering the negotiations from
1941 (the Atlantic Charter) until the signing of the Charter in San Francisco in 1945.
As the Second World War progressed, many states thought that a new world
organisation was necessary for preventing war and establishing peace. The Atlantic
Charter, of 14 August 1941, referred to the creation of a "wider and permanent system
of general security", which would "afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries" at the War's end.2
It was thought necessary to create an organisation which was more effective than the
League of Nations, though some writers believed that "the League's record in fact.
even in matters of peace and war, was not altogether bad"3, since it had resolved
several frontier and territorial disputes between states.
The primary purpose of the League of Nations, as its Covenant envisaged, was to
maintain international peace and security on the basis of law and justice. 4 To achieve
this purpose, the members of the League agreed to submit their disputes to peaceful
1-Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter.
2- Photographic reproduction of the text given in U.S. Department of State, Cooperative War Effort.
Executive Agreement Series 236, Publication 1732 (1942) p. 4.
3-E. Luard, A History of the United Nations, Vol. 1, (Macmillan, London, 1984), p. 3.
4-Preamble of the Covenant.11
procedures of settlement or adjustment. 5 The members undertook not to resort to war
in violation of the Covenant.6 If a member state resorted to war, it should ipso facto be
deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, and
the members were obliged to sever all trade or financial relations with that state. 7 The
Council had the right to recommend the use of force to protect the Covenant of the
League.8 Under the Covenant, both member states and the Council were obliged to
keep and make peace. While the League had no role to enforce peace and security, the
members of the League undertook definite legal obligations which, if observed or
enforced, would undoubtedly have prevented another great war.9
However, the League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War, essentially
because the concept of collective security was far weaker than the individual states'
desires to protect what they perceived as their national interests. m In fact, at the time
of the establishment of the League, the United States refused to join because it
believed that collective security was not in its best interests. 11 It is generally accepted
that the League failed partly because some of the big powers played no role. If a new
successor organisation was to succeed there would have to be a dominant place within
it for the great powers.12
THE DRAFTERS' INTENTIONS
The Four Power Plan, which was produced by US officials in August 1942, described
and analysed a system in which the primary responsibility for maintaining peace in
5-Article 12(1) of the Covenant.
6-The Preamble and Article 10 of the Covenant.
7-Article 16(1) of the Covenant.
8-Article 16(2) of the Covenant.
9- George A. Finch, "International Law in the United Nations Organisation", 1945-48  A. S. I. L.Proc.,
p. 30.
10- N. D. White, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,
(Manchester, 1990), p. 3.
11-EL
12-E. Luard, op. cit., pp. 18, 19.12
the post-War World would be placed upon the United States, the Soviet Union,
Britain and China. 13 This centrality of the great powers represented a recognition of
the fact that any new security system could not possibly function without the support,
much less against the will, of any of them. 14 Their unity was to be the key to the post-
war order and their co-operation the basis of any collective actions.15
In the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security (Moscow, 30 October 1943),
in paragraph 4, the necessity of establishing a general international organisation was
recognised, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states for
the maintenance of international peace and security.16
Subsequently, at Tehran, on 1 December 1943, the Big Three, in China's absence,
declared that the supreme responsibility would rest upon them and other states to
make peace which would command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the
peoples of the world and would banish the scourge and terror of war for many
generations."
These endeavours show an overwhelming desire to achieve peace and maintain
security by means of an international organisation. At the beginning of 1945 the big
powers began, as they had agreed at Moscow, to "draw up a more detailed and
comprehensive document" on the form of a post-war organisation. The British
representative believed that the United States should take the initiative in this process;
the Soviet Union did not object, and the United States finally took the initiative.18
13-L, 1
14- Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77, (Praeger Publishers,
USA, 1979), p31.
15_ Lth
16-The text is given in: U.S. Department of State, Toward the Peace Documents, Publication 2298
(1945), p. 6.
17- Foreign Relations to the US, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943,
(1961).
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The American proposal
During World War II, officials in the United States began to create a plan for the post-
war world. They had realised that at the end of the war the military power of the world
would be concentrated primarily in the hands of the leading victors and that ways
would have to be sought to prevent the enemy states from waging another war.I9
Anglo-American leaders, as the Allied countries' core, tried to attain this aim through
the framework of an international organisation. However, America was opposed to
participation in an international organisation with the characteristics of a world
government or a supranational federation of states. It believed that sovereign nation
states would have to remain the basis of any new organisation; and participation in an
international association of governments to keep the peace, if necessary by the use of
force, would involve neither the establishment of a supranational government nor the
"sacrifice" of national sovereignty.20 This principle is clear from the words of the
Moscow Declaration (October, 1943), which stipulated that the new organisation was
to be "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states". In
this respect, Kirk has written that "structurally, the new organisation was to be little
more than a mechanism through which the existing sovereign states would try to
coordinate their policies with respect to matters vital to world peace... [C]learly, an
organisation of this character would not be compatible with a powerful international
police force."2I
The Americans recognised that the new organisation had to be different from the
League of Nations in relation to peace and realised that, if the new organisation was to
succeed, the lessons of the League's failure had to be taken into consideration.
19-R. B. Russell, The United Nations and United States Security Policy, (Washington D. C., 1968), p.
51
20- R. B. Russell assisted by J. E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter, (Washington,
Brookings Institutions, 1958), P. 207.
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The main assumption for keeping international peace was that the concerted efforts of
major powers was necessary to control the military power of the world. The
Americans suggested that the first responsibility of maintaining peace and security
should be vested in the Security Council which would have in this respect a
mandatory role to enforce military measures. All the permanent members of the
Security Council would have to agree to apply the military measures.
It was assumed that one of the reasons for the League's failure was that it had no
effective mechanism for enforcing peace. The Covenant emphasised procedures for
the peaceful settlement of disputes. America, in its plans for the new organisation,
favoured structuring world security on the basis of the same general type of institution
as the League of Nations, but endowed with more power to maintain the peace.
Department of State officials generally thought in terms of a single global
organisation that would combine the negative function of preventing or punishing
aggression with the positive function of promoting conditions conducive to peaceful
relations among nations.22
Finally, in 1942 under the title of "The Four-Power Plan", the British Foreign Office
suggested that the "supreme direction" of a post-war organisation come from a council
composed of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China.23
Therefore, the privileged position of the victorious powers became part of the plan for
keeping peace through the new organisation.
Although the Americans tried to create new procedures for maintaining peace and
security, the system of enforcement measures which they proposed had an inherent
22-Mid, p. 206.
23-W. Churchill, "The Hinge of Fate", p. 561, in Russell and Muther, op. cit., p. 103.15
weakness in that it would need a positive vote of the permanent states and
enforcement measures would not be immediately available.
The Dumbarton Oaks discussions
At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on 21 August 1945, discussions began between
Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the United States on the US proposal. In the
course of these discussions it was agreed that the proposed organisation should not be
exclusively limited in its functions to the maintenance of international peace and
security.24
Also discussed was the role of the major and lesser powers in the proposed
organisation. All four governments had no difficulty in agreeing that they themselves
should enjoy the privilege of permanent membership of the Counci1.25 This special
position was given effect in the right of each power to veto Council decisions, as
subsequently agreed at the Yalta Conference.
An important issue was the right of veto for one of the so-called big powers being
involved in a dispute or having committed a breach of the peace and security. Britain
proposed that a party to the dispute should, as in the League, be unable to vote and
therefore unable to veto.26 The United States proposed a compromise under which.
even in such cases, the veto could be used to prevent enforcement action being taken
against the permanent member concerned. The Soviet Union had another proposal:
that a great power should be able to prevent any action by the Council, even including
24-L. M. Goodrich, The United Nations, (Stevens & Sons, London, 1960), p. 23. Goodrich has written
that it had been the original Soviet position that the organisation should be exclusively devoted to that
task.
25-E. Luard, op. cit., p. 29.
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measures of peaceful settlement. 27 The big three could not reach any decision so this
point remained unresolved.28
It has been argued that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, representing the views of the
Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China,
did not sufficiently take into account the interests and possible contributions of the
small nations and went too far in institutionalising the dominant power position of the
four nations.29
The draft constitution of a new international organisation prepared by the big powers
was put forward for negotiation by other states and for their approva1.30 There were
several problems which had remained unresolved; and the draft was only a
preliminary proposal and would then need amending.
The San Francisco Conference
The San Francisco Conference convened on 25 April 1945 with representatives from
the Sponsoring and invited governments. The invitation contained a suggestion that
the Conference would consider the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as affording a basis for
the proposed charter. The Conference organised itself into a number of commissions
and committees.31 Each country submitted proposals for preparing a charter which
27-id
28-At Yalta Conference (February 1945) it was argued by U.S. and British that if a great power could
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would oblige all the countries to prevent war and to provide grounds for economic and
social improvements. In the next sections the legal framework of provisions for peace
in the Charter will be discussed with reference to the representatives' arguments.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROVISIONS FOR PEACE IN THE CHARTER
The basic aspiration of the participants at the San Francisco Conference for the
maintenance of international peace and security is expressed in the Preamble of the
United Nations Charter, and in the basic Principles and Purposes set forth in Article 1.
The Charter called for (Article 1(1)) effective collective measures and peaceful means
to be used for preventing and removing threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and for adjustment or settlement of
international disputes. The collective measures are specified in Articles 41 and 42 of
the Charter.
Relevant to the discussions on provisions for peace in the Charter, there are some
notions argued at the San Francisco Conference which should be explained here.
These are the concepts of "peace, security and justice" disputed in relation to Article
1(1); and, "internal and international peace" in connection with Article 2(7). The
means to achieve and maintain peace and security through the provisions of the
Charter will then be analysed with reference to the discussions.
Peace, security, justice
The League's Covenant in its Preamble had provided that peace and security were to
be promoted "by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as
III on Security Council including Committee 1 on Structure and Procedures, Committee 2 on Peaceful
Settlement, Committee 3 on Enforcement Arrangements, Committee 4 on Regional Arrangements;
Commission IV on Judicial Organization including Committee 1 on International Court of Justice,
Committee 2 on Legal Problems. LaKM, Vol. I, pp. 10-12.18
the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and
a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with
one another."32
The conformity of the Security Council's action with international law and justice was
the subject of significant debate in the travaux preparatoires of the Charter. The
discussions were focused on whether and where to refer to the principles of justice
and international law. The first draft of Article 1(1) made no reference to international
law and justice, and was as follows: "To maintain international peace and security;
and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international
disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace."33
At the San Francisco Conference (Committee 1/II and Commission 1) there were
suggestions on adding the phrases "the principles of justice and international law",
since the delegates were anxious about the dangers of a repetition of the so-called
"appeasement policy", i.e. less powerful states should not be forced to act in favour of
the powerful in the name of peace.34 Two kind of suggestions were made by
delegates. First, a suggestion on the first part of the draft to read "... to maintain
international peace, security and justice", 35 and second, a suggestion on the same part
to read "... to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the
principles of justice and international law".36
Those countries which insisted on the addition of "justice and law" after "peace and
security" believed that a guarantee of justice must exist as an assurance of peace.
32-Preamble of the Leagues Covenant.
33-LTNCIO, Vol. 3, Doc. 1, G/1, p.2.
34-UNCIO, Vol. 6, Doc. 1006, P. 27.
35-UNCIO, Vol. 3, Doc. 2, G/7(a)(1), p. 34.
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because real peace and security would not be achieved with the sacrifice of justice.37
They argued that, although these phrases, namely peace, security, justice and
international law, might make the burden on the organisation heavier, it would not be
much as compared with the sacrifices which all countries suffered and all would be
ready to suffer for the sake of maintaining peace and security in the world.38
Several states (including the Sponsoring Governments) argued for maintaining the
original text and were opposed to the change. These delegations agreed that the
concept of justice was a norm of fundamental importance, and all affirmed that real
peace could not be based on anything other than justice. But they held that "justice"
was "...a notion which lacks in clarity" while "peace and security" was a "more clear
and almost tangible notion".39 They further argued that this would tie the hands of the
Security Council, and the concept of justice and international law would find a more
appropriate place in context of the last part of paragraph 1(1).40
Finally, the proposal of adding "justice" to "peace and security" was put forward and
delegates voted 19-12 in favour of the proposal, but it was not adopted since it lacked
the necessary two-thirds majority.4' The proposal to change the first part of the draft
to read "to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles
of justice and international law" also received a majority of votes but not the two-
thirds necessary for adoption.42
At the end, the phrase "in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law" was inserted at the end of the paragraph. The delegate of Panama stated that
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the suppression of aggression and the settlement of international controversies. He felt
that inserting the phrase "in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law" in the second part of paragraph applied only to the settlement of international
conflicts and not to the other parts of the paragraph.43
Internal and international peace
As stated in paragraph 1 of Article 1, the peace to be maintained is "international"
peace, not "internal" peace. Article 2(7) provides that "nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State ... but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII". Under Chapter
VII of the Charter, the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and may adopt measures to maintain
or restore peace.
The League's Covenant in Article 15(8) had laid down that international law would
have to be the criterion for testing whether a situation or dispute arose out of a matter
would be within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. If the dispute arose out of a
matter which by international law was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one
party, the Council should make no recommendation as to its settlement."4
Comparing Article 15(8) of the Covenant and Article 2(7) of the Charter, it is
understood that "international law" as an objective criterion to delimiting the
international sphere of domestic jurisdiction was abandoned. It seems that the drafters
of the UN Charter intended that questions of domestic jurisdiction no longer be
considered with reference to international law. Another conclusion might be that the
43-Ibid, Doc. 926, p. 422.
44-Article 15(8) of the Covenant.21
drafters of the Charter had deemed that, since the Charter is an international treaty and
international treaties are considered by the norms of international law, therefore
Article 2(7) and the principle of non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction should be
considered by international legal rules.
The United States delegation, John Foster Dulles on behalf of the sponsoring
governments said that international law "was subject to constant change" and it would
"be difficult to define whether or not a given situation came within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state".45 The US delegation added in his report that "the body of
international law on this subject is indefinite and inadequate" and that "to the extent
that the matter is dealt with by international practice and textbook writers, the
conceptions are antiquated and not of a character which ought to be frozen in the new
organisation" 46
This opinion was faced with considerable opposition particularly on the part of the
delegations of the smaller countries who believed that the proposal of the great
powers would mean a step backwards from the wording of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.'" The delegates of Uruguay and of Belgium took a leading part in
these debates.48
Furthermore, there is no article in the Charter to provide which organ or authority had
to determine, according to international legal rules, whether a situation or dispute was
outside the international jurisdiction of the organisation. It is believed that "[i]n
practice...[e]ach organ has interpreted the paragraph [7 of Article 2] as it is applicable
to its particular functions, and, except when the organ has the authority to take a
45-UNCIO, Vol. 6, Doc. 1019, p. 508.
46-Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the result of the San Francisco
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binding decision (as in the case of the exercise by the Court of its contentious
jurisdiction), members have not necessarily considered themselves bound by such
interpretations."49
At the San Francisco Conference, the word "solely" in Article 15(8) of the Covenant
was replaced with the word "essentially". 50 The inclusion of the term "essentially" in
Article 2(7) was the result of the intention the drafters had to broaden the scope of
domestic jurisdiction, and to limit the scope of UN activities.
The Australian representative to the San Francisco Conference, Evatt, stated that "the
field of matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction is wider than
matters 'solely' within the domestic jurisdiction ... And this forbids the Organisation to
intervene in a larger number of matters than would be permissible if we altered the
word to matters 'solely' within the domestic jurisdiction ... In other words the very
persons, the very countries, which are so jealous about intervention in domestic
jurisdiction are, I submit, placed in a position which is at once stronger and more in
keeping with modern development if this amendment of the sponsoring powers is
admitted ... Broaden the field, [of] matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
and the field of the international organisation is correspondingly contracted, and I
think that is right."51
He further implied that there are matters which, although regulated by international
law, would still remain "essentially" within the reserved domain. 52 He stated that
"matters solely within domestic jurisdiction were constantly contracting. For example.
international agreements to promote full employment would have been unheard of a
few years ago and even now, although this matter remained within domestic
49-L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and
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jurisdiction. It was, however, 'essentially within domestic jurisdiction and that was a
better criterion to apply".53
It seems that the drafters of the Charter were determined to establish a formula to
ensure that certain matters would fall "essentially" within the domestic sphere, even
though there is a relevant international legal obligation. However, both terms
"essentially" and "solely" are vague, and Article 2(7) does not contain a clear standard
to determine what matter falls under domestic jurisdiction of states. Even a review of
the discussions at the San Francisco Conference does not lead to a clear understanding
of what the drafters intended in Article 2(7).
At the San Francisco Conference, the Sponsoring Governments proposed a substantial
revision of the text of the domestic jurisdiction limitation and its transfer from the
section on "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" to the chapter on "Principles" with the
result that it would become a governing principle for the Organisation and its
members.54 This proposal was accepted but it was not intended to weaken the
effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining or restoring international peace and
security.55 Therefore, a new proposal was agreed on which provided "this principle
shall not prejudice the application of Chapter VIII, Section  B".56
At the Conference several countries submitted amendments that the International
Court of Justice should be the organ to make the decision on domestic jurisdiction of a
state. The Belgian delegate proposed that any state, party to a dispute brought before
the Security Council, should have the right to ask the Court whether a
recommendation or a decision made by the Council or proposed in it infringed its
essential rights. If the Court considered that such rights had been disregarded or
53_
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threatened, it would be for the Council either to reconsider the question or to refer the
dispute to the Assembly for decision. 57 The Belgian delegate stated the reason for
submitting this proposal: "[n]ext to political security, comes juridical or legal security.
Several delegations have expressed concern lest influence or political pressure might
induce the Security Council to impose on a state modifications of essential rights
which are derived, in the case of that state, from the general rules of international law
or from treaties." 58 However, this amendment was opposed by the Sponsoring
Governments and ultimately defeated.
It should be noted that the only basis for the Security Council's intervention in
domestic affairs of states would be a clear violation of the international legal rules
constituting a threat to the international peace.
Peaceful settlement of disputes
At the San Francisco Conference five graduated steps were outlined whereby the
Security Council could preserve the peace:59
- making a decision that there is a threat to peace;
- instructing the disputants to settle their differences by pacific means;
- recommending to the disputants the most appropriate ways of settling their
differences;
- diplomatic and economic enforcement measures;
- use of armed force.
Article 12 of the League's Covenant provided that disputes would be submitted to
arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council. Chapter VI of the
United Nations Charter on the pacific settlement of disputes arose out of Chapter VIII
57- UNCIO, Vol. 3, Doc. 2, p. 336.
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section A of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Charter contains an obligation
imposed upon members to settle, by peaceful means, their disputes "the continuance
of which" are "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security" .6° Article 33(1) provides a number of methods for settlement of disputes
such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration and resort to regional arrangements.
Articles 1(1) and 2(3) also contain the principle of pacific settlement of disputes.
The Security Council
The Security Council has been conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security.6I In discharging its duties, the Security Council
should act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, and
with the specific powers granted to it by Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the
Charter.62
The role of the Security Council in the peaceful settlement of disputes is not
mandatory. Although Article 33(2) states that the Security Council shall, where it is
deemed necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes, the wording does not
purport to impose a mandatory obligation on the Council to enforce the provisions of
Article 33(1). The Council's role under Article 33 is one of supervision of the
obligation to settle placed on members.63
The Security Council may investigate "any dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
60-Article 33(1) of the Charter.
61-Article 24(1) of the Charter.
62-Article 24(2) of the Charter.
63-White, op. cit„ p. 62.26
international peace and security" .64 But the Council may recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment.65
At the San Francisco Conference an amendment was suggested by the Turkish
delegate to ensure that the Security Council would not intervene in a case which was
being heard by the International Court of Justice. If the dispute developed into a threat
to the peace during proceedings before the Court, then the Council might intervene
but otherwise it should be clear that there would be no interference with judicial
proceedings.66 The delegate of the United States expressed the view that, if a dispute
was being satisfactorily handled by the Court and there was no threat to the peace,
then there should be no interference by the Council.°
In respect to Article 37(2) there was a suggestion for ensuring that the Security
Council implements its duties relating to peace and security. The Belgian delegate
suggested that the International Court of Justice could be asked by a state party to a
dispute, on whether a recommendation or a decision made by the Council or proposed
in it infringed on its essential rights. In the case of the Court considering these rights
to have been disregarded or threatened, the Council would either reconsider the
question or refer the dispute to the Assembly for decision.68
As mentioned earlier, the Belgian amendment met opposition from the Sponsoring
Governments, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
The US delegate asserted that the Council was already required by the terms of the
Charter to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organisation, and
referred to the Council's obligation to act in accordance with principles of
64- Article 34 of the Charter.
65-Article 36 of the Charter.
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international law.69 France recommended that there should be an endeavour to give
the most complete guarantees possible that the Security Council accomplish its task
according to law and justice); this amendment was ultimately defeated.71
The General Assembly
There was a desire at the San Francisco Conference to increase the competence of the
General Assembly in connection with the procedure of pacific settlement.72
According to the Charter, any dispute or situation may be brought before either the
Security Council or the General Assembly.73 The General Assembly may discuss any
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, but if action
is required, the Assembly must refer the matter to the Security Counci1.74
Referring to Article 11(2) of the Charter, the General Assembly might find a "threat to
the peace", a "breach of the peace" or an "act of aggression", and to make
recommendations to restore international peace. However, the mandatory decision on
international peace and security is rested in the Security Council. Furthermore, while
the Security Council is in the process of exercising, in respect of any dispute or
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The Secretary-General
Other than these two main United Nations organs, a political function is envisaged for
the Secretary-General in the Charter. The Secretary-General has the right to draw the
attention of the Security Council to any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.75 "This authority contains the three
elements of right, responsibility and discretion".76 It follows from the consideration of
Article 6 of the League's Covenant and Articles 97 to 101 of the UN Charter that the
drafters of the UN Charter gave the Secretary-General a larger political role. "Sir Eric
Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League, is said to have remarked that if
Article 99 of the Charter had been at his disposal, the position of his office and, by
implication, the influence of the League on events would have developed
differently"77
Although the authorities of the Secretary-General have been expanded in the Charter,
they are general and not detailed. It is upon his initiatives and policies to use his
powers for settlement of disputes. However, the role of the Secretary-General for
independent initiative is ambiguous. In fact, he can exercise his good offices through
conciliation and mediation. The Secretary-General may initiate and direct a fact-
finding operation and he has to obtain the consent of the states in question to engage
in fact-finding. Because of the necessity of the parties' consent, his initiative may fall
under Chapter VI. The potential of the Secretary-General's role "can be used
effectively only on the basis of interaction with other principal organs of the United
Nations, especially the Security Council and the General Assembly, and under the
condition of full support by states."78
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Regional arrangements
Regional arrangements or agencies can deal with matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security. The Charter emphasises that the Members of the
United Nations entering into such arrangements shall make every effort to achieve
pacific settlement of local disputes through such arrangements or agencies before
referring them to the Security Council:79
If one of the parties to a local dispute is interested in bringing the dispute to the
United Nations, the Security Council will put the matter in its agenda. However, if the
dispute has not yet endangered international peace and security, the Council may
decide, under Article 52, to refer the dispute to the regional forum, but keep the matter
in its agenda to resume its consideration if the regional attempt has failed.89
As mentioned earlier, Chapter VI of the Charter in general terms refers to the means
for pacific settlement of disputes without a mandatory role for the United Nations
organs. Indeed the main condition for member states to settle their disputes is their
commitment to use peaceful means. If states failed, the Security Council can intervene
with its recommendatory role. The General Assembly may discuss any question
referred to it, but if action is required the Assembly must refer the matter to the
Security Council. In Kelsen's opinion, it is the Security Council, not the General
Assembly, which will be empowered to recommend appropriate procedures or
methods for the adjustment of the disputes; it is the Security Council, not the General
Assembly, which will be empowered "to take any measures necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security," should this body deem that a failure
to settle a dispute in accordance with the Charter constitutes a threat to the
79-Article 52, para. 2.
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maintenance of international peace and security." In fact, the Security Council has
supremacy over matters coming within Chapter VI.
Enforcement measures with regard to peace
The most important initiative in the Charter of the United Nations relating to
international peace and security is the provision of enforcement measures in Chapter
VII. These include measures involving the use of armed force and measures not
involving the use of armed force. "Effective collective measures" have generally been
provided for in Article 1(1) "for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace".
Collective measures would be applied only by the Security Council. The General
Assembly and the Secretary-General have not been given authority for such measures.
Regional arrangements or agencies cannot take enforcement action without the
consent of the United Nations given through the Security Counci1. 82 At San Francisco
it was found necessary to enable regional arrangements or agencies to take initial
action. One proposal was to make the veto power in the Security Council inapplicable
to regional enforcement measures. 83 However, this proposal was not adopted. Instead,
it was decided to incorporate in the Charter a recognition of the right of collective
self-defence. The reason was that "the requirement of Security Council authorisation
made it possible for a permanent member to prevent any action from being taken by
the Council, this might lead to a situation in which a state would be deprived of any
protection against an attack directed or supported by a permanent member."84 The
Charter provided that enforcement actions would continue until the Security Council
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has taken measures.85 Therefore the authorisation by the Charter or the Security
Council does not mean that the United Nations would lose its control over
enforcement actions taken by regional arrangements.
These actions by regional agencies or arrangements of their own volition must still
conform to the principle stated in Article 2(4). If the United Nations should consider
that such actions constituted a threat or breach of international peace and security, "it
could decide accordingly and proceed to take such action as seemed to be called for,
acting in accordance with its general powers for the maintenance of international
peace and security" .86
Regarding enforcement measures in the League system, it should be said that Article
16(1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations obliged the members, in the event of a
member-state's resort to war, to sever immediately all trade and financial relations
and to prohibit all commercial intercourse between the respective nationals, whether a
member of the League or not. The Council could under Article 16(2) recommend
military measures after having determined the existence of a breach of the Covenant.
The automatic reaction on the part of the members under Article 16(1) seems to result
from the provision that an illegal resort to war should ipso facto be deemed to be an
act of aggression against the members.
The United Nations Charter has not provided automatic action against an aggressor
state and the decision of the Security Council is essential. Nonetheless, Kelsen has
argued that "as a sanction, such reaction can take place only after the violation of the
law has been ascertained by an authority determined by the law".87 He thus believed
85-Article 51 of the Charter.
86-J. W. Halderman, "Regional Enforcement Measures and the United Nations", 52, Geo, L. J., (1963),
p. 110.
87-H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, ( Stevens & Sons, London, 1950), p. 726.32
that there is no difference between the Covenant and the Charter as to the automatic
character of the sanction.
However, the critical difference between the two international organisations in
enforcement actions is the recommendatory role of the League's Council and the
central and decisive role of the UN Security Council.
Determination of act of aggression, breach of or threat to the peace
According to Article 39 of the Charter, only the Security Council is authorised to
determine the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression. This provision is strengthened by Article 25 by which members of the
Organisation are bound to accept the decisions of the Security Council, whereas the
members of the League were free to accept the Council's recommendation on the
contributions to military measures. In other words, the League's system was nearly
decentralised, whereas the United Nations system is completely centralised.88
Some writers believe that both centralised and decentralised systems are envisaged in
the Charter. In other words, collective security, under Articles 39 and 42 are
"centralised actions of the organisation, whereas the process of collective self-defence
(under Article 51) is a completely decentralised one". 89 Indeed, the question of
whether or not an act of aggression exists is to be decided in the case of a collective
security by a central organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, whereas in the
case of collective self-defence, so long as the Security Council does not intervene, the
question is to be decided by the individual states concerned."
88-H. Kelsen, The Old and the New League, op. cit., p. 74.
89- H. Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self Defence Under the Charter of the United
Nations", (1948), 42 A. J. I. L., p.794.
90-K. P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security, (D. K. Publishing House, Delhi, 1974)
p.4.33
The Security Council has been given the power to determine the existence of any
"threat to the peace", "breach of the peace", or "act of aggression" to make decisions
regarding the measures to be taken in such cases (Article 39). The expressions
mentioned in Article 39 have been left undefined and the determination of the Council
must depend upon any meaning which may be attributed to it. It is not clear what are
the differences and relations between "threat to the peace" in Article 1(1), "threat or
use of force" in Article 2(4), and "breach of the peace" and "act of aggression" in
Article 39. It seems, however, that in the drafters' opinion an "act of aggression" is
other than a "breach of the peace". Logically, where "use of force" or "act of
aggression" has taken place, a "breach of the peace" has also occurred.
At the San Francisco Conference it was strongly desired to incorporate a definition of
aggression in the Charter.9i Since some of the smaller states were fearful that the great
powers would under certain conditions close their eyes to aggressive action as a way
of avoiding the obligation to take enforcement measures, they listed circumstances in
which the Security Council should automatically and without delay take action.92
The opposition states argued that it would be impossible to enumerate all the acts that
constitute aggression. It was further argued that progress in the techniques of warfare
made a definition difficult, if not impossible. Such arguments, combined with the firm
stand taken by the Sponsoring Governments, led Committee 111/3 and the Conference
91- The phrase "aggression" was included in the Charter as the result of a Soviet proposal at the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The United States considered that the term "breach of the peace" was
broad enough to cover the "aggression". Both the United States and the United Kingdom accepted the
Soviet proposal, although at the time the United Kingdom argued against any attempt to define the
term. Russell and Muther, op. cit., pp. 464-5.
92-The argument was that "It should be known beforehand what acts would constitute aggression and,
consequently, what acts would be subject to sanctions, the Council's work would be facilitated if a
definite list were written in the Charter... The list was not intended as a definitive one nor as one which
would prohibit the Council from acting in other cases...The organization must bind itself to oppose
lawless force by lawful forces in certain cases where action should be obligatory... If one vote on the
Security Council could prevent action, then it would be essential to have a list of circumstances when
Council action would be automatic." UNCIO, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, p. 505.34
to decide that no definition of aggression should be attempted other than that found in
Article 2(4).93
At the San Francisco Conference some delegates proposed that the action of the
Security Council should be supplemented by participation of the General Assembly in
decisions related to enforcement measures.94 There was also a suggestion for a fixed
period of time for action by the Council; if no action was taken within that period,
then the Assembly would be free to act.95 However, none of these proposals was
accepted.
One of the weaknesses of Article 39 was, as argued, the inadequate position of the
small powers in the Security Council. It seemed rather impossible for smaller nations
to contribute to peace-enforcement operations without having a voice in the decision
making process. The Sponsoring Governments insisted that the Council's powers
should not be impaired by requesting a "voice" for the smaller nations. A "voice"
would be heard only in fighting a war not in keeping the peace.96
The Canadian delegate suggested a middle point which provided for the participation
of members of the General Assembly on decisions made in the Security Council
which gravely affected them.97 France and the Soviet Union agreed to find a formula
satisfying both views.98 The amendment was referred to the Subcommittee. It was
accepted and a new paragraph (Article 44) was recommended and then ratified.
Article 44 provides: "when the Security Council has decided to use force it shall,
before calling upon a member not represented on it to provide armed forces in
fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the
93-UNCIO, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, p. 505.
94-Ibid, p. 503.
95-Iranian amendment, ibid, Doc. 320, p. 316.
96-Ibid, Doc. 231, p.296.
97-bid, p. 303.
98-[bid, Doc. 355, p. 327.35
Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning
the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces". However, this article
does not recognise a right of participation in decision making on the side of that
member. It does not refer to the role of smaller powers in making decisions for
military actions and is merely about the employment of contingents. No change was
therefore made in Article 39.
According to Article 39, when the Security Council determines the existence of threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, it shall make recommendations
or decide on the measures to be taken. There is a question whether the Council can
make recommendations on enforcement measures.
In this respect and following the request of Belgian delegate, Committee III voted
unanimously on the following interpretation: "[i]n using the word 'recommendations'
in Section B (corresponding to Chapter VII of the Charter), as already found in
paragraph 5, Section A (corresponding to Chapter VI of the Charter), the Committee
has intended to show that the action of the Council so far as it relates to the peaceful
settlement of a dispute or to situations giving rise to a threat of war, a breach of the
peace or aggression, should be considered as governed by the provisions contained in
Section A. Under such an hypothesis, the Council would in reality pursue
simultaneously two distinct actions, one having for its object the settlement of the
dispute or the difficulty, and the other the enforcement or provisional measures, each
of which is governed by an appropriate section in Chapter VIII."99
It can be concluded that "recommendations" in Article 39, as the drafters of the UN
Charter had in mind, were understood to refer to Chapter VI provisions to call for
peaceful settlement of disputes, and the Security Council should decide, not
recommend, the enforcement measures.
99- Ibid, Doc. 881, p. 507.36
Provisional measures
Although the Covenant of the League had not expressly referred to provisional
measures, it had envisaged that in the event of "[a]ny war or threat of war, whether
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not ... the League shall
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of
nations.
It seems that the drafters of the Covenant tried to empower the League to take
effectual action to prevent conflicts developing into large scale real conflicts.
However, the League of Nations failed to take such actions to safeguard the
international peace.
In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was no reference to provisional measures;
China proposed it within the framework of Chapter VII which was accepted by the
United Kingdom, the USA and the USSR. 1°1 However, during the discussions at San
Francisco Conference, there was an opinion that, by applying provisional measures.
there would be a very great latitude left to the Council and it should retard its action or
diminish its effectiveness.IO2
Committee III approved the following observations in the report of the Rapporteur
Paul-Boncor, "[it is the Committee's view that the power given to the Council under
paragraphs 1 and 2 (corresponding to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter) not to resort
to the measures contemplated in paragraphs 3 and 4 (corresponding to Articles 41 and
42 of the Charter) or to resort to them only after having sought to maintain or restore
peace by inviting the parties to consent to certain conservatory measures, refers above
100_ Article 11(1) of the Covenant.
IOU UNCIO, Vol. 3, Doc. 2 0/29, pp. 625-6.
102- Ibid, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, p. 507.
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all to the presumption of a threat of war. The Committee is unanimous in the belief
that, on the contrary, in the case of flagrant aggression imperilling the existence of a
member of the Organisation, enforcement measures should be taken without delay,
and to the full extent required by circumstances, except that the Council should at the
same time endeavor to persuade the aggressor to abandon its venture by the means
contemplated in Section A (corresponding to Chapter VI of the Charter) and by
prescribing conservatory measures".103
From these observations, it would appear that, although drafters of the Charter
inserted provisional measures as an optional action before the application of
enforcement measures, at the same time leaving no question as to the duty of the
Council to take necessary enforcement measures when faced with a flagrant act of
aggression.
Physical means of coercion
As mentioned earlier, the intention of the planners of the United Nations was to give
the power to the Security Council to maintain the peace of the world through the use
of international force. This idea came from a general feeling that the failure of the
League of Nations in keeping peace was due to the absence of the physical means of
coercion. All four governments at Dumbarton Oaks favoured the basic principle of
making contingents of national armed forces available to the Security Council for
enforcement purposes.104
The reason for including the provisions of collective measures was to bring sufficient
pressure upon an aggressor state to comply with its international commitments.
Failure of the pacific settlement of disputes and provisional measures used by the
103_ id
104- Russell and Muther, op. cit., p. 467.38
Council for warning the parties concerned would result in the Security Council taking
various courses of action provided in Articles 41 and 42. However, before taking any
action, the Security Council should determine, according to Article 39, the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
If non-military enforcement measures provided for in Article 41 proved to be
inadequate, the Security Council might take military enforcement measures. However,
the Council would not need to wait for such proof. At the San Francisco Conference,
it was agreed that "in the case of flagrant aggression imperilling the existence of a
member of the Organisation, enforcement measures should be taken without delay,
and to the full extent required by the circumstances, except that the Council should at
the same time endeavour to persuade the aggressor to abandon its venture, by the
means contemplated in section A and by prescribing conservatory measures."105
The armed forces supplied to the Security Council are not different or independent
from the members' armed forces (as it had been provided in the League of Nations).
At the time of drafting the Charter there were three ideas for supplying the Security
Council with military forces: a permanent international force over national armies, an
ad hoc coalition of national forces acting under some form of overall international
direction, and national contingents. 106 The last option was accepted at the Dumbarton
Oaks and subsequently in the San Francisco Conference. In fact, all members of the
United Nations have undertaken to make available to the Security Council with
special agreement, armed forces, assistant and facilities for maintaining international
peace and security.107
There was an amendment to the costs of enforcement action. It was suggested that it
would be required to add a sentence in the Charter to oblige aggressor nations to pay
105-UNCIO, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, p. 507.
106-Russell and Muther, op. cit„ p. 235.
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the costs of enforcement action taken against them since this would be an additional
deterrent to aggression. The amendment was defeated because the Sponsoring
Governments believed that this amendment would be a further obstacle to the
satisfactory operation of the enforcement machinery of the Security Council.108
A desire was expressed that the Organisation should seek to promote a system aiming
at the fairest possible distribution of expenses incurred as a result of enforcement
action.109 Under Article 17(2) of the Charter the cost of the operations is to be
provided by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
CONCLUSION
After the abortive attempt of the League of Nations to keep international peace and
security, it was the overwhelming desire to establish a world organisation with
effective powers. It was expected that the new organisation would create efficient
rules for maintaining and restoring the peace.
At the San Francisco Conference participating delegates made enormous endeavours
to amend provisions relating to international peace and security. They sought to
minimise the differentiation between the Security Council and the General Assembly,
and remove the control of the Security Council over regional fora. The delegates were
anxious that the Security Council would be paralysed in maintaining peace because of
the veto power, and therefore, sought a reliable alternative for occasions where the
veto power is exercised. However, the original proposal prepared at the Dumbarton
Oaks Conference was adopted without fundamental changes.
los- UNCIO, Vol. 12, Doc. 649, p. 391.
109- Mid, Doc. 881, p. 513.40
In the present system, the Security Council has supremacy over other organs of the
United Nations on the matters coming within Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and
bears primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. At the San Francisco
Conference, Chapter VI received lengthy arguments where the role of the Security
Council was concerned, though, Chapter VII was not substantially questioned by the
delegates.
The main aim of the United Nations was described as maintaining international peace
and security. The peace to be maintained was international peace not internal peace
except incidentally and on account of international implications; and importantly, the
peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law".
The economic and military punitive techniques of the new Charter for handling
disputes which have deteriorated into armed conflict was the most important
difference to the old Covenant. The Security Council has been recognised as a central
organ of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security. To this
end, collective interests are to be considered over national interest.
Several methods have been provided in the Charter to bring about peace and security
when they are deemed to have been endangered. The Security Council may call upon
the parties to settle their differences, and may investigate any dispute or situation the
continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security. The
General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security, but if action is required, the Assembly should refer
the matter to the Security Counci1. 110 Other than these two main UN organs, a
political function is envisaged in the Charter for the Secretary-General. The Secretary-
General has the right to draw the attention of the Security Council to any matter which
110_ Article 11(2) of the Charter.41
in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
The Secretary-General may initiate and direct a fact-finding operation, and establish
good offices through conciliation and mediation. Regional arrangements or agencies
can also deal with matters relating to the international peace and security.112
If the parties to a dispute failed to use peaceful means in order to settle their
differences, the Security Council could use enforcement measures, including military
and non-military measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace. The armed
forces supplied to the Security Council for such measures are not different and
independent from the members' armed forces. The General Assembly and the
Secretary-General have not been given authority for enforcement measures. Regional
arrangement or agencies cannot take enforcement action without the consent of the
Security Council.
111. Article 99 of the Charter.
112- Article 52 of the Charter.CHAPTER TWO
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
In the previous chapter an analysis was made of the discussions on provisions for
peace and security during the drafting of the UN Charter. The present chapter will
analyse later developments concerning the role of the UN in respect of the
maintenance and restoration of international peace and security since the creation of
the Organisation.
One of the most important developments during the Cold War era was the emergence
of the institution of peace-keeping. The legal basis of UN peace-keeping will be
analysed with reference to the opinion of the World Court and Chapters VI and VII of
the UN Charter, followed by an examination of the basic principles of peace-keeping.
The concept of "threat to the peace" has been expanded in practice of the UN during
the post-Cold War era. A comparison will be made of the UN practice during and
after the Cold War period in determining the "danger" or "threat" to the peace. On the
other hand, the scope of Article 2(7) of the Charter regarding the limits of powers
delegated to the UN has reduced to a point that some issues that would have been
considered in the past as internal matters are now deemed international matters and
under the jurisdiction of the Organisation. The various aspects of Article 2(7) will be
discussed with reference to UN practice concerning domestic jurisdiction, and the
competent body to interpret this article will be investigated.43
Another view that has been developed in recent years is the view that a mechanism of
a judicial nature over the Security Council's decisions would be necessary. This issue
is of particular importance where decisions on matters relating to international peace
and security are concerned. The possibility of such a review will be discussed and
different ideas presented.
Finally, the development of the role of the Secretary-General since the establishment
of the UN will be discussed based on the provisions in the Charter, followed by a
discussion on Secretary General's independent initiatives in respect of international
peace and security.
EMERGENCE OF THE INSTITUTION OF PEACE-KEEPING
Within a few years of the establishment of the United Nations it became clear that,
because of the division between two Permanent Members of the Security Council, it
was not able to operate under Chapters VI and VII in the specific manner provided by
the Charter. Defensive measures taking place by each superpower and its supporters
put an obstacle in the way of the Organisation performing its tasks according to the
Charter. In fact, the system collapsed before being put to the test.
The main disagreement in the Security Council was on the enforcement measures by
the United Nations under Chapter VII, especially Article 43 which grants the Security
Council the power to acquire armed forces, assistance and facilities from member
states. As a result of this disagreement, the institution of "peace-keeping" emerged for
which member states voluntarily provide troops and equipment. Such an institution
had not been envisaged by the drafters of the Charter at the San Francisco Conference.44
The superpowers' views
The United States and the former Soviet Union had different views as to how a peace-
keeping force could be established. The Soviet Union argued that the Security
Council, as specified in Article 24 of the Charter, had the sole authority to decide on
all questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security,
including, by implication, the creation of peace-keeping forces.'
The United States challenged the Soviet argument by maintaining that Article 24 did
indeed give the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security", but that this was primary and not exclusive
authority.2
The interpretation of the International Court of Justice
Following the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by the
General Assembly in 1956 in the Middle East, and the establishment of ONUC
(known by its French initials) by the Security Council in 1960 in the Congo, a number
of questions arose with regard to the expenses of these forces. In fact, the expenses of
these two forces became very heavy and there were different opinions of how, legally
and politically, the financial obligations of peace-keeping forces should be met
On 20 December 1961 the General Assembly, by Resolution 1731(XVI), decided to
request the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question as to
whether certain expenditures authorised by the General Assembly to cover the costs of
1- A/5721, 10 Jul. 1964.
2- A/5739, 8 Oct. 1964.45
ONUC and UNEF constituted "expenses of the Organisation" within the meaning of
Article 17(2) of the Charter.3
Article 17(2) refers to the "expenses of the Organisation" without offering any
definition for such expenses.4 This article is the only article in the Charter which
refers to budgetary authority or to the power to apportion UN expenses.
The Court in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 made clear important issues to solve
the crisis. It observed that the expenses of the Organisation means all the expenses
and not just certain types of expenses which might be referred to as "regular
expenses".5 However, there was an argument before the Court that one type of
expenses, namely those resulting from operations for the maintenance of international
peace and security, are not "expenses of the Organisation" within the meaning of
Article 17(2), because they fall to be dealt with exclusively by the Security Council,
and more especially through agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter. 6 It
was also argued that since the General Assembly is limited to discuss, consider and
recommend, it cannot impose an obligation to pay the expenses that result from the
implementation of its recommendations.7
These arguments led the Court to consider the respective functions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council under the Charter. The Court made it clear that the
Security Council has "primary" but not exclusive competence under Article 24(1) to
maintain or restore international peace and security.8 To this end, the Security Council
is given a power to impose an explicit obligation on an aggressor under Chapter VII
3-GA Res. 1731(XVI), 20 Dec. 1961.
4- Article 17(2) says: "The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the members as apportioned
by the General Assembly."
5- Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. (1962), p. 161.
6-Ibid, p. 162.
7_ ist,
8- [bid, p. 163.46
and only the Council can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor.
However, according to the Charter, the General Assembly is also to be concerned with
international peace and security.9
The powers of the General Assembly
The Court referred to the measures to be recommended by the General Assembly
under Article 14 that these measures imply some kind of action and the only
limitation is a restriction in Article 12 that the Assembly should not recommend
measures while the Security Council is dealing with the same mafter unless the
Council requests it to do so. 10 Article 11(2) provides that questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security for which action is necessary shall be
referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly."
However, it is not clear that, if the General Assembly recommends to establish a
peace-keeping operation, this recommendation should be considered as an "action"
and referred to the Security Council. The International Court of Justice considered
that the kind of action referred to in Article 11(2) was coercive or enforcement
action. 12
9- Article 14 of the Charter has envisaged: "Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin,
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare of or friendly relations among nations, including
situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations."
1C1- Certain Expenses Case, op. cit„ p. 163.
IL - Article 11(2) of the Charter reads: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a State which is not a Member of the United Natiorzs in
accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make
recommendations with regard to any such questions to the States concerned or to the Security Council
or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by
the General Assembly either before or after discussion."
12- Certain Expenses Case, op. cit., pp. 164-5.47
Furthermore, the Court said that the word "action" must mean such action as was
solely within the province of the Security Council and could not refer to
recommendations which the Council might make, as for instance under Article 38,
because the General Assembly has a comparable power under Article 11(2). 13 The
"action" which was solely within the province of the Security Council, the Court
added, was that which was indicated by the title of Chapter VII of the Charter, namely
"action with respect to threats to the peace, breach of the peace and acts of
aggression".14 The Court concluded that the last sentence of Article 11(2) had no
application where the necessary action was not enforcement action.15
With respect to the function of the General Assembly, the Court stated that "[i]f the
word 'action' in Article 11, paragraph 2, were interpreted to mean that the General
Assembly could make recommendations only of a general character affecting peace
and security in the abstract, and not in relation to specific cases, the paragraph would
not have provided that the General Assembly may make recommendations on
questions brought before it by states or by the Security Council". 16 Consequently, the
General Assembly can establish a peace-keeping force but not in the sense of
"coercive or enforcement action". In fact, the Court by its opinion made clear the
distinction between peace-keeping and enforcement measures. It also determined that
both UNEF I and ONUC were peace-keeping forces and not enforcement actions
within the compass of Chapter VII and Article 43 could not have any applicability to
these cases."
With regard to the Security Council's powers, it was determined that if agreements





17- Ibid, p. 166.48
must lie within the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it
does not resort to enforcement action against a state. The Court added that the costs of
action which the Security Council is authorised to take consitute "expenses of the
Organisation" within the meaning of Article 17(2).18
The actual expenditures of the United Nations
There is a question as to what are the actual expenditures which should be constitued
as expenses of the Organisation under Article 17(2)? The Court's opinion was that
these expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of the United
Nations laid down in Article 1 of the Charter, and, if an expenditure were made for a
purpose which was not one of the purposes of the United Nations, it could not be
considered as one of the "expenses of the Organisation".I9
In fact, the purposes of the United Nations are broad, but neither they nor the powers
conferred to effectuate them are unlimited and the presumption is that the action taken
by the Organisation to fulfil one of the purposes is not ultra vires the Organisation.2(1
At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that the expenses of the Organisation are
the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out the purposes of the
Organisation, and that the expenditures authorised in General Assembly resolutions
with regard to UNEF and ONUC constituted "expenses of the Organisation" within
the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter.21
Although this advisory opinion of the Court did not lead to an immediate solution to
the crisis, it settled any doubts about the legality of peace-keeping and it became a
18- Ibid, p. 167.
19_ isi,
20_ BA, p. 168.
21- thisi, pp. 179-80.49
support for developing the institution of peace-keeping. Another legal point which
was examined by the Court was an ultra vires act of the Organisation. It was said that
the internal legal systems of states had often some procedure for determining the
validity of a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure was to be
found in the structure of the United Nations.22
During the drafting of the Charter, there were proposals to place the ultimate authority
to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice which were not accepted.
and, as was anticipated at San Francisco, each organ must in the first place at least,
determine its own jurisdiction.
The World Court in its opinion made it clear that the Assembly cannot even by
recommendation undertake enforcement action. It should be noted that under the
"Uniting for Peace Resolution" the General Assembly may recommend the adoption
of certain measures which might be decided by the Security Council under Chapter
VII, specially collective measures. "At no time does the Court uphold the right of the
Assembly to recommend enforcement measures (though it emphasises repeatedly that
only the Council may order coercive action), either under the Charter generally or
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Moreover, the opinion of the Court studiously
avoids all mention of that Resolution, even though it was much discussed in the
pleadings. "23
Except UNEF I, which was authorised by the General Assembly after the vetos of the
United Kingdom and France had paralysed the Security Council, the peace-keeping
function of the UN is now firmly in the control of the Security Council.
22- Ibid, p. 168.
23- D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, (Stevens & Sons, London, 1964), p. 291.50
The legal basis of peace-keeping
The institution of peace-keeping was not foreseen in the Charter; it is therefore
necessary to investigate its legal basis in the developments of United Nations practice
for the maintenance of international peace and security. The resolutions passed by the
Security Council and the General Assembly have invariably not articulated the
constitutional basis of peace-keeping. The only exceptions are the cases of Palestine
and Iraq-Iran war in which the Security Council expressly referred to Articles 39 and
40 to call for provisional measures. Also, the Security Council referred to Chapter VII
when it created peace-keeping forces between Iraq and Kuwait, but with no mention
of a specific article. Therefore, the legal basis of peace-keeping operations in general
needs careful consideration.
General powers
The first possibility for the legal basis of peace-keeping operations is Articles 24 to 26
of the Charter with regard to general functions and powers of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security. However, specific powers granted
to the Security Council regarding international peace and security are in Chapters VI
and VII. There is an opinion that Article 24 of the Charter is not as it would seem a
general determination of the competence of the Security Council, and it would not be
admissible to interpret the text in a way that confers upon the Council powers which
does not possess under other provisions of the Charter.24
24- H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, (Stevens & Sons, London, 1950), pp. 283-4.51
Chapter VI
Since peace-keeping operations were not foreseen under either Chapter VI or Chapter
VII, they seem to fall in unwritten Chapter VI 1/2 and this sounds legally defensible
because peace-keeping operations are a more ambitious level of UN involvement than
anything provided for in Chapter VI.25 In response to the view that peace-keeping
should be seen as "squarely derived from Chapter VI",26 it has been said that Chapter
VI deals with pacific settlement of disputes, while peace-keeping has been defined as
a technique that does not lead to a settlement or solution per se.27 Indeed, peace-
keeping forces try to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict leading to final
solution of conflicts.
Furthermore, Chapter VI can hardly be considered as a constitutional basis of all
peace-keeping operations, because the concept of peace-keeping has been created as a
result of the Council's failure to take action under Chapter VII and as an alternative to
these actions.
Articles 41 and 42
It has been suggested that Article 41 may provide the constitutional basis for peace-
keeping operations since they could be characterised as "measures not involving the
use of armed force" in the meaning of that article.28 However, although peace-keeping
operations are not enforcement actions, the use of armed force is not excluded from
them.29 In addition, peace-keeping forces are authorised to use force not only in self-
25- Ove Bring, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Positive Issues for the United Nations", in, 20 Melb. 
U. Law Review, (1995), p. 56
26- Gareth Evans, The Use of Force in Peace Operations, Address to the Stokholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), Stokholm, 10 Apr. 1995, p. 3.
27- 0. Bring, op. cit., p. 57.
28- Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations
Force", 	  (1958), p. 230.
29-- Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep., (1962), p. 166.52
defence but also in some cases in order to bring about their mandate if armed
resistance be mounted to hinder their actions.3°
Another assumption is that, under Article 42, the Council "... may take such action by
air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security...", and since there is no reason that only war should be considered under
this article, it has been concluded that the constitutional basis of peace-keeping
operations can be Article 42.31
It has also been stated that "the nature of international police action under Article 42 is
not diminished because the blue helmets are usually forbidden to fire (except in self-
defence), just as the action of national police who are forbidden to fire on
demonstrators is not any less a police action".32
Schwarzenberger has stated that "whether armed for defensive or offensive purposes,
a force on the UNEF model is an armed force and, therefore, falls under Article 42 if
established by the Security Council. Yet nothing in the wording of Article 42 suggests
that the creation of armed forces under this Article depends either on the special
agreements referred to in Article 43 or on the proper functioning of the Military Staff
Committee provided for in Article 47".33
Although the language of Article 42 does not disclose its connection with Article 43,
the link between the two articles is specifically indicated in Article 106, which
envisages possible joint action by the permanent members "pending the coming into
30- Dan Ciobanu, "The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-Keeping Operations",in, A.
Cassese (ed.), United Nations Peace-keeping Legal Essays, (Sijhoff & Noordhoff, The Netherlands,
1978), p. 18.
31- Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1996), p. 200.
32_ a
33- D. Ciobanu, op. cit„ p. 18.53
force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the
Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibility under Article42".
Furthermore, travaux preparatoires indicate that drafters of the UN Charter intended
that the application of Article 42 was to be dependent on the entry into force of the
special agreements that are provided for in Article 43. It was concluded at the San
Francisco Conference, in respect of the force put at the disposition of the Security
Council under Article 43, that this force should take the form of  national contingents
furnished by the members according to the special agreements to be negotiated
subsequently.34 These contingents would be put into action in accordance with the
plans of a Military Staff Cornmittee.35
As mentioned earlier, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion stated
that peace-keeping operations such as UNEF are not enforcement actions within the
compass of Chapter VII and Article 43 could not have any applicability to these
cases.36 In fact the consensual nature of peace-keeping operations determines that they
have not enforceable rights and once the host state withdrew its consent, peace-
keeping forces have to withdraw its territory.
Finally, as the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated in his Agenda for Peace.
"[p]eace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations. It has
brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the wor1d"37. Since
peace-keeping forces mostly have been dispatched to monitor cease-fires or
withdrawal of foreign forces as provisional measures, Article 40 would seem to
provide a possible legal basis for peace-keeping operations.
34- UNCIO, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, P. 509.
35_ isk
36- Certain Expenses Case, op. cit„ p. 166.
37- all (1992), p. 967, para. 46.54
Article 40, its relation to Article 39, and its binding effects
Under Article 40 "the Security Council may, before making the recommendation or
deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned
to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable". It is not
clear whether the "call" of the Security Council should be considered as
"recommendation" or "decision", and it is not clear that the Security Council is
obligated to make a formal determination under Article 39 before calling upon the
parties to comply with provisional measures.
It seems that provisional measures should be considered as emergency measures
before adopting any resolution under Chapter VII and "before making the
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39". It might
be said that international crises can develop over long periods of time and the Council
can take several measures at the same time and take up provisional measures also after
having adopted a resolution under Chapter VII either to recommend settlement
procedures under Article 39 or after having decided upon measures involving or not
involving the use of force.38
Higgins believes that "there must surely be an implied finding under Article 39 for
action under Chapter VII to be taken."39 However, as will be discussed in the
proceeding chapters, most of the provisional measures have been adopted by the
Security Council without any finding under Article 39. 40
38- B. Conforti, op. cit., p. 183.
39- R. Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United
Nations, (Oxford University Press, London, 1963), p. 236.
40- With regard to a tendency among states which try to avoid the use of Chapter VII when they wish
to retain the option of not being bound under Article 25 Higgins says: "it is misconceived to suppose
that all Chapter VII resolutions are binding, while no Chapter VI resolutions are ... the binding quality
of a resolution turns upon whether it is a decision or a recommendation ... not its placing in Chapter VI
or Chapter VII".
Rosalyn Higgins, " A General Assesment of United Nations Peace-keeping", in, A. Cassese (ed.), 2p_
2_ 1t,, p. 4.55
In United Nations practice there are few cases where the Security Council called for
provisional measures with explicit reference to Articles 39 and 40. In the case of
Palestine, the Council in Resolution 54 determined a threat to the peace under Article
39, and ordered under Article 40 for a cease-fire. 4' In the case of Iraq-Iran war the
Security Council called for provisional measures under Article 40 with a prior finding
of Article 39.42
In the case of Cyprus, the Security Council in its recommendation to create peace-
keeping forces referred to the situation as being likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. 43 It seems the Council implicitly referred in this case
to Chapter VI (Article 33(1)). In fact, in most cases, it is not clear whether the
provisional measures adopted by the Council could fall under Chapter VII or Chapter
VI. Since recommendations for provisional measures could be adopted either under
Chapter VI or VII, it is most appropriate that the Council determines the constitutional
basis of its decisions in its resolutions.
There is a question whether the "call" of the Security Council under Article 40 should
be considered as mandatory or recommendatory. The second part of Article 40 has
two contradictory statements. According to this article, the Security Council may
"call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional
measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of
the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of
failure to comply with such provisional measures"
41- SC Res. 54, 15 July 1948. The Security Council again referred to Articles 39 and 40 in Resolution
62 of 16 November 1948.
42- SC Res. 598, 20 July 1987.
43- SC Res. 186, 4 Mar. 1964.56
The "necessary or desirable" provisional measures which should be taken "without
prejudice to the rights of the parties" would imply that the provisional measures are
recommendatory rather than mandatory. Furthermore, the provisional nature of these
measures to prevent the worsening of a situation demonstrates that they must not
prejudice the rights and claims or positions of the parties concerned. However, the
Council take account of failure to comply with provisional measures.
In practice, the Security Council, in ordering a cease-fire in the case of Palestine,
stated that failure to comply would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace
and it might adopt further action under Chapter VII.44 As the hostilities broke out, the
Council appointed a committee to study the further measures that would be
appropriate to take under Chapter VII if the parties failed to comply with provisional
measures; these threats had some effect.45
In the case of the Congo, the Council adopted serious action to obtain compliance
with provisional measures. In the crisis over Katanga, the Council urged the UN to
take all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo
including the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.46 It seems that the mandatory
or recommendatory nature of provisional measures depends on the nature of the
Council's resolution. The Council in few cases has determined the consequences of
failure of the parties to comply with provisional measures. States have considered the
Council's request as an invitation rather a mandatory call. It might be said that
mandatory call by the Security Council might be inconsistent with the "without
prejudice" clause.
44- S/801, 29 May 1948, S/902, 15 July 1948, S/1070, 4 Nov. 1948.
45j
46- SC Res.161, 21 Feb. 1961.57
It should be noted that, under Article 33, the Council may call upon parties to settle
their disputes by peaceful means. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons believe that "the
term 'calls upon' is used would suggest ... that resolutions adopted under Article 40 are
more than 'recommendations' and the same verb used in Article 33 authorises "the
Council to call the attention of members to their obligations of peaceful settlement.
Moreover, under Article 41, the Council may 'call upon' members to apply non-
military measures which they are obligated to 'accept and carry out". 47 They
concluded that m[p]rovisional measures' are not 'enforcement measures' and do not
therefore fall under the specific exception stated in Article 2(7)". 48
In fact, the provisional measures in Article 40 are sharply distinguished from
enforcement measures under Article 42. Bowett believes that Article 40 would be
brought into operation in cases of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace. 49 "It is
difficult to envisage it being an appropriate measure where there has been a clear
finding of aggression - though a state may be called upon to cease fire, and its refusal
to obey such a call may well provide further, and final evidence of its aggressive
intent."5°
With regard to the attacked state, it should be noted that in practice it can be expected
that an attacked state which has conducted a successful defence will not easily comply
with a mere call for a cease-fire.51 Furthermore, the Council may hesitate to employ
enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42 against the attacked state, even when
this state disregards calls for provisional measures.52 Therefore, in case of flagrant
aggression, it would be appropriate that the Council take effective measures under
47- L. M. Goodrich, E. Hambro and A. P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations. Commentary and
Documents, (Columbia Univ. Press, USA, 1969), p. 306.
48_ Lth
49- D. W. Bowen, op. cit, p. 281.
50_ id,
51- Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1994), p. 620.
52_ 1.158
Articles 41 and 42 rather than call for provisional measures under Article 40, to avoid
encouraging the aggressor to continue its aggression and to prevent the attacked state
from disregarding the Council's calls for provisional measures.
The Security Council might call for provisional measures such as cease-fire,
cessations of hostilities, withdrawal of forces, conclusion of truce, release of prisoners
or any measure to mantain cease-fire and truce agreements. However, there is a
question whether the establishment of a peace-keeping operation per se can constitute
provisional measures? One might suggest that the Security Council and the General
Assembly may establish subsidiary organs under Articles 29 and 22 of the Charter, as
it deems necessary for the performance of their functions. It seems that, the creation of
peace-keeping forces by a simple procedural vote applicable to the setting up of
subsidiary organs is questionable, since the establishment of a subsidiary organ cannot
be divorced from the functions entrusted to that organ.53
Peace-keeping operations might be organised by the Security Council with a view to
supervising and assisting in the implementation of the provisional measures requested
under Article 40.54 Peace-keeping operations might be complementary to and
conditional on the existence of other provisional measures, and the power of the
Security Council to organise the operations would be in this case an implied power
which is directly related to its express power to call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary and desirable. 55 Being
complementary to and conditional on the existence of other provisional measures, the
peace-keeping operations must be organised under the same conditions which are set
forth in Article 40 for the provisional measures. This amounts to saying that the
Security Council could not exercise, under Article 40, its power to organise peace-
53- Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study, (1967), 178.
54-ibid, p. 280.
55_59
keeping operations unless the conditions set forth for the exercise of the power
expressly provided for by that legal rule to call for provisional measures are
ascertained by the Counci1.56
It is reasonable to conclude that the establishment of peace-keeping forces is based on
Article 40 in the sense that they are established for purposes such as cease-fire and
either include or are confined to the supervision of provisional measures.
The basic principles of peace-keeping
There are three important basic principles of peace-keeping which are essential to its
success. These are: the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except
in self-defence.57 The examination of these principles clarifies the real concept of
peace-keeping and its differences from other actions authorised by the United Nations.
The application of these principles has developed by the evolution of mandates of
peace-keeping operations as will be discussed in the context of the practice of the
Organisation later in this thesis.
Consent
Since peace-keeping is a consensual type of operation and is quite different from
enforcement measures, it is necessary that the parties to the conflict, after accepting a
cease-fire, give their consent to the presence of peace-keeping forces.
It is clear that, if the consent of the host state was withdrawn, the peace-keeping force
should withdraw immediately, as was the case with UNEF Tin 1967. However, there
56-D. Ciobanu, op. cit., p. 45.
57- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, auppleff_euit_to AnAgendafor Paper of theSecretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 Jan. 1995, A/50160-
S/1995/1, para. 33.60
is an argument that, since the establishment of peace-keeping forces is by the decision
of UN organs (the Security Council or the General Assembly), the withdrawal of the
force should be a decision made by the UN and not the host state.58 It seems that the
consensual nature of peace-keeping forces requires the consent of the host state in line
with its sovereignty.
In fact, these operations cannot be successful without the consent and co-operation of
host states and all disputant parties. The United Nations forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
was established with the consent of Lebanese goverment, but lacked the co-operation
of Israel as a party to the dispute; it was unable to perform its mandate and is still
experiencing difficulty in performing its tasks in a hostile environment.
In recent years, peace-keeping has forfeited the consent of the parties specially in
intrastate conflicts such as in Bosnia and Somalia. 59 In fact, the warring factions, by
breaking their agreements for UN supervision, effectively withdrew their consent and
announced non-co-operation with the United Nations. In such an environment, peace-
keeping would be impossible since there is no peace to keep.
The principle of "consent" as a constitutional basis of peace-keeping has been rejected
by some scholars. Bowett has argued that "the constitutional basis of a United Nations
force is not to be found in the consent of any state upon whose territory the force may
be required to operate: such constitutional basis is to be found in the Charter and not
in matters extraneous to the Charter (for the Charter nowhere refers to the necessity
for such consent). Hence the existence of such a consent may be relied upon to
indicate that the operations are in the nature of 'peace-keeping' operation rather than
'preventive or enforcement action' but this is to treat consent as evidence of a
58- This argument was made by Israel, New Zealand and Australia in the case of UNEF I. GAOR, 592
mtg., paras. 13, 111, 79, 1956.
59- The nature of intrastate conflicts will be discussed later and their effectiveness in performing their
traditional mandate will be assessed.61
particular Charter basis, not to accept consent as in itself a constitutional basis of the
force ... the right of the United Nations to place a United Nations force in the territory
of a state is best dealt with as a question separate from the constitutional basis of the
force".60 Thus, Bowett has separated the consent of the host state from the legal basis
of peace-keeping.
However, it should be noted that, although the Charter nowhere refers to the necessity
for such consent, Article 2(7) provides that UN should not intervene in the territory of
a state. Therefore, obtaining the consent of host state entitles the UN to intervene in
the territory of that state; otherwise, the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity prevent the UN from such intervention.
Retrospectively, the necessity of consent is implied by the Charter, though not
explicitly referred to, and is necessarily an element of the legal basis of peace-
keeping. Moreover, there is no single case in the practice of the UN of a peace-
keeping force established without the consent of the host state which remained in
operation when that consent was terminated by the host state. Practically, obtaining
consent is also an operational matter without which the mandate of the force cannot be
performed without serious difficulties.
Impartiality
The second principle of peace-keeping is impartiality. This principle distinguishes
peace-keeping from peace enforcement, because in the latter the UN identifies the
aggressor which becomes the target of enforcement action - hence the UN is no longer
impartial. The UN should take no sides in peace-keeping and should establish a
60- D. W. Bowett, op, cit., pp. 311.62
neutral military presence to prepare an environment for the parties to solve their
conflict peacefully.
In fact, peace-keeping forces are deployed to control the borders and supervise cease-
fires. They are armed to fulfil these functions, and they do not pursue military
objectives nor have the function of combatants.61 It is imperative that peace-keeping
forces must not take part in a conflict. The creation and the function of peace-keeping
forces should not cause any prejudice to the claims or rights of the parties
concerned.62
Other than the impartiality of the Organisation, the states participating in UN peace-
keeping should not pursue individual economic or political interests concerning
themselves or any of the disputant parties. Although disarmament is a separate issue,
it should be borne in mind that the countries participating in peace-keeping would
contravene the principle of impartiality if they at the same time exported weapons to
the field of conflict. The contributors to peace-keeping are not expected to exploit the
situation and stimulate the global arms race; otherwise it may seem more appropriate
if they withdrew from peace-keeping.
Use offorce only in self-defence
Indeed the principle of impartiality implies the neutrality of peace-keeping forces and
has a direct relation to the third principle, i.e. the use of force only in self-defence.
The status of neutrality requires that UN forces do not take coercive action against any
of the combatants, and are prohibited from taking the initiative in the use of
61- Report of the Secretary-General, A/3943, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 15.
62- A/3302 para. 8.63
weapons.63 That is why the UN forces have always had difficulty in using force in
self-defence.
In the case of the Congo, the Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to
take "vigorous action" including use of force "if necessary" for the expulsion of
foreign military personnel not under UN command. 64 This authorisation by the
Council was much wider than the principle of self-defence by which the forces are
only allowed to react in self-defence when attacked. In fact, UN forces was given a
new mandate by the Security Council for peace-enforcement.65 However, the
Secretary-General had always affirmed that peace-keeping forces in Congo never
exceeded the scope of self-defence.66
It cannot be concluded that these forces acted merely under Article 40 or 42, because
their legal basis was much wider than Article 40 and very similar to Article 42. It may
be concluded that, since UN forces could use force only for the expulsion of foreign
forces to facilitate the settlement of the dispute, this use of force per se was not
considered as the final settlement of the dispute. The International Court of Justice,
with regard to ONUC, in the Expenses case stated that "the operation did not involve
'preventive or enforcement measures' against any state under Chapter VII".67
In recent years, by establishing a new concept of "safe areas", peace-keeping forces
have undertaken a new mandate. The UN forces in defence of these "safe areas" have
used force to a greater extent than in self-defence. The United Nations forces in
Bosnia were authorised by the Security Council to carry out their mandate in the safe
63- A13943 para. 179, S/5653 para. 6.
64- SC Res. 169, 24 Nov. 1961.
65_ lici,
66- S/4940/Add. 4 para. 7.
67- Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 177.64
areas "acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of
force, to reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties ...',.68
Although enforcing the safe areas is much wider than the use of force for individual
self-defence, -UN forces in Bosnia cannot be considered as an enforcement measure
under Article 42, because they were not authorised to use force for the final settlement
of the dispute.
In the author's opinion, there are two kinds of enforcement action by the United
Nations. The first is the enforcement action for final solution of the conflict. This has
been used by recommendation in the case of Korea (1950) and by authorisation in the
case of Kuwait (1990). Albeit these actions cannot be considered under Article 42,
they were used to end the hostilities. The second is the enforcement action against the
forces which would violate the bans established by the United Nations. This kind of
action may be considered as a provisional measure under Article 40 since it would not
be used to settle the dispute by war.
THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF "THREAT TO THE PEACE"
The concept of "threat to the peace" has been expanded in practice of the United
Nations during the post-Cold War era. In this section, a comparison will be made of
the UN practice during and after the Cold War period in determining the "danger" or
"threat" to the peace.
68- SC Res. 836, 4 June 1993.65
Danger to the peace
One of the vague and broad concepts in the UN Charter is the concept of "threat to the
peace" stated in Article 39. The Charter has not clarified the difference and the
relation of the latter to the concept of endangering the maintenance of international
peace and security in Article 34 in Chapter VI.
Chapter VI relates to the Council's powers of pacific settlement of disputes or
situations which are "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security", while the title to Chapter VII reads "action with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". Under Chapter VII the Council
has enforcement powers for maintaining peace and security. White believes that,
conceptually, "there is a legal distinction between a 'danger' and a 'threat'. The latter,
for example, is often used as a legal tool to facilitate the imposition of mandatory
measures under Chapter VII, a function which the label 'danger' is not legally
qualified to perform."69 However, it seems that a clear distinction between a threat to
the peace and a danger to the peace is not conceptually possible.
During the Cold War, the Security Council was reluctant to determine that a situation
constituted a threat to or a breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Council's
tendency in most cases was to consider the matters under Chapter VI. For example,
the Security Council's Resolutions 163 and 186 of 1961 and 1964 respectively have
referred to situations which were "likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security" or "likely to threaten international peace and security". In 1970
the Council's Resolution 282 referred to a "potential threat to international peace and
security". There is an opinion that "potential threat" is not different to danger to the
peace, and it is a product of the Cold War which forced members to achieve
69- N. D. White, Keeping the Peace, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995), p. 38.66
consensus by appeasing all sides. 70 It seems that political considerations are the
motivating factor behind the Council's finding or not finding of a "threat to the peace".
Threat to the peace
The Council's determination during the Cold War
The Security Council has referred to the term "threat to the peace" in both intra-state
and inter-state conflicts. The Council's recent usage of this term has accompanied the
actions taken by this organ.
The earliest reference to "threat to the peace" was in Security Council Resolution 54
of 15 July 1948 when hostilities had broken out in Palestine after Israel's Declaration
of Independence. The Council determined that the situation in Palestine constituted a
threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 and ordered a cease-fire under
Article 40•71 It declared that, in case of non-compliance, it would take further action
under Chapter VII. However, an armistice was agreed later. It is not clear why the
Security Council did not refer to the situation in Palestine as a breach of the peace.
The next move by the Security Council to determine "threat to the peace" was in 1966
with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Although the Western powers were
unwilling to consider that the racial policies could be considered as a "threat to the
peace", the African and Asian members, backed by the Soviet Union, emphasised the
serious effects of these policies on Africa and considered the application of sanctions
70- Ibid, p. 42. In this respect White says: "Ulf some members desired a finding of a threat
accompanied by Chapter VII action, whilst others, for equally political reasons, desired only a finding
of a danger and a recommendation of peaceful settlement under Chapter VI, in order to produce some
sort of resolution a compromise was often achieved by the use of 'potential threat' accompanied
perhaps by voluntary measures. If a compromise was not achieved the veto was inevitably used." Js1_,
/1- SC Res. 54, 15 Jul. 1948.67
for maintaining the peace of the continent. 72 The Security Council in Resolution 232
of 16 December 1966 referred to Articles 39 and 41 and determined that the situation
in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security,73 but the
Council did not make it clear why the situation was a threat to the peace. It may
however be said that the Council was unwilling to recognise the racial policies within
a state as a threat to the peace.
In 1977 the Council, with reference to racial discrimination and apartheid in South
Africa and the persistent acts of aggression by South African Government against
neighbouring States, acted under Chapter VII and determined that the policies and
acts of South Africa constituted "a threat to the maintenance of international peace
and security".74 In fact, the Security Council determined the threat to the peace with
reference to both the internal and external actions of South African Government.
However, in 1985, South Africa was condemned by the Security Council because of
an act of aggression against Angola and in this connection it determined that a
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the latter was a danger to
international peace and security.75 It should be noted that, although the act of
aggression was recognised by the Council, the danger fell within the provisions of
Chapter VI.
Earlier in 1961, the Security Council in case of the Congo had emphasised that the
danger of wide-spread civil war in the Congo was a threat to international peace and
security, and urged the UN to take appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of
civil war in the Congo; it also urged the withdrawal of all Belgian troops. 76 It might
72- For more information see: Goodrich et.al., op. cit„ pp. 296-7.
73- Sc Res. 232, 16 Dec. 1966.
74- SC Res. 418, 4 Nov. 1977.
75- SC Res. 567, 20 June 1985.
76- SC Res. 161,21 Feb. 1961.68
be concluded that during the Cold War, the external element, i.e. a hostility between
two states, was essential for the Council to determine a situation as a threat to the
peace.
The Council's determination after the Cold War
By the end of the Cold War, the Security Council extended the concept of a "threat to
the peace" to different situations which has not been without controversy. In fact, the
Council's reluctance to refer to the concepts of Article 39 has decreased.
The Security Council in 1991 in Resolution 688 condemned the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including Kurdish populated areas, "the
consequences of which [would] threaten international peace and security in the
region".77 It is interesting to note that the repression itself was not called a threat to
the peace, but its consequences, which could be the mass flow of refugees towards
and over the Turkish and Iranian frontiers, was considered a threat to international
peace.
The Council in Resolution 688 made no reference to Article 39 or Chapter VII and did
not take economic sanctions against Iraq (since comprehensive sanctions had already
been adopted), and did not authorise member states to take forceful measures (as it did
in Resolution 678). The Council by Resolution 688 reaffirmed the commitment of all
member states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of Iraq, and insisted that Iraq give immediate access to international
humanitarian organisations and appealed to all member states to contribute to the
humanitarian relief efforts.78 Resolution 688 received ten votes in favour, three
77- SC Res. 688, 5 Apr. 1991.
78- EL In the Chapter on Kuwait crisis the action by individual states to creat safe areas will be
discussed.69
against (Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe), and two abstentions (China and India). The states
which could not support the resolution expressed alarm at the intrusion into another
State's internal affairs.79
In the former Yugoslavia in 1991, when several republics unilaterally declared
independence, the hostilities began between the forces of the Federal government and
the state of Croatia. The Security Council in Resolution 713 determined the
continuation of this situation "a threat to international peace and security". The
Council referred to the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in
the border areas of neighbouring countries. It can be said that in this case also the flow
of refugees to the other countries in the region was considered as a threat to the peace.
The Council decided, with reference to Chapter VII, to implement a general and
complete embargo. However, since the republics had not been recognised at that time,
the situation was deemed as an internal matter with consequences for other states.
Following the recognition of the republics and their admission to the United Nations,
the Council determined that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other parts
of the former Yugoslavia, constituted a threat to the international peace and security.80
By changing the system in the former Yugoslavia, the situation was no longer a civil
crisis.
In the case of Somalia, where the head of the State had fallen and the fighting between
different factions began, the Security Council by Resolution 733 determined that a
threat to international peace and security existed. 81 In this resolution there was no
reference to the consequences on the stability and peace in the region, and it was
79- White, op. cit., p. 47.
80- Sc Res. 757, 30 May 1992.
81- SC Res. 733, 23 Jan., 1992.70
decided to implement a complete embargo under Chapter VII. No particular party was
addressed and it is not clear which entity was targeted for embargo.
The Security Council referred to the concept of "threat to the peace" in 1992 in the
case of Libya which has not been without controversy. After the United States and
United Kingdom had requested the two Libyan officials who had been indicted on the
suspicion of having caused the air crash over Scotland (Lockerbie) to be handed over
to them, the Security Council decided, without mentioning Chapter VII, that Libya
should meet these requests.82
Although Libya offerred a trial for the two Libyans in Libya, and thereby purporting
to comply with its obligations under Article 7 of the Montreal Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971, 83 this did
not satisfy the Council, and led it to adopt Resolution 748.
The Security Council in Resolution 748, after recalling Article 2(4) of the Charter,
qualified as a threat to international peace and security the failure by the Libyan
Government to demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism by not surrendering two
officials to the United States or the United Kingdom. 84 Furthermore, the Council went
on to impose enforcement measures under Chapter VII to obtain Libya's compliance
with the requests.85
Another broad interpretation of the concept of the "threat to the peace" was in the case
of Haiti in 1993. On 16 June 1993, the Security Council determined that it was a
unique and exceptional circumstance, i.e. the legitimate government which had been
82- Sc Res. 731,21 Jan. 1992.
83- Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civl Aviation, 23 Sep. 1971,
24 U. S. T, 65, 974 U. N. T. S, 177.
84- Sc Res. 748, 31 Mar. 1992.
85_ a71
overthrown by a military government was not reinstated, and that the "continuation"
of the situation threatened international peace and security. 86 Furthermore, the Council
referred to the refugee problem and decided to apply economic sanctions against
Haiti. 87 The Council in its Resolution 940 recognised that the unique character of the
situation in Haiti required an exceptional response, and, under Chapter VII, authorised
member states "to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership" 88
The recent practice of the Security Council demonstrates its tendency to enlarge the
concept of "threat to the peace". The refugee problem (in the cases of Iraq and
Yugoslavia), the non-action per se (in the case of Libya), the existence of a
dictatorship regime (in the case of Haiti): each has been recognised by the Council as
a "threat to the peace".
The Security Council has not made clear what standards a situation should meet to be
recognised as a "threat to international peace" within the context of Article 39.
Combacau believes that "[a] threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 of the
Charter is a situation which the organ, competent to impose sanctions, declares to be
an actual threat to the peace". 89 He felt that there must be an explosive situation which
would constitute an actual and persistent threat to international peace and security.90
At the conclusion of a meeting of the Security Council, held on 31 January 1992 at the
level of Heads of States, a statement was read as follows: "[t]he absence of war and
military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and
86- SC Res. 841, 16 June 1993.
87- SC Res. 841, 16 June 1993.
88- SC Res. 940,31 Jul. 1994.
89- J. Combacau, Le pouvoir de sanction de l' ONU, (Paris, 1974), p. 100, quoted in, Peter H.
Kooijmans, "The Enlargement of the Concept 'Threat to the Peace, Rene-Jean Dupuy (ed.), The
Development of the Role of the Security Council, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993), p.
111.
90- Ibid, p. 114.72
security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian
and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security."91 It is believed that
the words "threat to the peace" in this statement are not used in the sense in which
they have been used in Article 39 of the Charter.92 The reason for this opinion may be
that economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields are essentially considered as
internal matters of any state. The subject of domestic jurisdiction will be discussed in
more detail later.
Regarding the actions necessary to remove a threat to the peace, reference should be
made to a report submitted by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992
entitled "An Agenda for Peace". It has distinguished four areas for action under the
titles of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building.93
The Secretary-General suggested that "Nile most desirable and efficient employment
of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks
out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive
diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior
staff or specialised agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General
Assembly, and by regional organisations in cooperation with the United Nations.
Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs  early warning
based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also
involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarised zones."
(Emphasis added.)94
91- S123500.
92- P. H. Kooijmans, op. cit., p. 118.
93.- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy. Peacemaking and
Pe	 k e in . 'eo. of the	 reta	 en r 1 •ur uant t th tatement ado ot-d • the UMM1
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A147/277 - S/24111.
94- !bid, para. 23.73
It is believed that "[a] number of suggestions and recommendations made in the
Chapter on preventive diplomacy may be of relevance for a future interpretation of the
concept 'threat to the peace'. Now it is clear that preventive diplomacy itself will be
carried out under Chapter VI but through it threats to the peace can be identified at an
earlier stage".95 In fact, if there is no evidence of real explosive crisis with regard to
the international peace and security, it seems there will be no legal basis for action
under Chapter VII.
Brownlie has emphasised that "[a] determination of a threat to the peace as a basis for
action necessary to remove the threat to the peace cannot be used as a basis for action
which (if the evidence so indicates) is for collateral and independent purposes, such as
the overthrow of a Government or the partition of a State". 96 By an extensive use of
the notion "threat to the peace", the action which would be followed may be in
contrary of the sovereignty of states. Therefore, it is required that the concepts of the
UN Charter be employed with careful considerations to prevent raising high costs for
the United Nations as well as avoid severe consequences for the population.
THE DEMISE OF ARTICLE 2(7)
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter refers to the limits of the Organisation's delegated
discretionary powers which is the "touchstone of the Organisation's legitimacy, much
as a nation judges the legitimacy of exercises of its public power by standards set out
in its constitution".97 Article 2(7) provides that "[n]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members
95- P. H. Kooijmans, op, cit„ p. 118.
96- Ian Brownlie, "International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations", Recueil Des
Cours, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston, London, 1995), p. 218.
97- Thomas M. Franck, "The Security Council and "Threat to the Peace": Some Remarks on
Remarkable Recent Developments", in R. J. Dupuy, op. cit„ p. 83.74
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".
General nature of Article 2(7)
Article 2(7) contains a prohibition against all forms of intervention by the United
Nations "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State". It has also been envisaged that the member states are not required to submit
matters within their domestic jurisdiction for settlement to the United Nations.98
However, Article 2(7) contains an exception to the prohibition of intervention in
relation to enforcement measures, which will be discussed later.
According to this article, states are not obliged to submit matters which are essentially
within their jurisdiction to the means of dispute settlement listed in Article 33 and
other measures under Chapter VI. In fact, UN resolutions demanding such settlement
need not be observed by the state concerned, and UN organs may choose not to assign
disputes of this kind to any international procedure of dispute settlement.99
As discussed in Chapter One, it seems that the drafters of the Charter were determined
to establish a formula to ensure that certain matters would fall "essentially" within the
domestic sphere, even though there is a relevant international legal obligation.
However, both terms "essentially" and "solely" are vague, and Article 2(7) does not
contain a clear standard to determine what matter falls under domestic jurisdiction of
98- Ermacora believes that UN members should not submit to the UN a request for a dispute settlement
concerning questions of domestic jurisdiction (Bruno Simma, op. cit., p. 149). It seems that this is a
misinterpretation of the article, because the states are not required to submit the "matters within their
domestic jurisdiction", but nothing in the Charter prevents states to submit "questions of domestic
jurisdiction".
99_ Bruno Simma, op, cit„ pp. 149-50.75
states.' 00 Even a review of the discussions at San Francisco Conference does not lead
to a clear understanding of what the drafters intended in Article 2(7).
Preuss, who was the assistant secretary at Dumbarton Oaks conversations (1944) and
the United States technical expert at the San Francisco Conference (1945), states that
"[i]f the purpose of the Sponsoring Governments was to safeguard the domestic
domain by limiting the powers of the United Nations, they chose an unreliable
instrument for accomplishing this aim. For Article 2(7), with its vague and elastic
phraseology, was to prove in practice to be susceptible of an interpretation in a sense
precisely opposite to that which was intended by its framers. Devoid of accepted or
technical meaning, it left to those who in the future would be called upon to apply it
an almost unlimited discretion, which could be exercised either to protect the
traditional sovereignty of states or to extend the scope of international action.
Although international law as an objective legal citerion was abandoned at the San
Francisco Conference and it was expected that a subjective political criterion, imposed
by the more powerful and politically more influential states, would take its place,102
the role of international law to determine what is essentially within domestic
jurisdiction of states is still crucial. It rests upon the political organs of the United
Nations to somehow emphasise the rule of law in their decision making.
I00 The Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion in the Nationality Decrees
case held that, "[the] question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a
State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations".
PCJI, Series B, No.4, (1923), p. 24.
101_ Lawrence Preuss, "Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters of
Domestic Jurisdiction", Recueil Des Cours, (1949), p. 604.
102- See: Djura Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the United
Nations, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), pp. 158-61.
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Discussion of the term "intervention"
The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The General Assembly was given certain powers
with respect to the adjustment of settlement of international situations or disputes.
Action taken by the Security Council is necessarily directed toward a particular
situation or dispute and might take the form of a recommendation or a decision
addressed to a party or parties concerned. Article 2(7) prevents the Organisation's
interference in the domestic affairs of any state; however, this principle should not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
There is a question as to what actions of the UN organs may be considered as
"intervention". Actions which might be defined as "intervention" range from the
placing of a matter on the agenda, discussion, formal investigation, and the paasing of
a resolution.103 There are two views, depending on whether to construe the term
"intervention" broadly or restrictively.
Among the authors who have given the restrictive and "technical" interpretation of the
term "intervention" is Lauterpacht. His opinion was on the basis of Oppenheim's
classical definition of intervention, according to which "intervention is dictatorial
interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of maintaining or
altering the actual condition of things". I04 Lauterpacht believed that the only
prohibited intervention under Article 2(7) was in the sense of this definition.105
However, this definition would make Article 2(7) meaningless. Because the United
Nations can carry out dictatorial interference only by enforcement measures under
103..R. Higgins, op. cit., p. 68.
104..see: 1-1. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, (New York, 1950), pp. 167-72.
105_ id,77
Chapter VII, and these measures have been allowed under the last part of Article 2(7)
to be taken even if matters of domestic jurisdiction are involved.
The broad interpretation suggests that intervention should not be interpreted in a
narrow technical sense but rather in the sense understood by the layman to mean
interference in any form and that the narrow interpretation would deprive the article of
all meaning.106
No clear interpretation was given at the San Francisco Conference, though the
travaux preparatoires show that the US delegation stated that domestic jurisdiction
should be viewed as a fundamental principle and not as a mere "technical and
legalistic formula".107 It seems that at San Francisco Conference there was a tendency
for an extensive interpretation of the term "intervention" in Article 2(7).
To examine the term "intervention", it is primarily necessary to consider whether the
discussion of a question within the domestic jurisdiction of a state would constitute
"intervention"?
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons believe that placing a matter on the agenda and
discussion do not constitute intervention. 108 While there is a belief that, at the stage of
discussion, the UN organs do not have real decision-making powers, the questions
examined usually have political importance, and the UN constitutes a center where
world public opinion is reflected, discussion "has an importance that is equal to if not
greater than the decision-making stage."I°9
106.. L. Preuss, op. cit., p. 553-653.
107- UNCIO, Vol. 6, Doc. 1019, Verbatim minutes, 17th Meeting of Committee 1/1, P. 512.
108_ Goodrich et.al., op. cit„ p. 67.
109.. B. Conforti, op. cit, p. 147.78
However, discussion in order to establish whether or not a matter comes within
domestic jurisdiction would be permissible "but the discussion must be kept within
the limits necessary for this purpose. The natural, even if not the only, time for such
discussion is before a matter is placed on the agenda. Placing a question of domestic
jurisdiction on the agenda does not therefore constitute an intervention under Article
2, para. 7 as long as such placement occurres in order to discuss and assess whether
the question has purely a domestic nature or not." 110 According to this opinion, the
involvement of the Organisation in the primary stages of consideration of a matter
should not contravene the domestic jurisdiction of a state..
Recommendations and resolutions of an organ of the United Nations are controversial
issues and need an examination of whether they constitute "intervention" in domestic
affairs of the state concerned, within the meaning of Article 2(7). Some interpreters
believe in a narrow and restrictive interpretation of the term "intervention". Among
them, Lauterpacht introduced a distinction in recommendations of the
Organisation.111
Lauterpacht explained that there is no legal obligation for member states to accept a
recommendation or take into account the general sense of a discussion or to act upon
the results of an enquiry and there may be pressure of the public opinion of the world
on them. H2 The only possible exception would be that of recommendations whereby
direct pressure, likely to be followed by enforcement measures upon a state in a matter
110_11
111_ H. Lauterpacht, "The International Protection of Human Rights", Recueil Des Cours, (The Hague
Academy of International Law, the Hague, 1947-1), p. 100. In the economic, social and humanitarian
spheres, he believes "a recommendation, even if specifically addressed to a state, not being in the
nature of a binding decision the disregard of which may entail legal consequences, does not constitute
intervention". Ibid, p. 21. He said "a recommendation is in fact in the nature of a decision the disregard
of which may in certain eventualities involve coercion, it may fall within the terms of Article 2,
paragraph 7". ail p. 20.
112_ Id79
which is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, probably would come within the
terms of Article 2(7).113
Higgins also believes that "[c]ertainly it does tend to show that the primary aim of the
clause was to exclude direct legislative intervention by the United Nations in matters
normally reserved to the legislation of the state". 114 However, according to Preuss "[i]t
is impossible to find any warrant, either in the text or in the general scheme of the
Charter, for a distinction between a recommendation toute simple, and a
'recommendation' which is in some ways indistinguishable from a decision" •115
Member states should settle their international disputes by peaceful means. This
obligation is not enforceable and, under Article 2(7) when the dispute arises out of a
matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, does not apply.116
Therefore, there is "no Charter basis either for the restrictive interpretation of
'intervention' or for the distinction between coercive and non-coercive
recommendation which is its corollary. The purpose of Article 2(7) is to prohibit the
application, in the course of peaceful settlement, of every form of pressure against a
state within whose domestic jurisdiction the subject matter of the dispute has been
determined to fall."117
Consequently, when an internal matter is concerned, the United Nations must refrain
from adopting a resolution whether it is a recommendation addressed to a state, or an
act of an organising nature (such as the establishment of a committee of enquiry), or a
decision of an operational nature (such as a decision by the General Assembly to
undertake a study of the economic or social situation within a state).118
113- H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, (New York, 1950), pp. 169-70.
114_ R. Higgins, op. cit., p. 72.
115.. L. Preuss, ozsil, p. 609.
116_ kl,
117_ hid, p. 610.
118.. B. Conforti, op. cit., p. 147.80
With regard to the power of the United Nations, specially the General Assembly and
the Economic and Social Council, in the economic and social fields, it is believed that
recommendations could not be made where they consituted "intervention", even if
they did relate to "domestic" questions, because they dealt with them on the general
plane of international cooperation, and not within the domestic sphere of a certain
state) 19
It seems that the scope of powers of the United Nations in the economic and social
fields is restricted not only by the rule contained in Article 2(7), but also by the
limitation imposed generally by the Charter upon the powers of the General Assembly
and the Economic and Social Council)20 Preuss emphasises that "[t]here is no
provision of the Charter which empowers any organ of the United Nations to
penetrate directly into the domestic life of member states in order to regulate their
economic and social affairs")21
It can be concluded that the framers of the Charter inserted Article 2(7) as a
reassurance that the United Nations would not undertake to intervene in domestic
affairs of member states. The conclusions based upon the travaux preparatoires
indicate "a use of the term (intervention) in the broad and non-technical sense".122
119- D. Nincic, op. cit., pp. 168-9. The US delegation to the San Francisco Conference, in his report to
the president said, "to extend this principle (non-intervention in domestic affairs) to the activities of the
Organisation as a whole, instead of limiting it to the pacific settlement of disputes as had been
proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, seemed desirable because of the amplification of the power and
authority given to the Assembly and, particularly, to the Economic and Social Council. Without
general limitation, which now flows from the statement of the principle in Chapter I, it might have
been supposed that the Economic and Social Council could interfere directly in the domestic economy,
social structure, or cultural or educational arrangements of the member states. Such a possibility is now
definitely excluded." Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the result of the San
Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State,
(Department of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71, 1945), p. 44.
120_ L. Preuss, op. cit„ p. 608. Lauterpacht has also supported this view. See: L. Oppenheim,
International Law, (7th ed., 1948), p. 379, note 1.
121_ Ibid, p. 578.
122_ ibi„,5 
p. 619.81
Therefore, discussion and investigation in disputes concerning questions within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state, or recommendation on settlement of a dispute that the
subject matter is within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, are excluded from the
activities of the United Nations.
The exception to Article 2(7)
"The United Nations is the creature of a treaty and, as such, it exercises authority
legitimately only in so far as it deploys powers which the treaty parties have assigned
to it."123 The treaty parties decided to create Article 2(7) to protect their sovereignty
from UN interference in matters which essentially are internal except when the
Security Council authorises enforcement measures under Chapter VII.  When the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, decides upon enforcement action, it
should decide that the matter threatened international peace and security and therefore
has already gone beyond the limits of domestic jurisdiction.
The United Nations is essentially an international organisation, concerned only with
international matters. I24 Although the limitation under Article 2(7) is on measures
short of enforcement, the power of the Security Council for collective measures, like
other powers of the UN organs, is limited to purposes which are essentially
international in character.
There is a question whether recommendations under Chapter VII are excluded from
the general rule contained in Article 2(7). Higgins believes that the travaux
preparatoires indicate that the restriction of the exception to enforcement measures
was deliberate. 125 She explains that, "[i]f a matter is giving rise to apprehension
123.. T. M. Franck, ozsit., p. 83.
124_ John W. Halderman, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, (Oceana Publications Inc., USA,
1966), p. 196.
125.. R. Higgins,	 p. 87.82
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, but it is a potential
threat rather than an actual threat and is causing international friction rather than a
breach of the peace, then - in spite of an obligation under Article 2(7) - the Security
Council may recommend measures under Chapter VI, for the question has become
one of international concern ... if, there is no finding, implied or express, under Article
39, and there is only a question of international friction, no recommendations under
Chapter VII may be made in the face of an objection on grounds of domestic
jurisdiction, though in certain circumstances, where the element of international
concern becomes pronounced, action may be available to the Council under Chapter
vut26
However, "international concern" is a vague concept to which the Charter has not
referred, and there is no definition for it. Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations had stated that "any war or threat of war ... is hereby declared a matter of
concern to the whole League ...". It is believed that "in League practice, however,
there was a distinction between concern and jurisdiction". 127 "Concern" is a broad
political concept while "jurisdiction" is a legal one. 128 If we accept that the political
concept controls the legal one, it means effectively that the latter is no longer treated
with the uniformity and predictability that one tends to associate with law, or at least
with the legal idea1.129 "Obviously, many more matters may be of international
concern than of international jurisdiction, and as a result this substitution of 'concern'
for 'jurisdiction' as the complement to domestic jurisdiction has created a concept of
unparalleled scope and ambiguity.,mo
126_ aid, p. 90.
127- Howell, "Domestic Question in International Law", 48 AS1L Procs. (1954), pp. 90, 93.
128_ J. S. Watson, "Autointerpretation, Competence, and the Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter", 71 A. J. I. L. (1977), p. 78.
129_ id
130_ Ld,83
To apply the domestic jurisdiction clause contained in Article 2(7), it seems it would
be inappropriate to shift from legal criteria of "international jurisdiction" as opposed
to "domestic jurisdiction" to a political element of "international concern" as opposed
to "domestic concern". The scope of "international jurisdiction" has been determined
by Chapters VI and VII, and once the procedural and substantive standards have been
met, the Organisation can use the powers which are delegated to it.
When a bona fide131 "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"132
is discovered by the Security Council, the Charter empowers the Council to take
action, even when the object of its action is "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of state".133 The Security Council might take action in the form of
"measures not involving the use of armed force", 134 or enforcement action "by air, sea
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security",135 and "may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations".136
Consequently, international jurisdiction will be established when any of the three
strands of Article 39, i.e. threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,
is determined by the Security Council. It seems that "breaches of the peace and acts of
aggression" might not be discovered in a matter which is "essentially domestic". Even
an actual "threat to the peace" needs to have an international element to be considered
as a threat to international peace and security.
The United Nations has not referred systematically to the three categories of act of
aggression, breach of or threat to the peace. In recent years, the Security Council has






demonstrated its tendency to invoke Chapter VII in circumstances that there was no
international military confrontation, and the subject matter could hardly be considered
as an international matter.
The UN practice concerning domestic jurisdiction
There have been cases of discussion undertaken or resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly or the Security Council that may imply interference with the internal affairs
of a state by the United Nations. In some cases the UN has condemned facist
governments such as the Franco regime in Spain, or governments established by force
as in Czechoslovakia, Hungaria and Haiti, or the governments imposed by foreign
powers as in Cambodia in 1979 and Afghanistan in 1980. In some cases internal crises
or civil wars have led the UN to intervene, such as the cases of Yugoslavia, Somalia
and Rwanda. Racial policies in South Rhodesia and South Africa led the UN to
intervene.
The nature of a nation's regime and its policies has been the basis of United Nations
intervention in Iraq in matters essentially domestic, in the absence of military
hostilities or occupation. 137 Iraq's "uncooperative behaviour" 138 rose to the level of a
threat to the peace implicating the use of collective measures to compel co-operation
with matters beyond those specified as binding obligations of the Charter. 139 In the
name of restoring peace and security in the region, the Council imposed intrusive
conditions on Iraq comparable to those of the Treaty of Versailles. 140 The Security
137- Sc Res. 687, 3 Apr. 1991.
138- "Uncooperative behaviour" is the wording used by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs in justifying the legitimacy of extending and augmenting Council's jurisdiction
indefinitely with regard to its demands from Iraq. C. A. Fleischhauer, "The Year of International Law
in Review", Address to the 86th Annual Meeting of the A. S. I. L, 4 April 1992.
139-T. M. Franck, op. cit„ p. 99.
140.. 0. Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 A. J. I. L„ (1991), p. 456. Franck
quotes the same statement by Schachter and further explaines that, in respect of the military capability,
the Council required Iraq to destroy all its chemical and biological weapons, to renounce development
of nuclear weapons and all but short range ballistic missiles (Res. 687 paras. 8, 12). It empowered the85
Council recognised its authority to continue to use economic sanctions and mandatory
inspections to control important aspects of the armament policy of a sovereign
state.141 The Council decided that it would "remain seized of the matter" and could
"take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present
resolution [Res. 687] and to secure peace and security in the area". 142 It is implied that
the "uncooperative behaviour", and "non-compliance" of a state "with its
obligations",143 would cause the Council's interference in domestic jurisdiction of that
state.
Two separate issues need be considered in evaluating the United Nations practice
concerning domestic jurisdiction, namely the right of self-determination and human
rights. With regard to colonial question in the context of the right of self-
determination, the United Nations has had an important role in the process of
decolonisation. The General Assembly took the initiative in the matter including
deciding if and when the various peoples subject to foreign rule were to gain
independence,144 "thereby realising the most far-reaching type of intervention in the
internal affairs of the colonising powers" 145
It seems that United Nations practice in respect of decolonisation has been inspired by
the principle of self-determination referred to in Article 1(2) of the Charter. However,
not only the General Assembly resolutions and declarations, but also the actual
International Atomic Energy Agency to engage in extensive inspection of suspected nuclear
capabilities within Iraq and permits an international commission to conduct searches by land and air
and to destroy a large range of prohibited weapons and facilities for their manufacture (Ibid, para. 9).
T. M. Franck, op. cit., p. 97.
141- SC Res. 687, 3 Apr. 1991, paras. 21-25.
142- Ibid, para. 34.
143- SC Res. 707, 15 Aug. 1991, para. 2. This paragraph refers to Iraq's "non-compliance" with its
obligations under its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency "which
constitutes a violation of its commitments as a party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1 July 1968".
144.. The General Assembly Declaration of 1960 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples recognised that the subjection of a people to alien domination was to be
considered contrary to the Charter. GA Res. 1514-XV, 14 Dec. 1960.
145- B. Conforti, op. cit„ p. 143.86
behaviour of states, show that the principle of self-determination, or more correctly
the right of self-determination, has a limited sphere of application. It is believed that
"it applies only in territories under a domination of a foreign Government and,
therefore, besides colonial territories, in those which have been conquered and
occupied by force (for example, the territories occupied by Israel in 1967).n146
However, by the end of the Cold War, new interpretations have been given in the
spheres of the right of self-determination and human rights. These interpretations
represent new attacks to weaken state sovereignty claims and the domestic jurisdiction
clause in Article 2(7). It is an opinion that the domain reserved to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state is quite small and "international law has evolved to the point
that matters which would have been unthinkable for states to have relinquished only
twenty years ago are now subject to international security". 147 It is also a belief that
"the international community has a right to intervene to uphold basic humanitarian
rights ... The rise of collective humanitarian intervention and the shrinking of
traditional conceptions of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction are essential for the
preservation of peace in the new international order".148
Another argument to extend international power and limit domestic jurisdiction is that
"the Security Council (or at least its members) should pursue initiatives that foster the
creation and development of rule of law institutions within countries as a process of
'deterrence from within'. Initiatives of this type are the most likely to be considered as
intruding upon 'the sovereignty' of nations. Yet threats to international peace and
security have their roots in internal structures, and if we are to take such threats
seriously we must be willing to rethink our methods of addressing them".149
146- !bid, p. 250.
147- F. R. Teson, "Collective Humanitarian Intervention", 17 Mich. J. Int. L., No. 2, (1996), pp. 370-1
148-Id.,
149- S. D. Murphy, "The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security after
the Cold War", 32 Colum. J. Transnat'l L„ No. 2, (1994), pp. 287-8.87
A few scholars have asserted that some controversial rights, such as the right of self-
determination, exercised through secession has achieved the status of a legal right
with universal application. 150 However, most scholars would agree that no such
universally cognisable right to self-determination yet exists. 151 In fact, from a legal
point and in the context of the exercise of enforcement measures by the Security
Council, 'lilt would be misleading to say that the International Community can
require that all Governments of the earth must have the consent of the majority of
their subjects and have been freely chosen by them. Similarly it would be misleading
to say that it may allow all secessionist aspirations of regions that are ethnically
distinct from the rest of the country". 152 It may also be argued that it is not acceptable
that the Organisation exercise its enforcement powers to impose any form of
government, democratic or otherwise, on the population of a state.153
Indeed, the UN Charter has referred to the principle of self-determination (Article
1(2)), to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all (Articles 1(3) and 55(c)), but how are these compatible with the
principle of the sovereign equality and the domestic jurisdiction clause (Articles 2(1)
and 2(7))? There should be a kind of reconciliation between the above-mentioned
priciples without sacrificing either. Such reconciliation can be achieved by holding
that in all matters of domestic jurisdiction, "the Organisation may adopt only
resolutions of general applicability (drafts for multilateral conventions,
150- Gebre	 Tesfagorias, "Self-determination: Its Evolution and Practice by the United Nations and
Its Application to the Case of Eritrea", 6 Wis. Intl. L. J., (1992), pp. 75, 92.
151_ Angela M. Lloyd, "The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Seccession", 32 Colum J. 
Transn'l L., No. 2, (1994), p. 427.
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recommendations addressed to all the states, and so on), while it is precluded from
adopting resolutions concerning individual states. This is objectively the only
convincing solution if we consider the opening phrase of Article 2, para. 7 •.."154
By broadening the concepts of international peace and threat to the peace, negating
domestic jurisdiction clause in the name of human rights, and abolishing the
distinction between international wars and civil wars, as Leo Gross states, "the area of
matters covered by Article 2(7) has been reduced to the vanishing point".155
The debate on human rights has increased in the Security Council's work in the post-
Cold War era. On the other hand, the fear that the issue of human rights becoming an
excuse for intervention in the domestic affairs of states has been reinforced. The
reason for such fear is that "any situation within a given state which is injurious to
human dignity - from mistreatment of minorities to the adoption of economic and
social policies detrimental to the population, to suffering imposed on the civilian
population by civil wars - is now the object of United Nations action whether or not it
constitutes the violation of a specific international obligation".156
It might be said that where human rights violations are short of genocide or apartheid
(which are severe and brutal violations of human rights), despite the general
ratification of the two UN covenants on human rights in 1966 and other international
agreements promoted by the UN, other violations of human rights which are not gross
violations come within the matters "essentially" within domestic jurisdiction. 157 In the
absence of an objective definition of what constitutes a human rights violation, the
intervention in domestic affairs of states should be restricted.
154- B. Conforti, op. cit„ p. 142.
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Such statements as "[t]he non-military sources of instability in the economic, social.
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to the peace" 158 which
represent the new thinking of the post-Cold War leaders, are not certainly what the
drafters of the UN Charter had mind. Following the World War II there was a trend to
broaden the limit of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) compared to the limit in
Article 15(8) of the Covenant. As mentioned earlier, the US delegate emphasised on
extention of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of states and on
national sovereignty. I59 There was also considerable concern in relation to the
American domestic policy that the US Senate would not ratify the Charter, as it had
not in the past ratified the Covenant, if the limit of domestic jurisdiction (including
their own) was not strongly defended.1613
The above-mentioned concern is still important not only to Americans but also to all
other countries. Therefore, it will be dangerous to claim that "non-military sources of
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields" constitute
threat to the peace, and justify the United Nations intervention in domestic affairs of
states.
Although the human rights conventions restrict the area of domestic jurisdiction, this
does not mean that the principle of non-intervention has vanished. In fact, the
conventions on human rights have not so far been enforced by international society,
and it is still widely held that intervention to protect human rights is not permissible
under international law.I61
158- British Prime Minister John Major in a joint declaration on behalf of the Security Council
members. S/PV. 3046 (1992).
159- Report to the President on the Result of the San Francisco Conference, op. cit., p. 44.
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Respect for human rights involves an acceptance of the fundamental principle of an
equality of rights to the basic goods of life, liberty and property; "this principle can be
interpreted and developed in various ways, and its recognition should thus be
compatible with the existence of a variety of cultural practices in different states".162
The idea of supranational role for the United Nations in protecting human rights and
the right of self-determination is not compatible with the structure, principles and
purposes of the Organisation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the United States
was opposed to giving a supranational role to the new organisation at the primary
discussions to create the international organisation. The main drafters intended that
the UN should be based on the same basis that the League was based. It would be a
great mistake to recognise the UN as a supranational government with supranational
jurisdiction on the basis of the rules and principles of international law. Because
international law and supranational law are distinct legal systems which derive their
validity from different bases, the former from the concept of the legal equality of
states and the latter from the idea of the ultimate unity of the legal systems of the
world.163
The competence of interpretation of Article 2(7)
The Covenant of the League of Nations in Article 15(8) required that the
determination of whether a matter was of domestic jurisdiction was to be made by the
League Counci1. 164 However, in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter there is a complete
absence of any reference to an organ authorised to decide whether or not a question
falls within domestic jurisdiction. At the San Francisco Conference some delegates
believed that the effect of the omission would be to confer the essentially juridical
162.. 1.1.
163- .1, S. Watson, op. cit.., p. 83.
164- Article 15(8) of the Covenant.91
function of determination upon the Security Council - a political body unrestricted in
its judgments by objective legal standards.I65
In order to prevent such a possibility the Greek Government proposed that: "It should
be left to the International Court of Justice at the request of a party to decide whether
or not such situation or dispute arises out of matters that under international law, fall
within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned". 166 However, this proposal
failed to receive the required two-third majority. A proposal that the General
Assembly might be given the power to interpret the Charter also failed to be
adopted.167
At the Conference no article was created to determine that who has the competence to
decide on the applicability of domestic jurisdiction. Lauterpacht pointed out that "the
authority to decide upon disputed questions of interpretation of the Charter belongs, in
principle, to the organ charged with its application". 168 It was generally assumed at the
Conference that each organ of the UN would interpret the Charter for itself as related
to its functions. In this regard a quotation from the Rapparteur of Committee IV/2 is
useful: "In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the
Organisation, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as
are applicable to its particular functions. This process is inherent in the functioning of
anybody which operates under an instrument defining its functions and powers. It will
be manifested in the functioning of such a body as the General Assembly, the Security
Council, or the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, it is not necessary to
include in the Charter a provision either authorising or approving the normal operation
of this principle."169
165- L. Preuss, op. cit., p. 595.
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However, it has been argued that "[f]irstly, the Rapporteur is directing his remarks at
'day to day' operations, which is a far cry indeed from legally binding interpretations
on highly charged political issues. Secondly, this statement is obviously aimed at
interpretations made by the organ for its own use. There is no mention here of the
legal significance of such interpretations for a member state."  170
It might be said that the Charter's silence with regard to interpretation is an element
contributing to proving this view that interpretation of each organ of the United
Nations on its own at the time it adopts specific measures, would not be binding for
the member states, though the attribution of a sovereign power of interpretation by the
organs owing to its importance would have required an explicit provision.m
There is an argument that if the UN organs had the sovereign power to interpret the
Charter provisions with a binding effect on the member states, there would be the
possibility of violating them with impunity, since any decision could be justifiable in
the light of a subjective and "special" interpretation of the Charter.172
The right of interpretation (without binding force) by the UN political organs within
the context of domestic jurisdiction would be the source of confusion. Goodrich
believes that the responsibility of political organs for interpreting and applying the
domestic jurisdiction principle "has undoubtedly resulted in a more liberal, and some
would say more confused, interpretation of the powers of United Nations organs and
consequently a more narrow interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction limitation than
would have been given by a court of law ... there has been a tendancy on the part of
individual Members to play down the domestic jurisdiction principle in those
170.. J. S. Watson, op. cit., p. 63.
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instances where they want United Nations actions and to stress its importance and
inviolability when it is to their interests not to have the United Nations take any
action. As a result, decisions of United Nations organs on the application of the
domestic jurisdiction principle ... are likely to be decided more by bloc alignments
and considerations of advantage and expediency than by any reasoned attempt to
apply objective standards to the situation in question". 173 The net result according to
Goodrich would be the reduction of the importance of the domestic jurisdiction
principle as a limitation and to enlarge the possibilities of UN actions.174
However, it is clear from the following statement that interpretation of UN organs
would not have binding force for member states. Reference should be made to a
passage from the Rapporteur of Committee IV/2 as follows: "It is to be understood, of
course, that if an interpretation made by any organ of the Organisation or by a
committee of jurists is not generally acceptable, it will be without binding force. In
such circusmstances, or in cases where it is desired to establish an authoritative
interpretation as a prcedent for the future, it may be necessary to embody the
interpretation in an amendment to the Charter. This may always be accomplished by
recourse to the procedure provided for amendment"175
Regarding the states' interpretation, Kelsen has said that "this is one of the absurd
consequences of the interpretation, compatible with the wording of the Charter, that it
is upon the state concerned to decide for itself whether a matter is essentially within
its domestic jurisdiction".176 It seems the drafters of the Charter left the organs and
members of the Organisation free to determine for themselves and by such procedures
as they might choose the meaning of Charter provisions.I77 Therefore, the Security
173- Leiland M. Goodrich, The United Nations, (Stevens and Sons, London, 1960), p. 77.
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Council and the General Assembly may adopt different views with regard to the
interpretation of a specific provision of the Charter, and also a member state may
adopt a view of its own. If the interpretation of a political organ lead to taking action,
the member state concerned may question that interpretation. Its question would
contain whether the action is in accordance with the Charter and international law.
In fact, the element of law rather than the political purposes of individual states should
be employed by the UN organs. There is a possibility that the conduct of a state does
not violate the rights of other states or international rules, and is essentially domestic,
but in some ways might be injurious to the interests of other states. In this case, it may
be claimed that there is an nternational concern but neither the United Nations nor the
individual states would be permitted to take action against that state. The UN action
should be completely compatible with all principles and purposes of the Charter, and
none of these principles and purposes be sacrificed. Furthermore, they should be
applied equally to all states and not to a group of states.
REVIEWING SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISIONS
There is a question as to, if the Security Council in its interpretation of the Charter or
in making a decision committed a grave mistake either because its decision was ultra
vires or in violation of principles of international law, how the Council's decision
could be reviewed and whether the Council is obliged to change its decision.
The UN Charter did not envisage any review mechanism of a judicial nature over the
legality of the actions of the UN organs. The advisory function of the International
Court of Justice cannot serve this purpose, since it cannot be requested by states but
can only be requested by the UN organs.I78
178- Article 96 of the Charter.95
There were many amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals submitted in order to
secure the collaboration of the General Assembly with the Security Council in the
management of conflicts. These amendments were not accepted by the four
sponsoring powers, and the US delegate observed that it was inconceivable that any
action of the Council would be contrary to the wishes of a majority of the Assembly
and so the Council would be a representative body of the Assembly just as the
Assembly would be representative of the various countries.179
As mentioned earlier, at the San Francisco Conference there were amendments for
ensuring that the Security Council implements its duties relating to peace and security.
It was suggested that the International Court of Justice could be asked by a state party
to a dispute on whether a recommendation or a decision made by the Council or
proposed in it infringed its essential rights.'" It was proposed that, if the Court
considered that these rights have been disregarded or threatened, the Council would
either reconsider the question or refer the dispute to the Assembly. 181 However, these
suggestions were not accepted at the Conference.
It might be said that none of the organs of the United Nations is in a position of
hierarchial superiority or subordination. In fact, primary organs of the Organisation
are institutionally equal and no organ can serve as an appellate body over the other's
actions.182 Once the Court determines it has jurisdiction in a particular dispute, it can
and must carry out its functions, despite the fact that each question is possessed of
both a legal and political dimension. 183 The Council is also an organ with a political
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nature to ensure collective security whose decisions would not be apart from the legal
considerations.
However, because of the East-West conflict and the Cold War, the Council had
minimum role in conflict management over forty years. It was expected that, by the
end of the Cold War, the Council would respond to conflicts properly and effectively
according to the principles and purposes of the Charter.
In fact, the Council extended its actions from a response to classical international
aggression to measures adopted in fundamentally different situations. Several
examples of recent Security Council measures in the context of Chapter VII exist
which have broken new ground and triggered a certain amount of controversy. These
include providing the terms of cessation of hostilities against a defeated aggressor
state with far reaching effects on that state's sovereignty;
two individuals allegedly responsible for acts of state sponsored terrorism directed
against two permanent members of the Council for trial in their national courts;185
military intervention in response to the breakdown of civil authority and the resulting
international anarchy in another state;186 and the severe limitation of a UN member
state's right of individual and collective self-defence through a mandatory arms
embargo' 87.
"Whether or not one feels that any of these, or other examples of recent measures
taken by the Security Council, is in any way ultra vires, illegal or just poor policy, it
is clear that they all fall outside the classical type of activity envisaged in the Charter
184..Sc Res. 687, 3 Apr. 1991.
185..SC Res. 748, 31 Mar. 1992, in conjunction with SC Res. 731,21 Jan. 1992.
186..SC Res. 794, 3 Dec. 1992.
187..SC Res. 713,25 Sep. 1991.
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and give rise to reasonable questions regarding the role and function of the Council in
the exercise of its authority."188
It is useful at this point to discuss the case of Libya which relates to allegations of acts
of state sponsored terrorism directed against two permanent members of the Council.
The remaining cases, relating to other categories mentioned above, will be discussed
in detail in the relevant chapters of this thesis.
In the case of Libya several issues raised regarding the Security Council, as the organ
charged with primary responsibility for international peace and security, and the
International Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. In
this case, the demands were put forward in the Council by the United States and the
United Kingdom for handing over of two Libyans who had been indicted in the US
and the UK on the suspicion of having caused the explosion of the American Airliner
over Lockerbie in Scotland.189
Libya had denied the allegations made by the US and the UK, and in its
communications to the Security Council reserved "the right to legitimate self-defence
before a fair and impartial jurisdiction, before the United Nations and before the
International Court of Justice and other bodies". 190 Libya asserted that the matter was
"purely legal question" outside the competence of the Council, and this organ should
recommend settlement through legal channels within the framework of the Montreal
Convention, in particular arbitration as envisaged in Article 14 of the Convention.191
By adopting Resolution 731 by the Council on 3 March 1992, in which the Council
urged the Libyan Government to provide a full and effective response to the above
188_i. D. Gill, op, cit„ p. 36.
189- Sc Res. 731,21 Jan. 1992.
190.. S/23221, 16 Nov. 1991.
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mentioned requests, Libya asked the Court to enjoin the United States and the United
Kingdom from taking action to compel or coerce it into surrendering the accused and
to ensure that no steps be taken.192
The United States and the United Kingdom preferred further action by the Security
Councile. On 31 March the Council adopted Resolution 748 and qualified as a threat
to international peace and security the failure by Libya to demonstrate its renunciation
of terrorism by not surrendering two officials to the United States or the United
Kingdom and decided to impose enforcement measures under Chapter VII to obtain
Libya's compliance.193
On 14 April, the day before the Council's measures were to come into effect, the
International Court of Justice denied interim measures. 194 The Court emphasised that
it was not called to decide definitely the legal effect of Resolution 748 or its
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case.195
The Court considered that "whatever the situation previous to the adoption of that
resolution, the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now be
regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures." 196 It
found that the parties as members of the United Nations, are obliged to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the
Charter and this obligation extended to the decision contained in Resolution 748.197
192.. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
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The Court stressed that, in accordance with article 103 of the Charter, the obligations
of the parties under this resolution superseded any obligations under any other
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention. 198 The Court concluded
that the indication of provisional measures would deprive the United States and the
United Kingdom of their rights under the resolution 748.199
The opinion of the World Court in the case of Libya demonstrates that states would
remain under an obligation provisionally to comply with decisions of the Security
Council even if they consider them ultra vires.200 However, as some of the judges in
separate and dissenting judgements suggested, it seems that the Court would be
prepared to act as guardian of Charter law which implies the possibility of the Court
overruling decisions of the Counci1.201 Nevertheless, the Court has been reluctant to
discuss the Council's decisions, most likely because the former prefers to avoid
opposing the latter.
Judge Bedjaoui noted that for the first time there was the possibility of one organ of
the UN influencing the decision of the other and the possibility of conflict between the
two decisions.202 He questioned the prudence of the Council in acting under Chapter
VII, referring to the three years time between the event and the Council deciding that
the matter constituted an imminent threat to the peace. 203 Having recognised the
Council's role as the sole determiner of the position of a political dispute, he regretted
that the Council did not seek an advisory opinion of the Court since Article 36 of the
Charter requires that all legal disputes be addressed to the Court.204
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Bowett in an example considers a decision by the Council on sovereignty and
territorial integrity of a state. He writes: "it is possible that the surest way to restore
international peace and security, in a situation created by the aggression of a powerful
State A, would be for the Council to agree that A should have what it covets, namely
part of the territory of weaker State B. But could the Council decide, with binding
effect, that B must transfer the territory to A in the interests of restoring peace?
Instinctively, one would reply in the negative, and, clearly, the simple recital of the
binding effect of Council decisions under Article 25 would provide no kind of
satisfactory answer" •205
The member states agreed to carry out decisions of the Council in accordance with the
Charter.206 On the other hand, the Security Council must act in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter,207 and is obliged under Article 1(1) to adhere
to the principles of international law and justice. Consequently, ultra vires decisions
may not be obligatory for member states.
Judicial review of Security Council resolutions is as much a concern today as it was
when the Charter was drafted in 1945. Kelsen considered the Security Council as a
political agency whose decisions would be determined rather by political principles
than by rules of positive law. He suggested that where "the Security Council takes
enforcement action against any state under the Charter, it should at the same time
submit the case to the international court of justice and should stop its action if the
court should decide that the state in question had not been guilty of a violation of the
Charter" 208
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The drafters of the Charter did not envisage the right of member states if their
essential rights under the Charter are breached by the Council's action, nor did they
make a provision for judicial control or review of the acts of the UN political organs.
Reisman points to the existence of the veto and the expansion of the non-permanent
seats in the Council in 1963 from six to ten to show that these political checks and
balances are adequate constraints on Council's conduct.209 It seems that Reisman
focused on an internal check, and believed that the freedom of the Security Council's
authority should not be fettered by external sources.
There is another view that, if the UN system is to be effective, it is necessary that the
checks and balances should not be exclusively internal to each organ; rather the
checks should be carried out by the interaction of the organs. 2I0 In this case the
International Court of Justice is considered as a guardian of legality of actions by the
UN organs and in particular the Security Council, though the International Court of
Justice is not a kind of constitutional court exercising general powers of judicial
review.
It is believed that, although the Council has the responsibility for enforcement
measures to affect and suspend the rights of states and individuals, its powers are not
unlimited, nor is it impossible to determine whether the Council has or has not these
legal standards.211 For determination of the legal limits of the Council's powers close
examination of the Charter's principles and purposes shows that they include well-
recognised and defined principles of international law which provide a sufficient legal
209- W. Michael Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations", 81 A. J. I. L., (19 03), pp.
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basis to determine whether measures taken by the Council are or are not lega1.212
These principles and purposes include, together with long existing rules and principles
relating to the rights of states such as territorial integrity and independence, also
fundamental rules of human rights law and rules relating to the humantarian conduct
of armed conflict.213
In case of violations of these standards by the Security Council, it is necessary to look
at the possible remedies. Countermeasures to restore equalities between the injured
state and the offending state by suspension or withdrawal of some privilege or right by
the former vis-a-vis the latter in order to induce the offending state to cease its illegal
conduct, are only likely to be practical and effective in situations where the injured
state has some degree of leverage over the offending state, and would be unsuitable
and inappropriate remedies for illegal Council action.214
Although another remedy has been suggested215 as non-compliance by the member
states, which is claimed to be probably an effective remedy (not immediately, but in
the long term), it may only be effective if a large number of states do not comply, and
it cannot be considered as a guaranteed response to an illegal act by the Council. On
the other hand, the Council derives its authority from the member states which have
invested it with the powers delegated to it. Therefore, the Council should maintain its
legitimacy and effectiveness by reflecting the legitimate will of states and having the
role of representation of all states in maintaining international peace and security.
Several suggestions have been made on the mechanism of legal control of Security
Council decisions. One suggestion is that the World Court has no direct power of
judicial review, but "is competent to pronounce on the validity of Security Council
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determinations of legal responsibility either where this arises as an issue in an inter-
state dispute or when an advisory opinion is requested .... Alternatively, the Council is
free to refer such challenges by any state to arbitration or to a Commission of
Jurists".216 Another suggestion is that "the Council or the Assembly could establish a
set of guidelines that would provide for automatic involvement of the Court" under
certain circumstances.217 The final suggestion is that the General Assembly could
establish an impartial body under Article 96 that would monitor internal crises and
request an advisory opinion when it deemed necessary.218
It is true that the Permanent Members of the Security Council act politically. It is also
understood that they may not be represented by lawyers, though, this cannot be
accepted as a justification for ignoring the rule of law. The Security Council, with its
powers conferred by the Charter, should put the legal basis for its decisions as the
prime objective, and political considerations should fall within the framework drawn
by legal considerations. It is primarily essential that the Council clarify the
constitutional basis of each and every decisions in its resolutions. "Common sense
would suggest that the authority of a political organ must depend on respect for the
Rule of Law and that there is an essential link between operational efficacy and
legality. 11219
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
The role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has developed during the life
of the Organisation. The Secretary-General can act within narrow and undefined
limits with independence in respect of international peace and security. His
216. Derek Bowett, op. cit., p. 101.
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personality, intelligence and experience are important in performing his duties. Within
the UN Charter, Chapter XV has been devoted to the Secretariat, the articles of which
relating to the political function of the Secreatry-General will be discussed here.
Article 99 and the political function of the Secretary-General
The direct political function of the Secretary-General derives from Article 9 9. This
article says: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the international peace and security."
This article has put the Secretary-General in a position that, in case of beginning the
occurrence of a breach of the peace, he may bring the matter to the attention of the
Security Council for consideration. The implication of this right makes him an
integral part of the discussions and actions regarding peace and security in the
Security Council.
Article 99 refers to "any matter" not exclusively of a "dispute or situation". This
implies a broad scope regarding international peace and security. However, the matter
should be accompanied by convincing evidences with serious content to engage the
Security Council. "Because of the possibility of a determination that a breach of the
peace has occurred, the direct interests of the great powers are automatically engaged.
Whatever the estimates of the Secretary-General may be, the permanent members of
the Council have the ultimate burden of responding to his initiative ... Whatever his
decisions in regard to Article 99, the Secretary-General faces a difficult and delicate
set of political problems.,1220
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The Secretary-General Hammarskjold was the first who invoked Article 99 at the time
of beginning the Congo crisis in 1960. 221 Earlier, the President and the Prime Minister
of the Congo jointly had asked the Secretary-General for military assistance to end a
"Belgian ... act of aggression against our country" .222 There was also an internal crisis
in the Congo regarding the secession of Katanga. The Secretary-General did not refer
to the Belgian "aggression" as a main problem in the Congo, rather he considered the
Congo's internal matter as a threat to the international peace. 223 The Security Council
by its resolution called upon Belgium to withdraw, and authorised the Secretary-
General to take necessary steps to provide "military assistance" in consultation with
the Congolese government until the Congolese security forces met their tasks fully.224
Although Resolution 143 did not refer to any finding under Article 39, Secretary-
General Hammarskjold's first report on the the deployment of forces contained that
the breakdown of the instruments of the government for maintenance of law and order
"represented a threat to peace and security justifying United Nations intervention on
the basis of the explicit request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. Thus
the two main elements, from the legal point of view, were on the one side this request
and, on the other hand, the implied finding that the circumstances to which I had
referred were such as to justify United Nations action under the Charter".225
Hammarskj old's use of Article 99 to start the the Council in motion gives the first
indication as to the possible constitutional basis of the action for he believed that his
use of Article 99 necessarily implied a finding by himself of a situation falling within
Article 39.226 The Secreatry-General did not want to categorise the Belgian
221_ 15 SCOR, 873rd mtg., para 18, (1960).
222.. S14382, 12 July 1960.
223.. 15 SCOR, 873rd mtg., para. 18, (1960).
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226.. J. Lash, "Dag Hammarskjold's Conception of his Office", 16 International Organisation, (1962).
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intervention as aggression in order to obtain the support of the Western powers on the
Counci1.227 It was obvious that if only the matter of Belgian action had been put on
the Council's agenda, the veto power of at least one of the permanent members would
have prevented Council's action regarding Belgian aggression. 228 Secretary-General
Hammerskjold by his initiation and under Article 99 found a path through this
minefield by proposing to create such conditions as to facilitate Belgian withdrawal
with a United Nations force filling the vaccum.229
The second case in which the Secretary-General invoked his political powers under
Article 99 in order to draw the attention of the Security Council to a matter which
might pose a threat to international peace and Security was in 1979 in the case of
capture and detention of hostages in the United States Embassy in Tehran.23°
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim sent a communication addressed to the President of
the Security Council, in which he gave an account of the situation in which the USA
and Iran found themselves.231 He stated that the crisis posed a serious threat to world
peace and therefore called uppon the SC to convene an emergency meeting in order
to seek a peaceful solution to this problem.232
The Security Council in its Resolution 457of 4 December 1979, expressed its deep
concern over the alarming amount of tension between the USA and Iran which could
have serious consequences for international peace and security, and advised Iran to
release the hostages being held in the embassy in Tehran.233 Both parties were
admonished to proceed with the greatest caution.
227..N. D. White, op, cit., p. 236.
228.. L. Gordenker, op. cit„ pp. 140-3.
229.. Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operations in the Congo (1960-19641, (Oxford University
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The Secretary-General was asked to offer his good offices in order to ensure the
immediate implembntation of the resolution and to avail himself of all measures
necessary to this effect, about which he should submit a report to the Security
Counci1.234
There is an opinion that although in the Congo crisis as well as the occupation of the
American Embassy in Tehran the Security Council agreed with the Secretary-General
in his assessment of the danger inherent in the situation and entrusted him with
important political duties to the extent that he should deem necessary, an express
application of Article 99 has not played the decisive role in the political development
of the office of the Secretary-General which had been anticipated by the drafters of the
Charter.235
However, the Secretary-General may perform his duties assigned by the Security
Council and may suggest the instructions he considers appropriate and ask for the
powers he deems necessary to perform his duties. Therefore, he may get special
powers to deal with a dispute by his initiation, confidence and responsibility.
Article 98 and delegated functions
Another important power of the Secretary-General regarding international peace and
security is drawn from Article 98. Article 98 of the Charter says: "The Secretary-
General ... shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs".
Article 98 has not made clear what the entrusted functions are nor did it clarify the
conditions according to which UN organs may delegate functions to the Secretary-
General. Yet it might be said that these functions should not be other than those the
delegating organ would apply under the Charter.
234.. Sc Res. 461.
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As mentioned earlier, in performing his political functions, the Secretary-General
might use his initiations which are necessary for fulfillment of his task. However, the
Secretary-General's autonomy must be exercised in compliance with eventual limits
and instructions imposed by the delegating organ as well as with the observance of the
Charter provisions.236
The most important example of delegation power in the context of applying
provisional measures to keep the peace is the entrusted power by the Security Council
for establishing and commanding peace-keeping forces. Under this function, the
Secretary-General should conclude agreements with host states and other states which
would contribute in the operations. The Secretary-General also might, according to his
delegated powers, perform investigation, conciliation, mediation and good offices.
In case of Congo the Secretary-General was authorised to take necessary steps to
provide "military assistance" in consultation with the Congolese government until the
Congolese security forces met their tasks fillly.237
In cases of Cyprus,238 East Timor,239 Libya,240 the Middle East,241 Namibia,242 and
Yugoslavia,243 the roles of the Secretary-General's good offices were authorised by the
Security Council resolutions. In cases of Afghanistan244 and the Western Sahara245,
the Secretary-General's activities were authorised by the General Assembly
resolutions.
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The past practice of the Organisation offers many examples in which the Secretary-
General performed conciliation, mediation and investigation, without specific
delegation by the UN organs. This will be discussed together with representative
examples in the following section.
Independent initiatives by the Secretary-General
The UN Charter did not envisage the power of the Secretary-General to take
initiatives independently. With regard to the constitutional basis of these initiatives, it
has been argued that it cannot be accepted to assume that they implicitly come under
Article 99, since this article deals with a procedural matter, the convening of the
Council, and it cannot serve to solve a question of substance. 246 It might be said that
independent initiatives are placed outside of the formal institutional framework of the
United Nations though they are entirely compatible with the position covered. 247 It is
useful at this point to consider some examples of the Secretary-General taking
independent initiative.
The Secretary-General Trygve Lie conducted an independent power of investigation
in 1946 to investigate alleged infilteration across Greece's northern frontier during the
civil war. At a Security Council meeting, Lie announced his own right to make
enquiries or investigations in order to establish whether a question should or should
not be brought to the attention of the Counci1.248
Another example of independent action by the Secretary-General was during the Iraq-
Iran war. In response to the repeated request by Iran to investigate the Iraqi use of
246_ B. Conforti, op. cit„ p. 221.
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chemical weapons, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar decided in March 1984 to send
a team of experts to Iran.249 The Secretay-General, as a fact finder and on his own
authority, sent several mission from March 1984 onwards, to examine the evidence on
the ground.250 Although the finding of the missions confirmed the Iraqi use of
chemical weapons251, which damaged the impartiality of the Secretary-General in
Iraqi eyes, both disputant parties continued to accept him as a mediator, and he
continued to advance proposals to both sides.252
The Secretary-General's efforts during this conflict, including mediation, fact-finding
and attempts to end attacks on civilians, were considerable. The Secretary-General's
impartial approach was the main reason that parties, particularly Iran, emphasised co-
operation with him. It seems that, if the organs of the United Nations fail to consider a
dispute and take appropriate action, the role of the Secretary-General could be
essential at least in negotiation and mediation.
The role of the Secretary-General during the Iraq-Iran war will be discussed in detail
in Chapter Six of this thesis. It should be mentioned however that "the Iran/Iraq
conflict demonstrates that, under favourabe conditions, the Secretary-General can
integrate several different roles: as impartial intermediary, investigator and voice of
world conscience" 253
However, in the case of the Kuwait crisis, the Secretary-General felt constrained to
limit his negotiations to securing Iraqi compliance with decisions made at the Security
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some permanent members of the Security Council, particularly those pertaining to the
timing of his approaches to Iraq".255
In the case of Lybia, the Secretary-General declined to have a role as a mediator, and
emphasised that his own authority under the Council's terms256 was too limited to
permit an invitation of the Libyan Government to negotiate a "mechanism" to
implement Resolution 73 1.257
The cases of Kuwait and Libya demonstrate the fact that, by the end of the Cold War
and the emergence of unipolarity of the United Nations political balance of power,
there is a shrinkage of the role of the Secretary-General performing mediation, good
offices, etc. It is believed that in the post-Cold War period "the capacity of the
Security Council to perform its political functions effectively has narrowed the former
role of the Secretary-General as an honest broker between forces locked into
intractable enmity. The Council, now more readily able to take decisions, tends to ask
the Secretary-General to go to Tripoli and to Baghdad not to exercise an independent
political role but more as a letter carrier to help execute its own plan of action."258
There is a strong possibility that situations of threat to to the peace may come where
the Council will need a role of mediation, conciliation, investigation, fact finding,
good ofices, etc. to be performed by the Secretary-General as an impartial body
acceptable to the parties concerned. He "can effectively exercise his good offices in
combination with other means at his disposal, to bring relevant pressure to bear on
255..T. M. Franck, "Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System", op. cit., p. 182.
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parties to a grave conflict".259 There exists a need to encourage and reinforce the
independent role of the Secretary-General for such circumstances.
"An Agenda for Peace"
In 1992 the members of the Security Council asked Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali to prepare "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening
and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the
capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and peace-
keeping".260 The Secretary-General prepared a report entitled "An Agenda for
Peace"26I in which he recognised the basic principles of new concepts of preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building. He proposed suggestions
to be applied by the Security Council, General Assembly, the regional organisations
and member states for changes and improvements with regard to maintaining
international peace and security, conflict management and UN financial matters.
The dramatic events that occured since the end of Cold War era made it necessary for
the Secretary-General in 1995 to prepare a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace",262
taking into account the practical problems of the emerging world order. In this
supplement, qualitative and quantitative changes were considered, and significant
suggestions were made in respect of instruments for maintaining peace and security.
The changes include increasing intra-state conflicts rather than inter-states conflicts,
the use of UN forces to protect humanitarian operations, the presence of UN peace-
keeping forces after negotiations, and the emergence of multifunctional peace-keeping
259-Thomas M. Franck and George Nolte, "The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General".
in: A. Roberts and Benedict Kingsburg (ed.), United Nations. Divided World, (Clarendon Press,
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operations.263 The instruments for maintaining peace and security suggested by the
Secretary-General were preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-
conflict peace-building, disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement action.264
According to the Secretary-General, "[p]reventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes
before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt
conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the
opportunity for post conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of
violence among nations and peoples".265
Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building can be
employed only with the consent of the disputant parties. 266 However, sanctions and
enforcement actions are coercive measures and by definition do not require the
consent of the party concerned, and disarmament can take place according to an
agreement or in the context of coercive action under Chapter VII.267
As discussed earlier, three basic principles of peace-keeping are consent of the parties,
impartiality, and the non-use of force except for self-defence. However, these
principles, in the last few years and in response to the new political environment
resulting from the end of the Cold War, have been changed. According to the
Secretary-General, three aspects of recent mandates have led peace-keeping
operations to forfeit the consent of the parties to behave in a way perceived as partial
and/or to use force other than in self-defence. 268 These aspects, he states, are the tasks
of protecting humanitarian operations during war, protecting civilian populations in
263- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
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designated safe areas, and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a
pace faster than they were ready to accept.269 Regarding the establishment of "safe
areas" in the case of Bosnia, the UN force was given a humanitarian mandate under
which the use of force was authorised, but for limited and local purposes and not to
bring the war to an end.279
The mechanism of enforcement measures envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter is
also limited since, according to Boutros-Ghali, neither the Security Council nor the
Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control
an operation, except perhaps on a very limited scale.271 The Security Council in
several cases authorised a group of willing member states to undertake enforcement
action.272 Entrusting enforcement tasks to groups of states might provide the
Organisation with an enforcement capacity but there is the danger that the states
concerned may claim international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that
were not envisaged by the Security Council when it gave its authorisation to them.273
The Secretary-General has suggested that it would be more desirable to prevent
conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and in some cases preventive
deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them
after they have broken out.274 He has recommended that in interstates disputes
preventive deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations
presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities.275 Preventive
269.. Id The cases of Bosnia and Somalia are two examples which will be discussed in the proceeding
chapters.
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deployment also may take place when a country feels threatened and requests the
deployment of an appropriate UN presence along its side of the border alone which.276
In intra-state crises there could be preventive deployment at the request of the
government or all parties concerned or with their consent.277 In an internal crisis, the
Secretary-General emphasised that, the UN will need to respect the sovereignty of the
state, to do otherwise would not be in accordance with the understanding of member
states in accepting the principles of the Charter.
With regard to humanitarian assistance, the Secretary-General has made reference to
General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. Among guidelines which
has been referred to in this resolution is that humanitarian assistance must be provided
in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and that the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in
accordance with the Charter.278 In this context, humanitarian assistance should be
provided with the consent of the affected country and on the basis of an appeal by that
country.279
Although the Secretary-General emphasises on respect for fundamental sovereignty
and integrity of states which are crucial to any common international progress, he
mentions that the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed and its theory
was never matched by reality, and it is the task of leaders of states to find a balance
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Regarding the delegated power of the United Nations and its limitations, he stressed
on the fact that "principles of the Charter must be applied consistently, not selectively,
for if the perception should be of the latter, trust will wane and with it the moral
authority which is the greatest and most unique quality of that instrument".281
Indeed, the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Peace made an important analysis and
recommendations on making more efficient UN organs and even regional
organisations, regarding conflict management, within the framework of the Charter,
and it is necessary international organisations (world and regional), consider these
recommendations in their endeavour in mantaining international peace and security.
281.. A147/277, S/24111, 17 June 1992, p. 23.CHAPTER THREE
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES
Although the institution of peace-keeping was not envisaged in the UN Charter, it
probably has been the most concerted effort by the United Nations regarding
international peace and security. These forces are usually deployed following a cease-
fire and have limited objectives. Their establishment is based on the consent of host
states, and their presence does not affect the sovereignty of host states. While peace-
keeping operations involve the use of military pessonnel, they do not undertake
enforcement action for final solution of a dispute.
There is a distinction between peace-keeping forces and observer missions though
they share the feature of not being enforcement measures to end a conflict. Observer
missions have been deployed before cease-fires in some cases to consider the
possibility of deploying peace-keeping forces. Observer groups may be stationed on
either side of the conflict and only observe the cease-fire. Another distinction is that
observers are not usually large enough to create a buffer zone between the
belligerents, a function that has been performed in some occasions by peace-keeping
forces. In addition, while observers are not equipped to perform activities such as
guarding border areas or checking vehicles for weapons, peace-keeping forces are
often stationed as an interposition force between the belligerents and guard border
areas. Peace-keeping forces use force not only for self-defence but also they may be
authorised to use force necessary for performing their mandates. In recent years
peace-keeping forces have been deployed to protect humanitarian operations during
continuing warfare. These operations will be discussed in Chapter Five.118
Since the concept of peace-keeping was not defined in the Charter, it is difficult to
give a clear constitutional definition for peace-keeping actions and make an absolute
distinction between observer missions and peace-keeping forces. In practice, the
United Nations has dealt with various conflicts having different characteristics which
necessitated special and ad hoc mandates to be given to the UN forces. The
appropriate approach seems to be the study of each case separately in order to
comprehend the basis of their establishment.
In this chapter, the background information and important facts of six cases in which
peace-keping forces were deployed will be summarised as deemed necessary for the
analysis of the cases. The constitutional basis of the establishment of each force and
the effectiveness of its operation will then be investigated. The conclusions drawn
from the examination of these cases will finally be presented.
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in his speech at Alexandria on 26 July 1956,
announced the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. American
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on 19 July 1956, had announced the US refusal
to finance the Aswan High Dam project on the Nile River.' Nasser stated that the
Canal dues would be used to finance the Aswan dam.2
Nasser intended to pay compensation to the shareholders of the Canal Company. The
compensation which was determined was on the basis of the market value of the
1- For more information see: Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez,
(Constable, London, 1967).
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took the first step toward establishing a politico-military alliance, later to become known as the
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), to protect its interests in the Middle East. Although the
United States increased its aids to Egypt, with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and the
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suffered. By US reversal policy, Nasser viewed the new treaties as anti-Egyptian rather than an
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shares on 25 July 1956, having received all the assets and property of the Canal
Company.3 The British and French, which were the principal shareholders in the Suez
Canal Company, being the most concerned, reacted strongly and supported the use of
force as an appropriate solution to the question.4
Between 16 and 24 August 1956, the London Suez Conference was held to prepare an
agreement on proposals to be presented to Egypt. Eighteen of the 22 powers who
attended proposed a definite system to guarantee at all times and for free use of the
Canal, with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt. 5 However, the plan was
rejected by Egypt which proposed the establishment of a negotiating body
representative of the different user views to seek solutions to questions relating to
freedom of navigation of the Canal and its development and equitable tolls. 6 This
proposal was considered by the Second London Suez Conference, held between 19
and 21 September 1956.7
The Canal worked efficiently and without incident for over two months.8 On 12
September, France and the United Kingdom placed the matter before the Security
Counci1.9 They asserted that the situation created by the action of Egypt in attempting
unilaterally to bring to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal
might endanger the free and open passage of shipping through the Cana1. 10 Egypt
asked the Council to consider the French and British assertions to be threats to
international peace and serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations."
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Although Secretary-General Hammarskjold had started his good offices, and
discussions with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Egypt seemed close to a
peaceful settlement of the crisis, the Anglo-French attack was agreed. 12 On 29
October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt. On the same day the United States requested the
Security Council to order an Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines. 13 It is
believed that, by this action, the US was attempting to demonstrate that its policy did
not agree with the British policy, and to preempt possible Soviet efforts to adopt a
leadership role sympathetic to smaller nations."
Britain and France, on 30 October, issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, calling on
them to stop their fighting. Egypt refused, stating that it is "totally inappropriate that
she should be told by Britain and France to cease the defence of her own territory"  15
On 31 October, Britain and France attacked Egypt. Since Britain and France would
veto any move in the Security Council, no action could be expected from that organ.
Therefore, the General Assembly acted under its own "Uniting for Peace" Resolution
(377 (V)).16 The General Assembly approved, on 2 November, a resolution based on
the US proposal, calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces
behind armistice lines." This resolution made no reference to the United Nations
Charter.
Canada proposed a draft resolution which became Resolution 998, requesting the
Secretary-General to submit a plan for setting up, with the consent of the nations
concerned, an emergency international United Nations' Force to secure and supervise
the cessation of hostilities.18 The General Assembly's next resolution (Resolution 999)
12-A. Nutting, op. cit., pp. 93-5.
13-S/3706.
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emphasised on the necessity of achieving an immediate cease-fire, and authorised the
Secretary-General to arrange immediately with the parties concerned a cease-fire and
a withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines.19
On 5 November, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1000 to establish the
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). In this resolution, the Secretary-General's
plan for UNEF I was approved by the General Assembly.29
A plan for the guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the UNEF,
reported by the Secretary-General, was accepted by the Assembly in Resolution
1001.21 Although some countries, including France and Britain, insisted that the
function of UNEF must be more than returning to the status quo, including achieving
a solution to the major Arab-Israel problem, the Secretary-General in his plan for
UNEF indicated that, as the Assembly intended, the force should be of a "temporary
nature", the "length of the assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the
present conflict" 22
UNEF's functions were limited to the objectives set out in the General Assembly
resolutions. UNEF could not remain in the area for an unspecified period of time to
solve all the political questions affecting the area. The Secretary-General in his report
on 6 November stipulated that "the Force obviously should have no rights other than
those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local
authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force
temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, moreover, should the
force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions
19-GA Res. 999 (ES-I), 3 Nov. 1956.
20-A13289.
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on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps for
compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly." He also stated that:
"[t]here is an obvious difference between establishing the Force in order to secure the
cessation of hostilities, with a withdrawal of forces, and establishing such a Force
with a view to enforcing a withdrawal of forces."23
Therefore, UNEF I had no mandate for enforcement action, but it was more than an
observer force. This elaboration of the UNEF's functions by the Secretary-General
illustrates the divisions between peace-keeping, enforcement action, and observation.
UNEF I was not intended to be an enforcement organ, and was to be placed in the area
after the cease-fire had been established. There is an argument that, had the foreign
forces still remained the moment UNEF entered Egypt, the UN Force would have
been helpless, and Egypt could not have performed its rights under the Charter to
defend its independence and sovereignty because of the cease-fire.24
The General Assembly approved the Secretary-General's recommendation regarding
the functions of UNEF; it was to be placed on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice
demarcation line, "after" full withdrawal by Israel from Egyptian territory.25
The constitutional basis of UNEF I is not clear from the General Assembly
resolutions. The General Assembly has general powers regarding international peace
and security in the Charter. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has created a procedural
device for the transfer of a matter from the Council (when it is paralysed by a veto of
a permanent member) to the Assembly. On the other hand, the Charter authorises the
General Assembly to act with regard to international peace and security, as long as the
Charter does not expressly forbid it. It is believed that "peace-keeping forces could be
reconciled with the general powers of the Assembly contained in Articles 10, 11 and
23_
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14 - in other words, they are express powers or at least powers implied directly from
express powers".26
The Secretary-General mentioned the constitutional basis of UNEF I in his later
report. "The force which has an international character as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly, as affirmed in its regulations, was not established to undertake
enforcement actions. While UNEF has a military organisation, it does not use all
normal military methods in achieving the objectives defined for it by the General
Assembly."27
In his opinion, while the General Assembly is enabled to establish the force with the
consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the
Force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the
consent of the government of that country.28
Some countries, including the Soviet Union, believed that enforcement actions
include peace-keeping, and that Article 11(2), which provided that "any such question
on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly either before or after discussion", prohibited the General Assembly from
establishing peace-keeping operations.29 The International Court of Justice, in 1962,
in the Expenses case regarding the word "action" in Article 11(2), asserted this
paragraph, "in its first sentence empowers the General Assembly, by means of
recommendations to States or to the Security Council, or to both, to organise peace-
keeping operations, at the request, or with the consent, of the States concerned. This
power of the General Assembly is a special power which in no way derogates from its
general powers under Articles 10 or 14 except as limited by the last sentence of
26.. D. White, op. cit., p. 194.
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Article 11 paragraph 2. This last sentence says that when "action" is necessary the
General Assembly shall refer the question to the Security Council. The word 'action'
must mean action as is solely within the province of the Security Council. It cannot
refer to recommendations which the Security Council might make,as for instance
under Article 38, because the General Assembly under Article 11 has a comparable
power" 30
The Court concluded that, according to the articles relating to the General Assembly's
powers, the General Assembly had the legal power to create UNEF 1•31 Consequently,
like the Security Council, the General Assembly can take measures regarding
international peace and security. The constitutional basis of the General Assembly's
action is Articles 10, 11, 14 and 22, while the Security Council would act under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The General Assembly would act with the consent of
the countries. However, the Security Council has a mandatory power.
The Court also argued that the General Assembly has been empowered by means of
recommendations to states or to the Security Council, or both, to organise peace-
keeping operations at the request, or with the consent, of the states concerned.32
According to the Court, UNEF I was not enforcement action within the compass of
Chapter VII of the Charter. Consequently, UNEF I was a force for securing and
supervising the cease-fire which was established by the consent of the parties
concerned.
After fulfilling its mandate, UNEF I's mission was terminated. It was one of the most
successful peace-keeping missions. Its withdrawal was not similar to its
establishment, as UNEF I was established by the General Assembly, but withdrew
because Egypt withdrew her consent on its presence. The importance of the consent of
30-Ce.ali_n_apenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Report, 1962, P. 164-5.
31-Ibid, p. 151.
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host state is well emphasised in the case of UNEF I as the most important element in
establishing and continuing peace-keeping missions.
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
During the period from 1960 to 1964 the United Nations was deeply involved in a
conflict in the Belgian Congo, now Zaire. The pressure for independence from the
colonial domination led the Congo to become an independent republic on 30 June
1960.
The Congo consisted of a large number of tribes which had little role in the political
and economic control of their country. The colonial power, Belgium, put Belgians
into senior positions in the civil and military authorities and made little attempt to
prepare the Congolese to take on these positions. Thus, after independence, the
Congolese were unprepared to conduct the affairs of their country.33
By the early June 1960, the parliament was established, and two rival dominant
Congolese leaders were elected as President (Joseph Kasavubu) and Prime Minister
(Patrice Lumumba). However, the Belgian commander of the Force Publique,
General Janssens, having the functions of an army and a police force, had no plans for
accelerating the training of the Congolese. 34 He expressed the view that, as far as the
Force Publique is concerned, independence had changed nothing. 35 As a result, a
mutiny broke out in the Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) garrison and spread to several
other cities. The Congolese Senate renamed the Force Publique the Armee Nationale
Congolaise (ANC). General Janssens, who was suspected of planning to organise
33- For more information see: Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960- 
December 1961, (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
1965), pp. 1-41; and, Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate. Politics of the UN Congo Operation,
(The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1967).
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resistance to the successor government, was dismissed and Lumumba appointed a
Congolese commander.36
The Belgian forces, who had remained in the country under the terms of the unratified
Belgium-Congo Treaty of Friendship, against the wishes of the Congo government.
reinforced and moved into several parts of the Congo, justifying their action as
humanitarian intervention.37 By 10 July 1960, Belgian troops landed in Katanga, and
the day after, Moise Tshombe declared the secession of Katanga.38
The Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, who was following the situation through
Under Secretary-General Ralph Bunche resident at the time in Congo to work out the
UN technical assistance, suggested that, if the Congolese government were to request
for military personnel as "technical assistance of a military nature", rather than a
"military assistance", he could take immediate action on his own authority without
referring the matter to the Security Counci1.39
Lumumba made his first call to Bunche on 10 July asking for technical assistance of a
military nature to train the ANC for the twin purposes of national defence and the
maintenance of law and order.49 On 12 July, the Secretary-General received the
request of Congolese government to send UN military assistance to protect the
national territory of the Congo against the external aggression which was considered
as a threat to international peace.4'
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On 13 July, Hammarskj old, using his authority under Article 99 of the Charter.
requested a meeting of the Security Council that convened on the same day. 42 The
Secretary-General recommended dispatching UN peacekeeping forces to assist the
government until the Congolese were able fully to meet their tasks, and if the UN
acted as proposed, the Belgian forces would withdraw from Congo. 43 On 14 July, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 143, calling upon Belgium to withdraw, and
authorised the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to provide "military
assistance" in consultation with the Congolese government until the Congolese
security forces, in the opinion of the government, met their tasks fully."
Despite establishing the UN operation in Congo, known by its French initials as
Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), Belgian troops remained and the
situation in Congo deteriorated. The Security Council in its second resolution (Res.
145) again called on the Belgians to withdraw and authorised the Secretary-General to
take all necessary actions to this effect.45 It also recommended the admission of the
Republic of the Congo to membership in the UN as a unit. The Council in its
resolution requested all states to refrain from any action and interference in the
Congo.
However, the question of the secession of Katanga and the withdrawal of Belgians
from Congo persisted and further action was needed by the UN. On 9 August 1960,
the Council in its Resolution 146 again authorised the Secretary-General to take all
necessary action, and noted that the UN had been prevented from implementing the
resolutions in Katanga, calling again for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from
Katanga. It declared that the entry of the UN force into Katanga was necessary but
emphasised that the UN in the Congo would not be a party to, or in any way intervene
42-S/4381, 13 July 1960.
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in, internal conflict. The Council called on the UN Member States, in accordance with
Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Counci1.46
The dispute within the leadership of the Congo in September posed another problem
for the UN. Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, and himself was dismissed by Lumumba.
Lumumba believed that UN should assist the Congolese government in pacifying the
country and in restoring law and order. The differences between Lturiumba and
Hammarskjold became serious.47 On the other hand, the Security Council could not
take more action because of the Permanent Members' support of the disputants in the
Congo. Lumumba was supported by the Soviet Union while the United States
supported Kasavubu, and French, British and Belgians appeared to be supporting
Tshombe.48
By a procedural veto, and according to the US proposal, the matter was transferred to
the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution (Res. 377 of 1950).49
Resolution 157 stated that the lack of unanimity of the Council's Permanent Members
prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and therefore, it was decided to call an emergency
session of the General Assembly to make appropriate recommendations. Higgins
believed that "as this resolution was procedural, it was not susceptible to the veto".50
On 20 September 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1474, requesting
all states to refrain from intervening in the Congo, and, in accordance with Articles 25
and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
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The Secretary-General was requested to continue to take vigorous action in
accordance with these resolutions.5I
At the beginning of January 1961, Lumumba was handed over to Tshombe by
Mubuto, the Army Chief of Staff, and was subsequently killed.52 The situation
deteriorated, and the Security Council adopted a resolution on 21 February 196153
which contained two parts. Part A emphasised that the danger of wide-spread civil
war in the Congo was a threat to international peace and security, and urged the UN to
"take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in
the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military
operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last
resort". It urged the withdrawal of all Belgian troops and advisors, of other foreign
military and paramilitary personnel not under the UN command and all mercenaries.
In Part B it was noted that "the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" in the Congo had occurred. Part A was particularly relevant to the use of
force in the last resort. By this resolution the UN force was given a new mandate by
which military action "could be used 'if necessary, in the last resort', for this purpose -
and not only in self defence".54
ONUC's operation (Round One) failed to bring about the end of Katanga's secession.55
On 24 November, the Security Council adopted Resolution 169 which approved the
authority of the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the use of the
requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention,
pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
51-GA Res. 1974, 20 Sep. 1960.
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personnel and political advisors not under the United Nations command, and
mercenaries...". To this end, the Secretary-General was authorised "to take all
necessary measures to prevent entry or return of such elements...". The situation in
Katanga deteriorated and the second ONUC operation failed. Finally, the third
operation ended the secession of Katanga after 36 hours fighting between UN troops
and Katangese forces, and ONUC withdrew from the Congo on 30 June 1964.56
The constitutional basis of ONUC was not mentioned in the Security Council's
resolutions. The Secretary-General initially convened the Security Council under
Article 99 of the Charter. Although Article 39 was not mentioned in the resolutions,
the Security Council stated that the situation in Congo was a threat to international
peace and security. However, the Secretary-General did not want to categorise the
Belgian intervention as an act of aggression because it was obvious that at least one of
the permanent members of the Council would have prevented taking action against
Belgian aggression. In Chpter Two of this thesis, more discussions have been made
regarding the Secretary-General's initiatives in case of Congo.
In different stages of the crisis in the Congo, ONUC had different mandates: as
military assistance for the Congolese government for the withdrawal of Belgian
forces;57 to assist the government of the Congo in restoring law and order; 58 to take
measures to prevent civil war using force if necessary; 59 to take vigorous action
including the requisite measures of force for the deportation of all military and
paramilitary personne1.69
In fact, ONUC was permitted to use force for more than self-defence and to prevent
the occurrence of a civil war. ONUC is considered to have performed provisional
56-Ibid, p. 82.
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measures under Article 40, rather than enforcement measures under Article 42. The
General Assembly in its resolution also recommended provisional measures which the
Security Council provided as a mandatory action.
The International Court of Justice, in the Expenses Case with regard to the resolutions
relating to the Congo, stated that "the operation did not involve 'preventive or
enforcement measures' against any state under Chapter VII". 61 The Court in its
judgement suggested that the General Assembly made no recommendation of
enforcement action and indeed the Assembly reaffirmed the mandate which was
created by the Security Counci1.62
Eventually, ONUC used force to subdue the Katangese rebellion in April and
December 1961 and between December 1962 and January 1963. 63 The use of force by
ONUC was much wider than acting in self-defence, while the Secretary-General had
always affirmed that ONUC never exceeded the scope of self-defence.64
Bowett believed that the constitutional basis of ONUC was wider than Article 40. He
considered ONUC as a force "for the purpose of supervising and enforcing
compliance with the provisional measures ordered under Article 40 and for other
purposes which were consistent with the general powers of the Council under Article
39".65 Although ONUC was not completely impartial, since it was against foreign
elements and secessionists, it could not be considered as a force with a mandate under
Article 42 to enforce peace. In fact, ONUC had a mandate to enforce provisional
measures assisting the Congolese government to restore and maintain law and order,
and securing the withdrawal of foreign military forces.
61-Certain Expences of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. (1962), p. 177.
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UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
The Cyprus conflict involves a long-running Greek-Turkish Cypriot dispute. Cyprus
is the third-largest Mediterranean island, with the population 80 percent Greek
Cypriot and 18 percent Turkish Cypriot. The island has been ruled by many rulers
such as the Venetians, the Turks and the British.66
In the nineteenth century the idea of enosis or union with Greece emerged and
intensified when Cyprus came under British rule in 1878.67 Pressures to end British
rule continued until World War II. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots opposed the
Greeks' demand for enosis both in Cyprus and in Greece.68
Turkish Cypriots, in a memorandum in 1950, asked the General Assembly that
Cyprus should remain British or revert to Turkish rule. 69 A campaign began by Greek
Cypriots against the British authorities in the cause of self-determination and enosis
(EOKA). The Charter of EOICA declared that it was dedicated to focus "international
public opinion" on the problem of Cyprus "until international diplomacy - the United
Nations - and the British" were forced to solve it."
After intensified violence, in 1959, representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United
Kingdom started negotiations about the future status of Cyprus. In February, their
negotiations resulted in the Zurich and London Agreements.71 The agreements were
embodied in four documents: the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus72
66- For more information see: Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, (Oxford University Press, London,
1974); I. J. Rikhye et al, op. cit. pp. 97-120.
	
67.. 	 Richard Norton (ed.), The Cyprus Conflict and the Role of the United Nations,
(Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1988), p. 5.
68-T. Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 2.
69- GAOR (1950), p. 18.
7°- T. Ehrlich, op. cit„ p. 11.
71- The Blue Helmets, op. cit„ p. 281.
	
72.. 	 LItla No. 5476.133
(signed by Cyprus, the UK, Turkey and Greece), the Treaty of Guarantee73 (with the
same signatories), the Treaty of Alliance74 (signed by Cyprus, Greece and Turkey),
and a constitution for the new republic75 (signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960).
The Republic of Cyprus was formally established on 16 August 1960 and became an
independent state. Its constitution expressly forbade the partitioning of Cyprus and its
union with any other state. The Treaty of Guarantee had provided that the three
powers undertook to consult each other in case of breach, but retained the right to
intervene unilaterally to re-establish the political status quo set out in the Treaty.76
Under the Treaty of Alliance, Greece and Turkey were allowed to station armed
contingents on the island, numbering 950 and 650 respectively.77 The constitution
provided for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to promote
peaceful co-existence. It recognised that the President, a Greek Cypriot, and the Vice-
President, a Turkish Cypriot, were elected by their respective communities, each
having veto powers over certain legislation.78 However, the agreements could not
promote peaceful co-existence between the two communities, and political and
constitutional crises led to growing tension in Cyprus.79
On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, proposed an
amendment to the constitution. 80 The Turkish Cypriots refused to consider the
amendment on the ground that it was designed to weaken those parts which
recognised the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community.81 The situation in Cyprus
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deteriorated and violence intensified between the two communities. On Christmas Eve
of 1963 Makarios and Dr. Kutchuck, the Vice-President, called for peace and an end
to bloodshed. A similar call was made by the British, Greek and Turkish
governments. However none of them was successful.82
The Turkish government sent a national military contingent to Cyprus under the
Treaty of Alliance.83 On 24 December 1963, Greece, Turkey and the UK informed
Cyprus of their readiness to assist in restoring peace by means of a joint
"peacemaking" force under British command. 84 This offer was accepted by Cyprus,
and a few days later agreement was reached on a line and a neutral zone dividing the
Greek and Turkish areas of Nicosia (the Green Line). The zone was to be patrolled by
the joint "peacemaking" force. In the negotiations in January 1964, in London, the UK
proposed that the peacekeeping force should be strengthened by NATO countries.
However, Cyprus rejected this proposal and Malcarios insisted that the UN must be
brought into the picture in some substantial way.85
The UN organs were already engaged: the Secretary-General with his consultations,
and the Security Council with its resolution. The latter adopted Resolution 186 on 4
March 1964 based on the non-Permanent Members' proposal. This resolution noted
that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten international peace and security, and
recommended the creation, with the consent of the government of Cyprus, of a United
Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The Council recommended in
its resolution that the function of the force should be to preserve international peace
and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and to
contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to a
82-T. Ehrlich, op. cit., p. 45.
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normal conditions. 86 The Secretary-General was asked to arrange for a mediation in
agreement with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK.87
Although Resolution 186 referred to Article 2(4) of the Charter, it did not refer to any
specific article to create UNFICYP. The Secretary-General, in his interpretation of the
function of UNFICYP, stated that it was a consensual type of peacekeeping operation
based on UNEF I to create an improved climate in which political solutions may be
sought. The Secretary-General emphasised that the force should not take any action to
influence the political situation in Cyprus.88 According to the Secretary-General's
interpretation, UNFICYP could not take enforcement measures. However, Chapter VI
of the Charter has not provided a satisfactory basis for peace-keeping in Cyprus, and it
has "a more natural legal basis in Article 40 for provisional measures".89
On 15 July 1974, after a coup against Makarios, backed by Greece, the Secretary-
General and the Cypriot representative requested that the Security Council convene a
meeting." On 20 July, Turkey, invoking the Treaty of Guarantee, attacked Cyprus and
the Council on the same day adopted Resolution 353. The Security Council in its
resolution called upon all parties to cease-fire and demanded an immediate end to
foreign military intervention.9I
The Council called on all parties to co-operate with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out
its mandate. The function of UNFICYP did not change and, in different
circumstances, it had to perform the original mandate determined in 1964. The
Secretary-General proposed that UNFICYP should create a security zone between the
86- SC Res. 186, 4 Mar. 1964.
87_
88-S/5653, and S/11335.
89-Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Vol. IV, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981),
p. 144.
90-S/11334.
91- SC Res. 353, 20 Jul. 1974.136
Turkish forces in the North and the Greek Cypriot forces in the south. This proposal
was accepted by the Security Counci1.92
The UN forces in Cyprus were not sent as a provisional measure to an international
frontier, but to an internal and unofficial dividing line between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. However, in 1974, by the military involvement of another state, its function
changed from applying intra-state provisional measures to inter-state provisional
measures. UNFICYP, like UNEF I, was established by the consent of host state, and it
could not take the initiative in the use of force except in self-defence. Its objectives
were to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and
restoration of law and order. There are two assumptions for the constitutional basis of
UNFICYP. One assumption is that it was to implement non-mandatory provisional
measure under Article 40. The other assumption is that it was established under
Chapter VI Article 33(1), since the Security Council Resolution 186 had referred to
the situation in Cyprus as likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)
On 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and attacked the Israeli
positions entrenched on the east bank of the Canal since the 1967 War, and Syrian
troops simultaneously attacked the Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, occupied
also by Israel in June 1967.93
Disagreement among the members of the Security Council resulted in no decision
being taken on the situation for seventeen days. The Arab forces had some initial
gains, but the resupply of Israeli forces by the United States strengthened Israel, and
92-SC Res. 355, 1 Aug. 1974.
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by 21 October the situation improved for the Israelis." On the other hand, the Soviet
Union supplied the forces of Egypt and Syria. In such a situation, where two major
powers became involved in the hostilities, it proved impossible for the Security
Council to reach an agreement on a cease-fire.
Finally, with the prospects of escalation of the war in sight, the Soviet Union and the
United States agreed on a cease-fire. They requested an urgent meeting of the Security
Council and in the early hours of 22 October 1973, the Council adopted Resolution
338 which called for a cease-fire and a start to implementing Resolution 242 of
1967.95 Resolution 242 had called for Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied in
the 1967 war to the lines as prior to 5 June 1967.96 The Secretary-General, in a further
resolution, was requested to dispatch United Nations' observers immediately.97
Resolution 338 made no reference to any specific article of the UN Charter justifying
its terms. Meanwhile, war continued and the Egyptian Third Army was encircled by
Israeli forces and cut off from its supplies. Egypt requested that the Soviet Union and
the United States send their troops to the area to enforce the cease-fire. 98 The US
Government opposed the request, but the Soviet Union agreed and suggested the
establishment of a joint US-Soviet force to implement the UN cease-fire resolutions;
otherwise a Soviet force would intervene unilaterally.99
The threat of military intervention by the major powers resulted in a growing fear of a
global conflict. The Non-Aligned members of the Security Council introduced
Resolution 340 on 25 October 1973. This resolution demanded an immediate and
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complete cease-fire and the setting up of a United Nations Emergency Force
(excluding the permanent members of the Council) under its authority . The
Secretary-General was requested to increase the number of UNTSO observers on each
side. He was given whatever powers were necessary to enforce the cease-fire.1°°
The guidelines for the functioning of UNEF II have been described in the Secretary-
General's report requested by the Security Counci1. 101 He reported that UNEF II, in its
supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire, must enjoy certain essential
conditions: it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security
Council, and it must operate with co-operation of the parties. He emphasised that the
force must enjoy freedom of movement and communications, and it should be
provided with weapons of a defensive character and would not use force except in
self-defence. "Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to
prevent it from discharging its duties" 1°2; and the force would act with complete
impartiality and avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of
the parties concerned. The Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report
in its Resolution 341 on 27 October 1973.103
The functions of UNEF I and UNEF II were similar. They had to supervise the cease-
fire and withdrawal as provisional measures. However, UNEF I was created by the
General Assembly and UNEF II was created under the Security Council's auspices.
The General Assembly acted under Articles 10, 11, 14 and 22, and the Security
Council under Article 40.
The withdrawal of LTNEF I was requested by Egypt, and it was subsequently
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by the Security Council's decision. It should be mentioned that the consent of the host
state is essential for the presence of a peace-keeping operation.
Neither of the forces was authorised to undertake enforcement measures. They had to
act with complete impartiality to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal. Although
the Security Council did not mention the constitutional basis of UNEF II, it must be
considered to be a supervising force set up to give effect to the provisional measures
(under Article 40) clearly implicit in Resolution 338.
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, though UNEF II was established
between Egypt and Israel, fighting continued between Syria and Israel in the Golan
Heights occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.104
By the end of May 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. The United States
Secretary of State undertook a diplomatic mission, which resulted in the conclusion of
an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces on 31 May
1974.1°5
On 30 May, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the
Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces, with the protocol
called for the creation of a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
(UNDOF).106
According to the Agreement, Israel and Syria were scrupulously to observe the cease-
fire on land, sea and in the air, and refrain from all military actions against each other
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from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of Security Council
Resolution 338 of 1973. 107 By the terms of the Protocol to the Agreement, Israel and
Syria agreed that the function of UNDOF would be to maintain the cease-fire, to see
that it was strictly observed, and to supervise the Agreement and Protoco1.108
On the day of signature, the Security Council adopted Resolution 350, sponsored by
the United States and the Soviet Union, 109 which recognised the disengagement
agreement negotiated in implementation of Security Council Resolution 338 of 1973,
and requested the Secretary-General Waldheim to establish UNDOF.110
By June 1974 UNDOF began its work with a renewable mandate of six months."
The Secretary-General interpreted UNDOF's functions as the supervision of
disengagement and the observation of cease-fire lines, with the same principles
followed by UNEF 11.112
UNDOF was not despatched to enforce peace. Its mandate was that of supervision of
cease-fire as provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter, which was agreed
by the parties and approved by the Security Council, for implementation of Security
Council Resolution 338 of 1973.
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United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
Israel invaded southern Lebanon in March 1978. According to the report of Chief of
Staff of UNTSO, heavy ground, naval and air attacks were committed by Israel
against Lebanon.I13
The Non-Aligned countries in an emergency session condemned this action as an
aggression as well as Israel's expansionist policy, and it was announced that the aim of
that action had put in jeopardy the existence of the Palestinian people in Lebanon and
would further aggravate the explosive situation in the region.114 However, the Israeli
representative to the United Nations denied that his country had any territorial design
on southern Lebanon and that it acted against PLO to prevent Palestinian raids into
Israel)"
Following an appeal by Lebanon for immediate action, the Council held a meeting on
19 March. The United States proposed a draft resolution to end military action against
Lebanon,116 because the US was concerned about the impact of Israel's invasion on
the peace negotiations underway between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, since the
Cold War was still very real, the United States supported a UN peace-keeping force
both to assist with the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and to avert a
direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation.117
The Security Council in its meeting adopted the US draft as Resolution 425. In this
resolution, the Council called for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty
and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised
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boundaries.118 It called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese
territory.119 The Council, at the request of the Lebanese government, decided to
establish a United Nations Interim Force for southern Lebanon to confirm the
withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the
government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.120
The resolution was carried by a vote of 12 in favour with the abstentions of the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. China did not participate in the vote. Although the USSR
opposed the resolution, it did not use its veto because of Lebanese and other Arab
states support for the resolution.121
The USSR delegation stated that the sending of United Nations troops to Lebanon
should not infringe the sovereign rights of the government and should fully take
account of the responsibility borne by Israel for its aggression. He emphasised that the
costs of the UN peace-keeping in Lebanon should be borne by Israel.122 In fact, the
USSR and its allies, in support of that position, withheld their share of the cost of
UNIFIL until 1986, when USSR changed its policy under the influence of
Gorbachev's glasnost (new thinking).123
The Chinese delegation said that since the resolution failed to condemn the Israeli
armed aggression against Lebanon and to support the just struggle of the Arab and
Palestinian people, China decided not to participate in the voting.124
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On the same day, the Secretary-General in his report set out the terms of reference of
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 125 with the main task of
confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the
international border. The Secretary-General indicated that, as a preliminary measure
for the implementation of the Security Council resolution, it might be necessary to
work out arrangements with Israel and Lebanon. He also emphasised the principle of
non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the host country.
UNIFIL would not use force except in self-defence. Furthermore, UNIFIL could not
and should not take on responsibilities which fell under the goverment of the country
in which it was operating; those responsibilities should be exercised by the competent
Lebanese authorities.126
On 6 April 1978, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defence Force submitted a plan for
an initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces. 127 However, the Secretary-General indicated
that the Israeli plan was not satisfactory since Security Council Resolution 425 called
for the withdrawal of Israeli forces without delay from the entire occupied Lebanese
territory. 128 Finally, the plan was accepted, and several positions were evacuated and
handed over to UNIFIL troops. However, the manner in which the Israeli forces
carried out the fourth and last phase created major problems for UNIFIL. In contrast
to the previous three phases, the Israeli Defence Force on 13 June turned over most of
its positions not to UNIFIL but to the De Facto Forces (DFF) which were supported
by Israel.129 The DFF, which had been strongly armed by the Israelis, threatened to
use force to oppose any attempts by LTNIFIL to gain wider deployment. In response to
the Israeli Foreign Minister, who had stated that Israel had fulfilled its part in the
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task lying ahead for UNIFIL had not been facilitated by the decision of the Israeli
government not to turn over control of the evacuated area to UNIFIL.130
Justifying its action, on 13 June, Israel stated that, in the wake of the Israeli
withdrawal from Lebanon on the same day, members of the PLO had returned to the
area and that UNIFIL was permitting the transit of supplies to them, and some units of
UNIFIL treated the PLO elements with indulgence and even co-operated with them.131
However, the Secretary-General expressed his surprise at the allegations made,
acknowledging that there were PLO liaison officers with UNIFIL, as there were
liaison officers of all parties concerned, and noted that PLO had undertaken to co-
operate with UNIFIL in the implementation of Resolution 425.132
The inability of UNIFIL to take over the enclave from DFF, prevented UNIFIL from
fulfilling an essential part of its mandate and made its other tasks considerably more
difficult. In April 1980 the DFF under the command of Major Haddad proclaimed the
constitution of the so-called "State of Free Lebanon".  133
The Security Council by Resolution 444 of 19 January 1979 invited the Lebanese
government to draw up, in consultation with the Secretary-General, a phased
programme of activities to promote the restoration of its authority in southern
Lebanon.134 Within the programme, as worked out by the Lebanese government with
the assistance of UNIFIL, a Lebanese army battalion was deployed in the UNIFIL
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UNIFIL headquarters to intense shelling which caused casualties and heavy material
damage, the deployment of the Lebanese battalion was proceeded as planned.I35
Despite the measures to improve UNIFIL's operational capacity, serious incidents
occurred in the UNIFIL area in April 1980. The DFF attempted to establish more
armed positions in the UNIFIL area; their action was firmly resisted by UNIFIL,
which led to serious confrontations resulting in the death of UNIFIL soldiers and
UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura was subjected to heavy bombardment. 136 Following
these incidents, the Security Council in Resolution 467 of 24 April 1980 commended
UNIFIL for its great restraint in carrying out its duties and also called attention to the
provisions of its mandate that would allow the Force to use its right to self-defence.I37
On 3 June 1982 the Israeli Ambassador to Britain was attacked in an assassination
attempt and Israel immediately accused the PL0.138 The PLO denied responsibility,
stating through its London representative that the attack served Israeli interests and
not Palestinian ones. I39 On 4 June Israel launched massive bombing raids against PLO
targets in Lebanon. I49 On 5 June it was announced at the United Nations that the
British authorities had arrested three individuals who were part of an anti-PLO group,
and charged them with the crime.I4I The Security Council adopted Resolution 508,
charging all parties to discontinue armed military activities in Lebanon.I42
On 6 June 1982, UNIFIL Force Commander Lieutenant General William Callaghan
met the Chief of Staff of the IDF to discuss the implementation of Security Council
Resolution 508, but instead he was informed by the Chief of Staff of the IDF that the
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IDF planned to launch a military operation into Lebanon within half an hour. I43 The
UNIFIL Commander ordered that all UNIFIL troops block the advance of IDF, adopt
defensive measures, and remain in position unless their safety was "seriously
imperilled".144
With regard to the role of UNIFIL during the attack by Israel, the Chief of Staff of the
IDF informed the UNIFIL Commander that the Israeli forces would pass through or
near UNIFIL positions and that he expected that UNIFIL would raise no physical
difficulty to the advancing troops. These words were described by the UNIFIL
Commander as a totally unacceptable course of action. I45 Despite the efforts by
UNIFIL soldiers, they could not withstand the massive Israeli invading forces with
their light defensive weapons.I46 During a week of Israeli invasion into Lebanon it
was estimated that 10,000 people were killed or wounded and some refugee camps
were completely destroyed and a number of towns and cities were reduced to
rubble.I47
The IDF began to withdraw from several parts of Lebanon in September 1983 with a
further withdrawal in February 1985, but despite the efforts by the Secretary-General
and the Lebanese government, the Israeli government refused to withdraw completely
from Lebanese territory. The Israelis continued to hold positions in southern Lebanon,
creating a "security zone" controlled by the IDF and the South Lebanon Army
(SLA).148
In order to analyse the constitutional basis of UNIFIL and to explain the nature of its
mandate, the Security Council resolutions, the positions of parties, and the
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effectiveness of UNIFIL should be considered in the same context. UNIFIL was
created to confirm Israeli withdrawal and to ensure "the effective restoration of
Lebanese sovereignty". 149 UNIFIL's mandate was to be applied with the consent of
the parties. Its guidelines were essentially the same as those applied to UNEF II and
UNDOF, i.e. a consensual type peace-keeping, as White 150 puts it, without the right of
use of force for its purposes. As Resolution 467 emphasised, UMFIL could use force
for self-defence to perform its mandate. However, the right of self-defence had no
effect on the implementation of UNIFIL's mandate. 'UNIFIL was not given the means
to carry out its mandate and thus was faced with an impossible task.
If the parties provided consent and co-operation, UNIFIL could have implemented its
mandate successfully. Although UNIFIL was a response to the Lebanon's request and
had the consent of Lebanon for its presence, Israel was not prepared to co-operate
fully with UNIFIL.
As the Secretary-General stated in 1991, the Israeli authorities continued to state that
they had no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and that the "security zone" was a
temporary arrangement. 151 The Secretary-General concluded that Israel continued "to
build up DFF and to improve the ability to reinforce IDF's strength inside Lebanon
quickly. A consequence of this policy is that the Israeli-controlled area is becoming
increasingly separated from the rest of Lebanon".152 Therefore, UNIFIL's original
mandate, i.e. to facilitate the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, was impossible to
achieve. UNIFIL also was ignored by Israel in the attacks which were launched by the
latter in 1992 and 1996. Israel in its last attack targeted UNIFIL's headquarters in
Qana (Lebanon), resulting in the killing and wounding of both UN personnel and
Lebanese who took refuge in the peace-keepers' base.153
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UNIFIL had successful negotiations for a short-lived cease-fire between Israel and the
PLO. In addition, UNIFIL worked closely with the special representative of the
Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance in Lebanon. Nevertheless, UNIFIL
should be considered as an inter-state peace-keeping force with its mandate based on
Article 40 for provisional measures. However, UNIFIL has had a unique mandate,
because it should ensure the restoration of Lebanese governmental authority and its
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and territorial independence. This task seems
impossible because of the limited power of UNIFIL and lack of co-operation of the
parties concerned.
The Council has preferred to make no effective move and allow Israel to continue the
occupation of the Lebanese territory. Even the attacks on the positions of United
Nations forces in 1992 and 1996 have been ignored, although the reports of the UN
fact-finding missions to the area have confirmed that those attacks had been
committed intentionally.154 At least the United Nations should be able to protect its
personnel and areas. On the other hand, the United Nations should take such courses
of action that do not imply the peace-keeping operations tend to sanctify the status
quo and give the impression that they would remain in the area forever.
Conclusion
The mandate for peace-keeping operations, according to the nature of the conflict
concerned, will differ. Conflicts can be divided into inter-state and intra-state
conflicts. Until the 1980s, most of peace-keeping operations were concerned with
inter-state conflicts. There were various causes for these conflicts, ranging from the
154.. Ibid, 24 July 1996, p. 1.149
ideological, territorial, strategic, imperialistic, class, non-colonial and de-colonial to
self determination) 55
During the Cold War, ONUC became involved because of external intervention and
internal destabilisation; UNIFIL was involved because of conflicts between Lebanon
and Israel; UN Commission in Indonesia was involved because of decolonisation and
of national self-determination; UNFICYP was involved after decolonisation by the
United Kingdom; UNAVEM was dispatched following the independence of Angola
from Portoguese colonial rule, and all the Middle East cases stemmed from the period
of the withdrawal of the colonial powers from the area.156
During the Cold War, peace-keeping forces were dispatched for supervising,
observing, and securing cease-fire and ensuring that no party violated the cease-fire.
They had to observe and report the violations of cease-fire without an active role to
keep the peace; even "ensuring" did not mean that they had to use force in the
conflicts to maintain the peace.
ONUC had an initial mandate which was to assist the government of Congo for the
withdrawal of Belgian forces. 157 With the continuation of the war, ONUC's mandate
was changed to "prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo including
arrangements for cease-fire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of
clashes, and the use of force if necessary, in the last resort". 158 However, the Security
Council decided to reinforce the mandate of ONUC and authorised the Secretary-
General "to take vigorous action including the requisite measures of force". 159 ONUC
could not be impartial because it had to fight, not only in self-defence, but also to
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perform its mandate, i.e. assisting the central government against foreign forces and
secessionists. In practice, ONUC during its operation used force when attacked by
Katangese forces.
The presence of peace-keeping forces in most cases has proved to be a technique
capable of expanding the possibilities for both prevention of conflict and resolving the
dispute. The consent and co-operation of the parties concerned are the most important
elements for the success of a peace-keeping force. Otherwise, their success is doubtful
as seen in the case of UNIFIL. UNIFIL's main function still remains the supervision
of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, and dependent on Israeli co-operation.
In the absence of co-operation, the change of its mandate might be necessary to
implement the Council's resolution.
On the contrary, UNEF I which was created by the General Assembly with the
substantial assistance of the Secretary-General, has been considered one of the most
effective UN peace-keeping operations. Its mandate was to secure a cease-fire,
supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from the area, observe the armistice
agreement and patrol armistice lines. As the Secretary-General explained the mandate
of UNEF I, the force was not authorised to use force other than to carry out its
mandate and it was more than an observation mission, but it was not an enforcement
measure. Even ONUC, which was authorised to use force in the last resort, could not
be considered as an enforcement action because its purpose was not to use force to
end the hostility.
Although the presence of peace-keeping forces provide conditions for a political
solution or, as in the case of UNDOF, to help to stabilise the cease-fire, UNFICYP's
experience shows that a long-standing peace-keeping body not only has a high cost
for the Organisation, but also its presence may only maintain the status quo rather
than assist the parties to solve their dispute.151
Regarding the constitutional basis of peace-keeping operations, it should be noted
that, as discussed in Chapter Two, there is doubt that peace-keeping is derived from
Chapter VI of the Charter since this chapter deals with pacific settlement of disputes.
while peace-keeping may be characterised as a technique that does not lead to a
settlement or solution per se. However, as Chapter Four will discuss, observer
missions have been deployed to investigate and mediate, the functions which are
deemed under Article 34 of Chapter VI of the Charter.
Article 42 also cannot be considered as a legal basis of peace-keeping, because this
institution has been created as a result of the Council's failure to take action under
Chapter VII. In fact, it could be said that peace-keeping is to supervise or to ensure
compliance with provisional measures contained in Article 40, as it deems necessary
or desirable, which shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the
parties concerned.
The General Assembly also may recommend provisional measures. UNEF I was
established by the General Assembly after the disputant parties had accepted the
General Assambly's recommendation for a cease-fire. The General Assembly
possesses such power under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter.
The International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case, regarding the
establishment of ONUC and UNEF I, confirmed that peace-keeping forces are not
enforcement action within the compass of Chapter VII. Therefore, the General
Assembly, which could make recommendations of a general character affecting peace
and security, could establish a peace-keeping force for this purpose. Except UNEF I,
which was established by the General Assembly, the establishment of peace-keeping
forces is firmly in the control of the Security Council.CHAPTER FOUR
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION MISSIONS
Over the years observer groups have undertaken several missions of varying scope,
duration and degree of success. They have been dispatched to observe both side's
behaviour and report on what they see to assist resolving the dispute. Observer
missions might undertake several functions, such as observation of the cease-fire
orders, investigation of allegations of violations, assistance in arranging cease-fires
and provision of operational data for the Security Council.
This chapter will review nine cases in which observation missions were deployed. The
facts of the cases are given in brief, followed by an analysis of the constitutional basis
of the observer groups involved and the effectiveness of these missions. The chapter
will conclude with a general discussion on the presented cases.
UN Observers in Indonesia
The first United Nations' observer mission is the UN involvement in the archipelago
of Indonesia in 1947. Indonesian colonial history began in 1511 when the Portuguese
seized Moluccas, to be followed by Spaniards, Dutch and British. By the end of 17th
century the Dutch had gained control over Indonesia and maintained their authority
until the mid-20th century. The Japanese invasion of Indonesia in 1942 did not face
serious local opposition because they were regarded as liberators from Dutch
colonialism. After Japan's surrender to the Allies in 1945, Sukarno, the leader of the
Indonesian nationalist movement, proclaimed independence.'
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The Netherlands government was prepared to accept the de facto situation of
Indonesia, but insisted that the new state would remain under the Dutch rule. The
Nationalists did not accept this as it was not recognition of the Republic of Indonesia.
The Republicans insisted that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty. The
Dutch argued that, under Netherlands' law, they could conclude treaties only with
foreign independent powers. Indonesians wanted an agreement to provide for
international arbitration, but the Netherlands disagreed, seeing this as an opening for
international intervention.2
Despite a third party intervention by Britain and the concluding of the Linggadjati
Agreement, which was far from precise especially in establishing the de jure authority
of Indonesia, the first "police action" was attempted by the Netherlands against the
Republic of Indonesia on 20th July 1947 in Java and Sumatra. 3 On 30th July India
drew to the attention of the Security Council that Dutch forces had embarked, without
warning, on large scale military action against the Indonesian people. In the opinion
of the Indian government, the situation was covered by Article 34 of the Charter
(Chapter VI); thus, the Security Council should take necessary measures to put an end
to the military operations.4 On the same day Australia, in a letter to the Secretary
General, considered these hostilities as constituting a breach of the peace under
Article 39 and proposed that the Security Council, as a provisional measure under
Article 40, should call upon the parties to cease hostilities.5
The Dutch representative argued that the Netherlands had sovereignty in the region
and that, since the Charter operated between sovereign states, it was not applicable;
this matter was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the Netherlands. 6 Britain and
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France sympathetically favoured a settlement outside the United Nations and
vigorously opposed sending an investigatory or supervisory body to the scene. 7 The
Australian representative stated that the situation constituted not a mere "police
action", but armed conflict between two states according to international law and was
therefore covered by Articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter. 8 The representative of the
United States suggested that references to specific articles should be deleted and a
simple statement would be enough.9
Goodrich and Hambro, on UN jurisdiction in this case and the interpretation of Article
2(7), stated that: "The question of jurisdiction was never explicitly decided by the
Council, though the action subsequently taken could only have been justified on the
assumption that competence to act existed. Nor was it made clear whether the action
of the Council was based on the exception to the domestic jurisdiction principle or on
the view that the matter was not essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of The
Netherlands."10
The Security Council, on 1st August, in its first resolution, called on the Netherlands
and the Republic of Indonesia to cease fire and to settle the dispute by arbitration or
by other peaceful means." When the Council, at its 171st meeting on 31st July,
invited the representative of the Netherlands and India to participate in the discussion
of the Indonesian question, the representative of Australia and the USSR proposed
that a similar invitation should be sent to the government of the Republic of Indonesia
under Article 32.12 At the 181st meeting of the Council on 12th August, the
representative of the Netherlands, supported by the representatives of the United
Kingdom, Belgium and France, reiterated the argument that the Republic of Indonesia
7-Ibid, p. 365; see also SC 172nd mtg, 2nd yr UN SCOR (1947), pp. 1700-1703.
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could not be admitted to participate in the discussion under Article 32 as it was not a
sovereign and independent state generally recognised as such, because it had received
only de facto recognition. Finally, the Council decided in favour of this invitation.I3
The government of the Netherlands requested career consuls stationed in Batavia to
report jointly on the situation. The government of the Republic of Indonesia requested
a commission of observers appointed by the Security Counci1. 14 Although it was
deemed necessary as an immediate step to appoint a neutral observer for the cease-
fire, the Netherlands' suggestion was accepted. 15 The Security Council in its
resolution requested the Governments members of the Council which had career
consular representatives in Batavia "to instruct them to prepare jointly for the
information and guidance of the Security Council reports ... to cover the observance of
the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation
or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement
between the parties". 16 Thus the Consular Commission was established. This
Commission at its first meeting unanimously agreed that each of the powers
represented should be requested to furnish military officers to observe any possible
violations of the cease-fire orders; to investigate, where possible, allegations of
violations of the cease-fire orders; and to gather any other data that might be of value
to the Commission and to the Security Counci1. 17 The observers were formally the
Consular Commission's, and the states from which they were drawn were Australia,
Belgium, France, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 18 The Security
Council at the next stage established a Committee of Good Offices (GOC) to assist
disputants in the peaceful settlement of their dispute.19
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The Security Council on 1st November requested the Committee of Good Offices set
up under Resolution 31 to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement
to ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution.2° The Security Council also
requested the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its
services available to the GOC.21 The GOC was composed of Belgium, nominated by
the Netherlands,22 and Australia, nominated by Indonesia23; Belgium and Australia
selected the United States as the third member.24 Thus, GOC and the Consular
Commission with its military assistants were constituted for peace-keeping and
peaceful settlement of dispute in the area. "The military assistants assumed broad
reporting functions related to observation of violations of the cease-fire orders,
investigation of allegations of violations, assistance in arranging cease-fires, and
provision of operational data for the GOC and the Security Council."25
The GOC aided the parties in reaching agreement on a truce which was signed by the
Netherlands, the Republic of Indonesia and the GOC as the Renville Agreement26 on
17 January 1948. Unfortunately, the Renville Agreement could not prevent the second
"police action" (military action) of the Netherlands against Indonesia and hostilities
were renewed on 18-19 December 1948.27 Some writers believe that resumed
hostilities and ineffectiveness of the Renville Agreement indicated a failure of the
Council's good offices, founded on a "piecemeal approach" and separating the
political and military aspects of the controversy.28
The Security Council's reaction to the second military action was different to that over
the first Netherlands' military action. In fact, the Netherlands lost its support in the
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Security Council which perhaps was one of the reasons of the renewal of hostilities.
The Security Council in its resolution on 28 January 1949 (S/1234) clearly
condemned the occupation of the territory of Indonesia by the armed forces of the
Netherlands which was incompatible with restoration of good relations between the
parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of dispute.29
Besides, all of the arguments of the Netherlands under Article 2(7) and the
competence of the Security Council and refusing to de jure recognition of Indonesia
were rejected.3°
The Committee of Good Offices was reconstituted as the United Nations Commission
for Indonesia (UNCI) and the Consular Commission was requested to facilitate the
work of UNCI by providing military observers and other facilities.31
Mentioned in the Council resolution32 were the transfer of sovereignty by the
Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia at the earliest
possible date and in any case not later than 1 July 1950; and a request to the Secretary
General to make available to the Commission staff, funds and other facilities for the
discharge of its functions and all the duties of the UNCI.
The Security Council had not specified in its Resolutions the constitutional basis and
specific article of the Charter about observing groups in Indonesia. Higgins and
Wainhouse believe that, in spite of the silence of the resolutions, the Security Council
acted both under Chapter VI and Chapter VII.33
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The present author believes that the Security Council's peace-keeping and peaceful
settlement of dispute in Indonesia was under both Chapter VI (Article 33(1)) and
Chapter VII (Article 40). The request of the Security Council for the settlement of
dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means (good offices) was justified by
Chapter VI, and the use of military observers was justified under Chapter VII (Article
40). The Security Council action could not be considered as an enforcement action
since the observer forces were established by the consent of both parties, without any
authorisation to use force to prevent breaches of the cease-fire. The establishment of
UN military observers in Indonesia demonstrates the emergence of the institution of
peace-keeping to monitor cease-fire as a provisional measure for further steps to be
taken to settle the dispute.
UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)
The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was created on 21
October 1947 by General Assembly Resolution 109 (II) to deploy an observation
group to observe the frontiers between Greece and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
and to ascertain whether Greek Communist guerrillas were receiving outside support
in their insurgency against the goverrunent.34
The dispute originated out of the Cold War tensions focused on the Greek crisis. The
actions of third states and the superpowers increased the danger to international peace
and security. After the occupation of Greece by Axis powers in 1941, the British
Government evacuated King George II from Greece and he with his government
began a period of exile in London and in Cairo.35
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The movement known as the National Liberation Front (EAM, whose military arm
was ELAS, the National People's Liberation Army) fought the occupation under the
leadership of the Communist Party (KKE) and, as the German occupation came to the
end, the two rival groups formed a Government of National Unity in 1944. But later,
at the beginning of December 1944, civil war broke out in Athens between
government forces and ELAS units because EAM ministers were concerned at the
surrender of arms by ELAS, and British troops were ordered to fight ELAS.36
In January 1946 the Soviet Union submitted a complaint concerning Greece to the
Security Council stating that Britain supported the Greek government and had troops
in the country thereby interfering in Greek internal affairs.37 Britain's claim that they
were in Greece at the Government's request were rejected by the Soviet Union.38
On 24 August 1946 the government of the Ukrainian SSR brought the Greece's
problem, especially violent incidents on the border between Greece and Albania,
before the Security Counci1. 39 There were several proposals before the Security
Council. The United States suggested that an investigative commission be established
to look into incidents along the whole northern border of Greece, but its proposal
failed to be carried because of the Soviet veto.40
On 3 December 1946 Greece requested the Security Council to consider the situation
existing between Greece and its neighbours and asked the Security Council to arrange
for an on-the-spot investigation.4' Although Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia denied
that they had assisted the insurgents in Greece and stated that the civil war in Greece
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arose from the repressive policies of its government, the Security Council established
a Commission of Investigation.42
The Security Council in Resolution 339 established the Commission of Investigation
under Article 34 of the Charter. The Commission carried out its function and reported
that Greek guerrillas were receiving support from the three Communist
govertunents.43 However, the USSR disagreed with the report and vetoed any Security
Council resolutions. On 15 September 1947 the Greek question was removed from the
agenda of the Security Council, enabling the General Assembly to deal with the
matter.44It is thought that the United States was instrumental in removing the issue
from the Council's agenda and placing it before the General Assembly, where the
West was in firm contro1.45
The General Assembly, with the report of the Commission of Investigation, decided
to set up the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB).46The
function of UNSCOB was to observe the compliance by the four Governments
concerned with the General Assembly recommendations and to assist them in the
implementations of such recommendations.47When the Committee (UNSCOB)
interpreted its mandate, it decided to concentrate on its observation function.48
The General Assembly made no reference to any specific article of the UN Charter in
the resolution establishing UNSCOB. However, the origins of UNSCOB was in the
report of the Commission of Investigation established under Article 34 by the Security
42.. Res. 339, 19 Dec. 1946. This commission was composed of nationals from Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The USSR changed its previous position.
43-UN Yearbook, (1947-48), pp. 338-9.
44-Ibid, pp. 348-350.
45-Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping, (Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1969), p.211.
46-This committee consisted of the representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States.
47-- GA Res. 109 (II), 21 Oct. 1947
48_ A1521, (1948).161
Counci1.49 The authority granted to the General Assembly was under Articles
10,11(2),14 and 22. It is believed that, as long as the Charter powers do not overtly
conflict with Articles 12 or 2(7), they potentially encompass all the recommendatory
powers of the Security Counci1.50 If an observation function is categorised as a
provisional measure under Article 40 only the Security Council can decide on its
implementation. Otherwise the General Assembly has the power to recommend
provisional measures under Articles 10,11, 14 and 22.
After the establishment of UNSCOB, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia contended
that UNS COB had been constituted illegally and its establishment was an
infringement of their sovereignty.5I They argued that while under Chapter VII the
Council could order measures to be taken without the consent of the parties, under
Chapter VI the Council could merely make recommendations, which could be
accepted or rejected by the parties concerned. The establishment of the proposed
commission (UNSCOB) was more than a recommendation and involved a decision
imposed regardless of the parties' consent.52
Higgins believes that these contentions confuse the establishment of UNSCOB with
its operation. She says "Nile General Assembly acknowledged that UNSCOB could
not operate in the territory of any State without that State's consent; but its
establishment was nonetheless clearly within the terms of Articles 10, 11, 14 and 22
of the Charter".53
In fact, the observers' role was simply to investigate and report and not to impose a
solution.54 It makes sense that the General Assembly with its recommendatory role
49- GA Res. 109 (II), 21 Oct. 1947, para. 2.
50-N. D. White, ihe United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990), P. 183.
51-UN Yearbook  (1947-48), p.341.
52_ a
53-R. Higgins, op. cit.., p. 32.
54-I. J. Rikhye et al, op. cit„ p. 146.162
could establish an observation force. The presence of forces should however be based
on States' consent.
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)
The Palestine problem has a deep root in history. Before the British mandate in 1922,
Palestine was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 until 1917. Although
for four centuries Palestine was an integral part of Turkey, Palestinians were not a
subject people and were citizens of a sovereign and independent country with full
civil and political rights.55 After the First World War, the concept of mandate was laid
down in Article 22 of the League of Nations and Palestine was established as a
mandate of the "A" class, a class which applied to certain communities belonging to
the Turkish Empire. Palestinians attempted to establish an independent state during
World War I and were pledged to independence by the British government and its
allies which were at war with Turkey.56 However, the pledges and mandate never led
to an independent Palestine.
On the other hand, political Zionism, with the aim of creating a national home for
Jews, was founded by Theodor Herzl at the first Zionist Congress in Basle,
Switzerland, in 1897.57 Herzl expected that the German government, as a first step,
would make appropriate arrangements to create a Jewish land, but Germans rejected
this proposal as did the Ottoman Empire.58 Great Britain provided effective support
for Zionism and later the British mandate contained provision for the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jews.59 The pledge given to Zionist Jews on 2
55-For more information see: S. N. Fisher, The Middle East, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1960), pp. 320- 322, and, Henry Caftan, The Palestine Ouestion, (Croom Helm, U.K., 1988), pp.
7-8.
56-British Government's Report, Cmd. , 5974, 16 March 1939.
57-W. T. Mallison and S. V. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World
Order, (Longman, England, 1986), pp. 7,12.
58-Ibid, pp. 20-21.
59- Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1969), p. 5.163
November 1917 by Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, known as the
Balfour Declaration, contained the statement that the British Government would
"view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people" and would use its "best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this
object" •60
During the mandate, the immigration of Jewish people increased and violence in
Palestine started.61 A Jewish group killed 91 British senior officials in the King
David Hotel in Jerusalem. They also captured and hanged British officers and troops.
The British army became increasingly engaged in fighting with members of various
Jewish military organisations.62 On 2 April 1947, the British government placed the
issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations with a request to set up a
special commission for considering the future of Palestine. The General Assembly
established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) 63 on 15 May 1947 to
examine the Palestine problem and submit proposals to the General Assembly.64
The majority of UNSCOP supported the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish
and Arab states joined by an economic union, with Jerusalem under an international
regime administered by the UN. A minority of the Committee's members favoured
establishment of a single, binational state.65
60-W. T. Mallison and S. V. Mallison, op. cit., p. 427.
61- The chief Zionist underground military organisation, the Haganah, became very active in
Palestine in smuggling in illegal immigrants and forcibly releasing illegal immigrants who were
held by the British. Id.
62.. 	 Kirk, The Middle East. 1945-1950, (Oxford University Press, London, 1954), pp. 209-13.
63-GA Res. 106, 15 May 1947.
64-UNSCOP included representatives from Australia, Canada Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India,
Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.
65- UNSCOP Report A/364, 21 Sep 1947. Those countries in favour of a single state were
Yugoslavia, Iran and India.164
Although the competence of the UN for the implementation of the partition plan was
doubtful,66 on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly passed Resolution 181(II)
adopting the partition plan and establishing a UN Palestine Commission to implement
the resolution67. Besides, Resolution 181(II) stated that the British mandate over
Palestine should be terminated and British armed forces should leave the country by 1
August 1948.68 Brownlie believes that "[I]t is doubtful if the United Nations has a
'capacity to convey title', in part because the Organisation cannot assume the role of
territorial sovereign: in spite of the principle of implied powers the Organisation is not
a state and the General Assembly only has a power of recommendation. Thus the
resolution of 1947 containing a partition plan for Palestine was probably  ultra vires,
and, if it was not, was not binding on member states in any case."69
Hostilities between armed Jewish and Palestinian elements intensified. On 10 April
1948, the Palestine Commission reported to the Secretary General that "the armed
hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-
operation from the mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine,
and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the
necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the
Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution".7°
66-According to the UN Charter the purposes of the United Nations does not include the partition
of territory of a state and creating a new state. Article 10 of the Charter also contains the power
given to the General Assembly to discuss any question or matter within the scope of the Charter
not more than that to divide the territorial integrity of a state. Furthermore Article 2(7) has
provided that the United Nations is not authorised to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. For more information see: Quincy Wright, The
Middle East Problem, 64 A. J. I. L., (1970), p. 277; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, 4th ed., (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 172-173; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, (Stevens and Sons, London, 1950), p. 97.
67- The Commission included a representative from Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama
and the Philippines.
68-GA Res. 181(11), 29 Nov. 1947.
69-I. Brownlie, op. cit„ p. 172.
70-GA Report A1532, 10 Apr. 1948.165
On 16 April 1948, the Security Council passed a resolution establishing a Truce
Commission (UNTS0)71 to assist the Council in securing a truce in Palestine.72 On 15
May 1948, the British mandate came to an end and the Jews immediately proclaimed
the establishment of the state of Israel. The reaction of the Arab states was that their
armed forces crossed the frontier and intense fighting broke out. The Security Council
called for an immediate cease-fire and on 29 May 1948 succeeded in arranging a four-
week truce.73 The Security Council resolution on 29 May 1948 instructed the
Mediator and the Truce Commission to dispatch a sufficient number of observers.74
According to Higgins, this point marked the birth of a body for UN Truce
Supervision.75 In the meanwhile, Count Bernadott of Sweden had been appointed
mediator to act in concert with the commission in supervising the truce.76 Bernadott
negotiated a four week truce but the lack of resolve led him to write: "[t]he United
Nations showed itself from the worst side. It was depressing to have to recognize the
fact that even the most trivial decisions with regard to measures designed to lend force
to its words were dependent on the political calculations of the Great Powers".77
On 17 September 1948, Count Bernadott and a senior French observer were
assassinated in Jerusalem by the Stern gang, a Jewish terrorist organisation. 78 Dr.
Ralph Bunche, as a new Mediator, continued the work to effect a permanent truce.
After passing the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states, the
Security Council, by its resolution of 11 August 1949, terminated the role of the
Mediator and referred to the continued use of the Truce Supervision Organisation.79
71- The Commission was composed of representative from those members of the Security Council
having career consular offices in Jerusalem (the United States, France, Belgium and Syria with the
latter declining to participate.
	
72.. 	 Res. 723, 16 Apr. 1948.
73-R. Higgins, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 14-15.
74- SC Res. S1801, 29 May 1948.
75-R. Higgins, op. cit., p. 16.
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77- D. W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, (The John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1973), p. 27.
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The Truce Commission became known as the Truce Supervision Organisation for the
first time in this resolution. "This step really achieved a separation between the
function of conciliation, which was surrendered by the Acting Mediator to the
Conciliation Commission (General Assembly body established by the Assembly on
11 December 1948), and that of observation and supervision of the Armistice
Agreements. ... Hence, UNTSO, whilst organised and developed by the Mediator,
acting in consultation with the Secretary-General, became a separate organ of the
Security Council based essentially on Article 40 of the Charter."8°
The UNTSO, as its former Chief of Staff General Burns observed, "was no longer
subordinated to the Mediator, but became a subsidiary organ of the United Nations
with its own well-defined functions. Its machinery for supervising the cease-fire and
the truce, established under previous Security Council resolutions, was made available
for assisting the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements through the Mixed
Armistice Commissions set up therein. The Chief of Staff was made responsible for
reporting to the Security Council on the observance of the cease-fire order of July 15,
1948, which remained in force."81
UNTSO was created under the auspices of the Security Council to secure cease-fire as
a provisional measure under Articles 39 and 40, as stated in Resolution 54. Besides, in
the armistice agreements it had been given the specific function of observing the
armistice lines and reporting to the Security Council, which was then recognised by
the Council in 1949.82 Its duties have ranged from observation of the 1949 truce and
subsequent armistice agreements, with specific roles being granted to it after the 1956,
1967 and 1973 conflicts.83
80-D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, (Stevens & Sons, London, 1964),  P. 63.
81-E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, (George G. Harrap, London, 1962), p. 27.
82.. 	 Res. 72, 11 Aug.1949.
83- N. D. White, op. cit., p. 184.167
Consequently, UNTSO was an observation team which had a mandatory role to call
for provisional measures. UNTSO was not created for settlement of the dispute, and
its effectiveness was only in observation and reporting as the provisional measures for
keeping the status quo.
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
The origin of the dispute between India and Pakistan dates from 15 August 1947, the
date the Indian Independence Act came into effect, partitioning the Indo-Pakistan
subcontinent along Hindu-Muslim lines. In addition, the Act technically and legally
required independent (princely) states to accede either to Pakistan or India. 84 Most of
the princely states in fact decided to join either Pakistan or India, though three states
did not join the two new dominions: Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir.
Hyderabad was invaded by India in 1948 and was forced into the Union of India. In
1947 Junagadh was invaded by the Indian army and, in a subsequent plebiscite, the
population voted to join India. Hyderabad and Junagadh were predominantly Hindu
and ruled by a Muslim goverment. The state of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter
referred to as Kashmir) was in a different situation. Kashmir, the largest state, had a
population in the region of four million (now 8 million), was predominantly Muslim
and ruled by a Hindu, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. It possessed borders with India,
Pakistan, China and Afghanistan.85
The goverment of the Hindu ruler was unpopular and faced strong domestic
opposition from Muslim leaders. He was also under pressure from the British Viceroy
84- Ibid, p. 316.
85.. 	 more information see: A. Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir 1947 to 1966, (Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1966); J. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1954); Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation, (Oxford University Press, Oxford and
New York, 1985), pp. 47-50.168
of India, Lord Mountbatten, to join one of the two states.86 Finally, in August 1947,
when a revolt in the town of Poonch was suppressed by the state forces, the Muslim
soldiers of the ruler organised the Azad (free) Kashmir movement. The Muslim
tribesmen of the North-West Frontier Province invaded Kashmir. The Maharaja
appealed to India for help which was given in return for his state's accession to India;
and on 24 October he signed an instrument of Accession to India.87 On 27 October
1947 the Indian army was dispatched to Srinagar. Pakistan complained to the Security
Council regarding the Muslims' right of self-determination in Kashmir which was
being denied by India. In response, India said that the question was purely a domestic
one.88 Although Nehru (of India) and Mohammed Ali Jinnah (of Pakistan) had agreed
on holding a referendum in Kashmir under international auspices, nothing of the sort
ever took place.
Diplomatic attempts by both sides at first failed to bring the issue to the United
Nations, but on 20 January 1948 the two governments agreed to the establishment of
the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP).89
UNCIP's function was "to investigate the facts pursuant to Article  34 of the Charter of
the United Nations ... to exercise ... mediatory influence likely to smooth away
difficulties.. .and to report how far the advice and directions, if any, of the Security
Council have been carried out".90 UNCIP consisted of the United States, Belgium and
Colombia (nominated by the Secretary General), Czechoslovakia (nominated by
India), and Argentina (nominated by Pakistan). A Security Council resolution of 21
April set out the mechanism for conducting a referendum under UNCIP auspices91;
86- S.D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict
1946-1964, Vol. II, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), P. 61.
87.. Higgins, op. cit., p. 316.
88.. M. Franck, op. cit., p. 51.
89.. Res. 39, 20 Jan. 1948.
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and in paragraph 17, this Commission was authorised to establish United Nations
observers in Kashmir.
However, fighting intensified between Indian and Pakistani forces, preventing the
holding of a referendum. Instead, the Commission concentrated on arranging a cease-
fire, which came about on 1 January 1949. On 5 January the Commission received the
Governments of India and Pakistan acceptance of the Commission's plebiscite
proposals and adopted a plan for an UNCIP-supervised plebiscite.92 Disagreements
between Pakistan and India over how to implement that plan left UNCIP to
concentrate on demarcating the cease-fire line and positioning observers along it.
Although the plebiscite was never held, UN observers stayed on. The cease-fire line
became the permanent boundary, though modified by sporadic renewal of fighting.93
UNCIP was later augmented by a United Nations Mission Observers Group for India
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which was not operational until after a cease-fire
agreement between India and Pakistan was reached at Karachi on 27 July 1949.94
Another UN mission was dispatched to the area between 1965-66, following the
report by UNMOGIP of violations of the Karachi Agreement.95 The Security Council
in its Resolution 211 asked the Secretary-General to "provide the necessary assistance
to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel". 96 With
reference to the requirements of Resolution 211, the Secretary-General created UN
India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM). 97 Although UNMOGIP and
UNIPOM's functions were similar, their creation were quite different. In fact
UNMOGIP "was created by agreement between the parties and sanctioned by the
Security Council. UNIPOM was created by the Council - or more correctly a
92-SCOR, 4th year, Special Supp. No. 7(S11430), 1949, pp. 25-27.
93-T. M. Franck, op. cit„ p. 52.
94-The Karachi Agreement, SCOR, 4th year, Special Supp. No. 7 (S11430), Ann. 26, 1949, pp.
126-9.
95-S/6651, (1965).
96-SC Res. 211,20 Sep. 1965.
97-S/6738.170
combination of the Council and the Secretary General - consented to by the parties,
and later sanctioned by them."98
To analyse the legal basis of UN forces in this case it should be said that UNCIP was
created within the provisions of Chapter VI by Council Resolution 39 to investigate
the facts and exercise a mediatory influence. UNMOGIP's functions were defined by a
bilateral (Karachi) accord which embodied an agreement on provisional measures
(cease-fire and withdrawals) made between the parties. In fact, the constitutional basis
of UNMOGIP is Article 40, as stated in Council resolution 47. It seems however that
the observer group could not be established without the agreement of the two parties
at Karachi in July 1949. The terms of this agreement were approved by the Security
Council later which was necessary for establishing this force.
It is difficult to assess the extent of UNMOGIP's achievements. It might have
prevented a serious deterioration of the situation, but preserving the status quo would
not be considered as a settlement of dispute. UNMOGIP has in fact fulfilled its
function as determined by the bilateral agreement; it may however be argued that the
final settlement of dispute could have been reached under the UN-held plebiscite.
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
With Arab nationalism and political consciousness rising among the Muslim
community in the 1950s, political pressures intensified within Lebanon. The country's
population was divided between Muslims and Christians. The latter had political
power at the time. In February 1958 Egypt and Syria united, forming the United Arab
Republic (UAR) and this prompted the pro-Western governments of Jordan and Iraq
to form a federation (Arab Union).99 The government of Lebanon, which had
98.. 	 D. White, The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security,
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990), p. 189.
99- The Annual Register of World Events, (1958), pp. 309-12.171
officially accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine I00 and had refused to break relations with
Britain and France to support Nasser of Egypt in the Suez crisis, faced increasing
dissension among Lebanese political leaders.I01
In early May 1958, following the murder of a newspaper editor, considerable
disturbances occurred in the Lebanon. The government of President Chamoun asked
Washington for US military intervention. Because of the conditions laid down by the
United States102, Chamoun made no formal request for aid to the US. On 22 May
1958, the government of Lebanon complained to the United Nations about alleged
massive intervention and indirect aggression by the UAR. 103 The UAR denied the
accusations made by Lebanon and noted that Lebanon was trying to internationalise
what was essentially a domestic issue in order to persuade the West to intervene.104
The Soviet Union supported the position of the UAR, whereas Lebanon was
supported by Iraq, Jordan, the United Kingdom, the United States and France.105
The Security Council delayed action until the Arab League considered the issue, but
the League was unable to reach an agreement. On 10th June, the Swedish delegate
submitted a draft resolution calling for the establishment of an observation group in
Lebanon. I06 His draft was adopted the following day as Resolution 128 and the United
Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established "to ensure that there
100_ According to this doctrine, approved by Congress in 1957, the United States was authorised
to give economic and military assistance to any nation in the Middle East that asked for it, against
armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, (Doubleday & Co., Garden City, New York,
1965)pp. 176-83.
101_ For more information see: Roger Owen, The Crisis in Lebanon, (Ithaca Press, London, 1976).
102_ President Eisenhower replied that US intervention would not be for the purpose of supporting
a second Chamoun term of office and; another Arab state should agree to US intervention. D. D.
Eisenhower, op. cit„ p. 267.
103- S/4007.
104_ SCOR, 13th yr, 823rd mtg, 6 June 1958, pp. 23-25.
105- SCOR, 13th yr, 824th mtg, 10 June 1958, pp. 26-50.
106_ S/4022172
is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the
Lebanese border."107
UNOGIL, in its first report to the Security Council on 3 July 1958, stated that there
had been no major infiltration occurring from the UAR. 108 Lebanon, supported by the
United States and Britain, criticised this report and stated that massive intervention
was continuing in Lebanon by UAR.109
In mid July, pro-Western King Faisal of Iraq and his prime minister were assassinated
in a military coup and Iraq was proclaimed a republic. Fearing that events in Iraq
would have consequences in Lebanon and Jordan, the latter two turned to the West for
protection, and finally the United States landed troops in Lebanon and British forces
did likewise in Jordan." 0 Lebanon stated that its request for aid from the United
States was under its right to self-defence." The United States and Britain each
declared that they were acting under Article 51 of the Charter, helping a legitimate
government at its own request to defend its country against external aggression." 2 On
the other hand, the Soviet Union and Arab States contended that the right of self-
defence no longer applied, as the Security Council had already acted by taking a
decision which allowed for the resolution of the situation inside the country (domestic
issue), and by the establishment of UNOGIL." 3 Besides, the Soviet Union introduced
a resolution which would have condemned the US intervention in Lebanon as contrary
to Article 2(7) of the Charter and as a serious threat to international peace and
security. 114
107-SC Res. 128, 11 June 1958.
108-5/4040
109..S/4043
110..The New York Times, 18 July 1958.
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112_ R. Higgins, op. cit., p. 538.
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Secretary-General Hammarskjold in his statement to the Security Council implied that
the US intervention in Lebanon had prejudiced the ability of UNOGIL to fulfil its
role.115 The Swedish delegate to the United Nations stated that "one of the conditions
for Article 51 to be applicable ... [is] ... that an armed attack has occurred against a
Member-State. The Swedish Government does not consider that this condition has
been fulfilled in the present case, nor does my Government consider that there is an
international conflict in terms of Article 51 ".h16
The issue was taken up in the General Assembly. By that time the situation in
Lebanon had calmed by itself and, on 21 August, the Assembly requested Secretary-
General Hammarskjold to make practical arrangements to "facilitate the early
withdrawal of foreign troops" from Lebanon and Jordan. 117 In fact, the practice of
"Leave it to Dag" had at that time reached its height, and confidence in the Secretary-
General was so great that he pursued a course of action which the Security Council
had a month previously failed to agree upon." 8 The United States withdrew from
Lebanon on 25 October and Britain did likewise from Jordan on 2 November. On 16
November, the Lebanese representative to the United Nations informed the Security
Council of the existing friendly relations between the UAR and Lebanon and asked
for deletion of the Lebanese complaint from the agenda of the Security Counci1.119
The request was followed by a report of the Secretary-General that UNOGIL had
completed its task, and it finally left Lebanon on 9 December 1958.
As already explained, UNOGIL was established by Security Council's Resolution
128, which had determined to despatch an observation group to Lebanon to ensure
that there was no illegal infiltration across the Lebanese border and, to that end,
authorised the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps.
—
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It is not clear from the word "ensure" whether the Security Council meant to imply
that the observation group should forcibly prevent intervention, or whether its mission
was that of observation, fact finding and investigation. Although Lebanon insisted that
the United Nations should act forcibly to seal the borders, and the United States stated
that UNOGIL should act to stop indirect aggression, the Secretary-General believed
that use of force by the United Nations would have come under Chapter VII of the
Charter and could not be performed by a small non-fighting group, 100 in number,
such as UNOGIL.120 He emphasised that UNOGIL's role was strictly limited to
observing whether illegal infiltration occurred. 121 The Secretary-General later
mentioned that "the Council acted entirely within the limits of Chapter VI of the
Charter".I22
UNOGIL was therefore given no power to stop infiltration or the supply of arms. In
fact, the observation group was "requested" to keep the Security Council informed
through the Secretary-General. The functions of UNOGIL can be considered as
investigation and observation under Article 34 in order to ascertain the facts before a
United Nations' decision to adopt necessary measures; this observation is different to
the provisional measures being performed under Article 40.
UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) /
UN Observers and Security Force in West Irian (UNSF)
Although the main dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the
independence of Indonesia was resolved in 1949, both parties had not yet agreed over
the territory of New Guinea (West Irian) which remained under Dutch control.
120- SCOR, 13th yr, 827th mtg, 15 July 1958, para. 64.
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The Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty concluded between the parties at the Hague
had envisaged the end of Dutch control over Indonesia. After discussions in 1949
about sovereignty over West Irian, it was agreed that the status quo should be
maintained in West Irian for a year and the future of this territory would be settled in
negotiations between the two parties. 123 Failed negotiations led Indonesia in 1950 to
ask for the incorporation of West Irian into Indonesia. Finally, in 1954, Indonesia
brought the matter before the United Nations.124
Negotiations over the future of West Irian took place at the General Assembly's
sessions between 1954 and 1961. However, no progress was made. In 1961 the
Netherlands, in a memorandum, approved the General Assembly Resolution 1514, the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 125 In
response, the Indonesian government declared that the Netherlands' policy "was not
decolonization, but, on the contrary, merely a tactic to strike at Indonesia", and the
Dutch were trying "to use the right of self-determination as a means to cut off a part
of the territory of the Indonesian Republic".126
In December 1961, when increasing violence between the Indonesian and Dutch
governments made the prospect of a negotiated settlement elusive, U Thant, who had
been appointed Acting Secretary General following the death of Dag Hammarskjold,
undertook to resolve the dispute through his good offices. 127 The United States was
encouraging a negotiated settlement. 128 Consequently, secret negotiations began on 12
123-For the parties arguments on the Netherlands right of administration (Indonesian
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March 1962 in the presence of retired United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,
who officially represented U Thant and unofficially represented the US
government.129
However, during negotiations tensions occurred between the two parties. The
Netherlands charged that Indonesia committed an act of aggression. 130 Indonesia
responded that "Indonesians who have entered and who in the future will continue to
enter West Irian are Indonesian nationals who move into Indonesia's own territory
now dominated by the Dutch by force".131
U Thant was requested by the Netherlands to send United Nations observers to the
scene. U Thant declined this request and stated that "I could consider such a move
only if requests were made by both the Netherlands and Indonesian governments".132
The Acting Secretary-General was eventually able to announce on 31 July 1962 that a
preliminary agreement had been reached. 133 Final negotiations were held at the United
Nations Headquarters under the chairmanship of U Thant, with Ambassador Bunker
as a mediator, and an agreement was signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15
August 1962.134
The agreement provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be
transferred by the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
(UNTEA), to be established by and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General
and to be assisted by a UN Security Force (UNSF) headed by a United Nations
Administrator who would be acceptable to both parties and who would be appointed
129.. Christopher J. McMullen, Mediation of the West New Guinea Dispute, (Institute for the Study
of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1981), pp. 10-13.
130.. S/5 123, 21 May 1962.
131.. S/ 5128, 25 May 1962.
132.. S/ 5124, 23 May 1962.
133.. The Blue Helmets, op, cit., p 265.
134.. Text in, 9 U.N. Review (Sep. 1962), and in, A/5170, Ann. C.177
by the Secretary-Genera1. 135 When the General Assembly unanimously approved the
Agreement, on 21 September 1962, the UN undertook for the first time direct
executive authority over a territory. 136 The Secretary-General was authorised to carry
out the tasks entrusted to him therein.137
Provided in the Agreement was the UNSF's function with two different aspects. One
aspect related to the provisional measures which were essential for the establishment
of UNTEA in the territory. The other aspect of its function related to maintaining law
and order after the transfer of administration to UNTEA. Under the Secretary-
General's jurisdiction, UNTEA would have full authority to administer the territory to
maintain law and order to protect the rights of the inhabitants until 1 May 1963 when
the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia.
Neither the agreement between the two parties nor General Assembly Resolution
1752 had referred to the constitutional basis of UNTEA and UNSF. The General
Assembly may recommend measures for peaceful adjustment of any situation
regardless of its origin under Article 14. Also the Assembly may establish a
subsidiary organ as it deems necessary for performance of its function (Article 22),
and UNTEA could be observed as such subsidiary organ.
The substantial role of the Secretary-General merits consideration. According to
Higgins "after approving the Agreement, the Assembly played no further role, and full
discretion was left to the Secretary-General, operating in consultation with Indonesia
and the Netherlands." 138 The Agreement between these two states approved by the
General Assembly authorised the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks entrusted to
135_ LW.
136.. GA Res. 1752, 21 Sep. 1962.
137- 1[131id.
138_ R. Higgins, op. cit., p.122.178
him under Article 98. His rights regarding the observers would fall within his general
powers, so long as his actions are compatible with the purposes of the Charter.
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)
Following a coup in Yemen in September 1962, the royalist regime was overthrown
by the republicans, and throughout the next few months conflicts between the
royalists and the republicans escalated into civil war. The new government was
supported by the United Arab Republic, whereas the royalists received arms and
supplies from Saudi Arabia. The republican government was recognised by the UAR
and the Soviet Union on 29th and 30th of September respectively. However, the US
and the British governments, as well as the pro-Western governments in the region,
did not recognise the new government.09
Close relations between the UAR and the republicans and other "disturbing elements
into the rich-oil and reactionary Arabian peninsula" were not acceptable to the West,
and it was desired to get the UAR out of the Yemen. 140 The US president, John
Kennedy, proposed a plan to end Egyptian and Saudi support for the parties, and
recognition of the new government by the United States. Egypt and Saudi Arabia
continued to support the parties of the dispute; however, the United States recognised
the republican goverment on 19 December 1962.
The Yemeni question came before the United Nations when its permanent mission in
the UN was still staffed by the royalists. On 27 November 1962 they (royalists) wrote
a letter to the Secretary-General, U Thant, to ask for the establishment of an enquiry
to investigate whether the coup in Yemen had been fostered from Cairo. However,
139- See generally: Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen. the Unknown War, (Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, New York, 1968).
140_ Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping, (Chatto & Windus for the Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1969), p. 86.179
this request was not put on the Security Council's agenda, and on 20 December the
General Assembly accepted the credentials submitted by the President of the Yemen
Arab Republic. The Secretary-General started to take diplomatic initiatives before the
issue was placed on the Security Council's agenda. Dr Ralph Bunche was sent to
Yemen on a fact-finding mission by the Secretary-General in March 1963. The United
States did likewise by sending Ellsworth Bunker to Riyadh and Cairo.
Negotiations between the Secretary-General and the governments of UAR, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen led to an UAR and Saudi Arabia agreement on terms of
disengagement in Yemen and on a UN presence which U Thant reported to the
Security Council on 29 Apri1.141
On 11 June 1963, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's initiative,
and requested the Secretary-General to establish of a United Nations observer group,
as defined by him, in Yemen (UNYOM). 142 The Secretary-General in his definition
stated that: "[b]y the provisions of the agreement on disengagement, UNYOM's
functions are limited to observing, certifying and reporting. This operation has no
peace-keeping role beyond this ... [T]he agreement on disengagement involves only
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic ... UNYOM, therefore, is not concerned
with Yemen's internal affairs generally, with actions of the Government of Yemen, or
with that Government's relations with other Governments and bordering
territories".143 He further stated "I do not, however, believe that the solution of the
problem, or even the fundamental steps which must be taken to resolve it, can never
be within the potential of UNYOM alone - and most certainly not under its existing
limited mandate". 144 On the role of the UN he said: "[t]he implementation of the
disengagement agreement ... is the primary concern of the two parties to the
141_ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S15298, 29 Apr. 1963.
142.. SC Res. 179, 11 June 1963.
143_ Report of the Secretary-General on the functioning to date of the Yemen Observation
Mission, S/5412, 4 Sep. 1963, pp. 153-4, 156.
144_ s15447.180
disengagement agreement. The terms of that agreement give the United Nations no
role beyond observation and reporting with regard to its implementation."145
UNYOM started its mission on 4 July 1963 with its headquarters in Sana. Although
the parties were responsible for fulfilling the terms of the disengagement, UNYOM
did not get the full co-operation of the parties. Finally, in September 1964, it withdrew
from the area at the request of all three parties.146
The Secretary-General had an important role in the disengagement agreement. The
establishment of UNYOM was by a Security Council decision. However, the Council
did not determine the Charter basis of UNYOM. Although observing and reporting
could be either under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, the function of investigation (Article
34) was not requested of UNYOM, nor were provisional measures (Article 40).
Furthermore, the fundamental steps which should have been taken to resolve the crisis
in Yemen were not within the potential of UNYOM, since it had a limited mandate.
The role of the Secretary-General in this case, before the issue was placed on the
Council's agenda, was substantial since there is no Charter basis to allow the
Secretary-General to initiate his diplomatic efforts before the matter is on the
Council's agenda. According to Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General can
only bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently, the
initiations of the Secretary-General can be important in cases that the Security Council
is not willing to take steps to consider a dispute.
145- S/5794.
146_ Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the termination of the United
Nations Observation Mission in Yemen, S/5959, 11 Oct. 1964.181
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
When the communist leadership of Afghanistan seized power in 1978, it faced strong
resistance throughout the country. Noor Mohammed Taraki and his Prime Minister,
Hafizullah Amin, introduced reform programmes that were thought to threaten social
and religious (Islamic) institutions. Islamic and tribal leaders tried to resist Kabul's
efforts to extend its control over the country. By the autumn of 1979, the government
had lost control of the major part of the country. Consequently, the Soviet Union,
which had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Taraki, began to
expand its military aid.I47
By 27 December 1979, Soviet forces, in response to a request from the Afghan
government, occupied the country and installed Babrak Karmal from the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as prime minister. Fighting between Afghan
resistance or Mujahideen and the new regime and the 100,000 Soviet troops was
intense.
The Security Council debated the issue in January 1980 but failed to agree on a
resolution. The issue was referred to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for
Peace" procedure. I48 The General Assembly on 14 January 1980 approved a
resolution strongly condemning the armed intervention and called for the "immediate,
unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan".149
147- For more information see: Robert 0. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East, (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1991), pp. 71-74; and see N. Y. Times, 4 May 1979, and 13 April
1979.
148_ By adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 377(V) of 1950, when the Security Council
is unable to act because of a veto, the Assembly may hold "emergency special session" within 24
hours in a peace and security crisis, or establish a Peace Observation Commission or a Collective
Measures Committee.
149- GA Res. ES-612, 14 Jan. 1980.182
Following the General Assembly's session, the issue was discussed in the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The first OIC resolution called for the
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.150
This resolution did not contain any provision on a negotiated settlement to achieve the
above objective. "A lasting legacy of the first OIC resolution was its call for non-
recognition of the Karmal govenunent".151
However, the General Assembly approved the credentials of the delegation of the
Karmal regime. It is believed that such a recognition "shaped the character of
subsequent negotiations over Afghanistan" 152. On 14 May 1980, the government in
Kabul issued a statement directed to the governments of Iran and Pakistan, outlining a
programme for a political solution to the "tension that has come about in this
region".153 The programme contained four points: the withdrawal of the foreign
troops, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, international guarantees, and
the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes. 154 However, Kabul's proposals
were rejected by the governments of Iran and Pakistan which were reluctant to take
any step which might be seen as a diplomatic recognition of Kabul's regime. This
difficulty was overcome when on 11 February 1981 Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim appointed Javier Perez de Cuellar, under-Secretary-General for Special
Political Affairs, as his personal Representative on the Situation Relating to
Afghanistan. 155 Perez de Cuellar visited the region in April and August 1981 and,
after extensive discussions, got acceptance of the governments of Afghanistan and
150-OIC Declarations and Resolutions of Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Conferences 1389-1400 H, 1969-1981, (OIC Secretariat Publication, Jeddah), p. 594.
151-Riaz Mohammad Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, (Duke University Press, Durham and
London, 1991), p. 17.
152-William Maley, "The Geneva Accords of April 1988", in, Amin Saikal and William Maley
(ed ), The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989),
pp. 13-14.
153.. A/3 5/23 8-S/13 951, 19 May 1980.
154..Icl.
155- The Blue Helmets, op. cit., p. 316.183
Pakistan to a four-point agenda. But the Mujahideen were excluded from the
negotiations, in which in sympathy Iran declined to participate directly.156
By the end of 1981 Perez de Cuellar was elected as the new Secretary-General. He
appointed Diego Cordovez from Ecuador as his successor in the Afghanistan
negotiations. During six years (1982-1988), Cordovez acted as intermediary in
negotiations between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva and in
the area.157 The Geneva Accords were signed finally on 14 April 1988. The Accords,
known formally as the Agreement on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to
Afghanistan, contained four instruments: a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan
and Pakistan on mutual non-intervention and non-interference; a declaration on
international guarantees by the USSR and the USA not to interfere or intervene in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan or Pakistan; an agreement on the phased withdrawal of
Soviet troops; a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the
voluntary return of refugees. There was also an annexed memorandum of
understanding which provided that the Secretary-General would send an inspection
team at the request of the parties to report on the withdrawal of foreign troops and on
any violation of the Accords.158
After several months the Security Council, on 31 October 1988, in Resolution 622,
formally confirmed its agreement to the measures envisaged and executed by the
Secretary-Genera1.159 The Secretary-General immediately established the United
Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).
UNGOMAP was created by the parties with confirmation by the Security Council to
156-W. Maley, op, cit., p. 14.
157-The Blue Helmets, op, cit., p. 316. Pakistan kept in close touch with Iran and encouraged
Cordoves to do the same. The first progress with Iran was achieved by Cordoves during April
1984. Iran maintained a strong declaratory policy demanding Soviet withdrawal and supported the
legitimate interests of the Afghan people. R. M. Khan, op. cit., pp. 164-5.
158-For the text of Accords see: UN Press Release SG/1860, 14 April 1988. On 14 April 1988 the
Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he intended to dispatch military observers to
the area. S/19834.
159-S/19835, S/19836.184
provide neutral information. Indeed, it was created by parties to an agreement to
monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops, non-intervention and non-interference by the
two countries in one another's internal affairs, and the return of refugees from Pakistan
to Afghanistan.160
UNGOMAP was concerned with provisional measures as envisaged in the Accords. It
completed its task successfully on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
UNGOMAP received full co-operation from the parties, including all freedom of
movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Its
mandate was to facilitate the measures for settlement of disputes which the parties had
agreed in 1988.161
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)
In the endeavours that lead to the independence of Angola from Portuguese colonial
rule in the 1950s, three parties were active with conflicting interests. Fighting
however broke out and MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola),
with Cuban support, took control of the major part of the country including Luanda.162
As the United States began funding the FNLA and UNITA through the CIA in 1974
to prevent Soviet influence in the region, Cuban forces arrived in Angola to support
the MPLA. At the same time, South African troops intervened to back the FNLA and
UNITA. After the recognition of the MPLA as the Angolan government, war
escalated between the government (supported by Cuba) and UNITA (supported by
160_ S/19834, 26 Apr. 1988.
161_ UNGOMAP's mandate ended on 15 March 1990, and upon the termination of UNGOMAP
the UN Secretary-General established the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (OSGAP) in order to continue pursuit of a political settlement in the internal conflict of
Afghanistan. The Blue Helmets, op. cit., p. 322.
162_ For more information see: Robert Jaster, The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-
Western Africa. Adelphi Paper 253 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1990).185
South Africa). I63 The United States and the Soviet Union continued their military aid
to the disputants until 1986.
After intensive acts of aggression by South Africa, the Security Council in Resolution
602 of 25 November 1987, condemned South Africa and demanded unconditional
withdrawal of South African forces from Angolan territory, to be monitored by the
Secretary-General. The Secretary-General sent a mission to Angola to monitor the
South African troops' withdrawal. The mission reported to the Secretary-General that
South Africa still had military activities in Angola. I64 In 1988, Angola, Cuba and
South Africa reached an agreement on a de facto cease-fire, and by the end August,
South Africa withdrew its forces.I65
In December 1988, the parties undertook to sign two documents, a trilateral agreement
between Angola, Cuba and South Africa about Namibian independence and a bilateral
agreement between Cuba and Angola for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from
Angoia.166 167
On 17 December 1988, Cuba and Angola requested the Secretary-General to
recommend to the Security Council the establishment of a United Nations military
observer group.168 The Secretary-General issued a report on recommendations to the
Security Council for carrying out his tasks. The Security Council, in its Resolution
626 of 20 December 1988, approved the Secretary-General's report and decided to
establish the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). UNITA had
163- Africa South of the Sahara, (European Publications Ltd, London, 1991), p. 235.
164_ S119359.
165.. R. Jaster, op. cit„ pp. 25-26.
166.. S120345, 22 Dec. 1988; S/20346, 22 Dec. 1988.
167.. Although the linkage between independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola was opposed both by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the United States
government pursued its efforts to relate both issues. The Blue Helmets, op. cit., p. 335.
168- S120336, 17 Dec. 1988; S120337, 17 Dec. 1988.186
not been part of the negotiations and its actions halted the Cuban withdrawal
temporarily. However, the rebels wanted the withdrawal to be completed.169
With the co-operation of Angola and Cuba, UNAVEM is considered as a successful
mission. The Secretary-General commented "what can be achieved by a United
Nations peace-keeping operation when it receives the full co-operation of the parties
concerned".170 The constitutional basis of UNAVEM lies in the agreements signed by
the parties complying with provisional measures.
The Cuban forces left Angola by 25 May 1991, and the Security Council in its
Resolution 696 extended the mission as UNAVEM II to cover Angola's internal peace
plan."'
Conclusion
Similar to peace-keeping forces, UN observer missions are successful only where
consent and co-operation of the parties exist. In the dispute between Indonesia and the
Netherlands in 1947, peace observers were given a broad mandate which, without the
co-operation of the two parties, could not achieve its objectives. UNAVEM also has
been considered as a successful mission and, as the Secretary-General said, its success
was because it received the full co-operation of Angola and Cuba.
The cases of UNTSO in the Middle East and UNMOGIP in Kashmir demonstrate that
although these peace observers had a limited function which is being fulfilled, their
presence has lasted for many years without leading to a final solution to the disputes.
169- Virginia Page Fontna, "United Nations Angola Verification Mission I", in: William J. Durch (ed.),
The Evolution of UN Peace-Keeping, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993), p. 379.
170.. S/20783.
171.. S C Res. 696,30 May 1991.187
In the case of UNYOM, although it had a limited function, the parties themselves
were totally responsible for fulfilling the terms of the disengagement.
UNGOMAP was created to facilitate measures, i.e. withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, by providing neutral information on compliance with the Geneva
Accords. It was one of the most successful observation missions, since it was created
by an agreement by both parties which later was sanctioned by the Security Council.
In fact, the Soviet's determination to abide by the Geneva Accords was the key
element of success of UNGOMAP, though one might say that the Soviets would have
withdrawn their forces with or without UNGOMAP.
The establishment of UNIIMOG, which was an observation mission to monitor the
cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, will be discussed in Chapter Six. It should however
be mentioned here that this mission was another successful example of observers for
the similar reason as with UNGOMAP, i.e. the parties were determined to keep the
truce.
Observer missions, similar to peace-keeping forces, could be established either by the
General Assembly or the Security Council. UNSCOB was established by the General
Assembly to investigate and report receiving arms by armed groups in Greece. The
authority granted to the General Assembly was under Articles 10, 11, 14 and 22 of the
Charter. UNOGIL and LTNCIP were given an investigatory and mediatory role by the
Security Council. These mandates are under Article 34 of Chapter VI. It can be
concluded that either the General Assembly or the Security Council may establish an
observer mission under Chapter VI. Further discussion on the constitutional basis of
establishment of the UN forces to monitor, observe or supervise provisional measures
has been made in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis.CHAPTER FIVE
UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN FORCES
In recent years, the United Nations has increasingly been involved in situations of
intrastate conflicts for humanitarian purposes, often without the consent of the parties
concerned. In the Security Council resolutions relating to these cases, Chapter VII has
been invoked in order to apply sanctions and use force, while Chapter VI, which
provides a range of means for peaceful settlement of disputes, has not been referred
to.
In cases where ethnic cleansing, genocide, mass starvation, famine and drought would
move millions of people out on the roads and create a disaster, effective action is
required to end the situation threatening the lives of humans. However, as An Agenda
for Peace considers, the new mandate of protecting humanitarian aid has led peace-
keeping operations "to forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was
perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in self-defence".'
The recent practice of the United Nations in its attempts regarding humanitarian
purposes will be discussed in this chapter by considering the important facts and the
legal basis of the UN response to the crises in former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and
Rwanda. In light of assessing the degree of success or failure of these attempts, and
the underlying reasons, the author's view will be stated.
1- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 Jan. 1995, A/50/60-
S/1995/1, para. 34.189
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
Background
The state of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics (Slovania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina).
By the end of the Cold War, a new situation emerged. Four of the six republics
declared independence unilaterally during 1991. The Serbians wanted centralised
control over Yugoslavia and strongly disapproved of the declarations of
independence.2
The maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federation was supported
by the United States, the European Community (EC), and the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), 3 which undoubtedly strengthened the Serbians.4
The conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war during June 1991, and subsequently
the European Community involved itself in the crisis, though Yugoslavia was not a
member of the EC. The EC and other European institutions, namely CSCE and WEU
(Western European Union), began to initiate a cease-fire. These initiatives, which
were started by several declarations, included the dispatch of a Ministerial Troika to
work out a cease-fire, the dispatch of a mission to monitor the implementation of a
cease-fire and a three months suspension of the declarations of independence, and the
application of an embargo on armaments and military equipment to the whole of
Yugoslavia.5
2-UN Yearbook (1991), p. 214.
3-For more information about this organisation see: 14 J.LM 1292 (1975).
4_ Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia", 86 A. J. 1. L., 1992, p. 570.
5- UN Yearbook (1991), p. 214, S/22775 (1991).190
However, serious fighting began in Croatia by the Serbs living there, supported by the
JNA (Yugoslav People's Army).6 The European authorities considered dispatching
military interposition forces, not to defend the status quo, but to isolate the sources of
conflict.7
The Soviet Union considered the EC operation as an act of intervention that would
spread the conflict over Europe. 8 However, the EC did not obtain the consent of the
Serbian side and the plan was not put into action.9
The United Nations involvement
On 1 September 1991, the delegate of Australia informed the Secretary-General that
the Security Council should consider the situation in Yugoslavia as a matter of
urgency. 1° On 25 September 1991, the Security Council, after three months of the
crisis, convened in response to requests from Australia' 1, Canadao, and Hungary o, as
they feared the crisis could endanger international peace and security.
Yugoslavia, at its request, was invited to participate in the Council's meetings without
the right to vote in accordance with rule 37a of the Council's Provisional Rules of
Procedure. 14 Yugoslavia asked in its arguments for a complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to all parties.15
6- United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, United Nations Department of Public Information,
http://ralph.gmu.edu/cfpa/peace/unprofor.html
7-Helm and Tanner, "EC Force for Yugoslavia Closer", Independent, 3 Aug. 1991, p. 1.
8-Gardner and Dempsey, "Soviets Warn over Yugoslavia", Fin. Times, 7 Aug. 1991, p. 1.





14-UN Yearbook (1991), p. 214-5.
15-S/PV. 3009, 25 Sep. 1991, p. 17.191
The Security Council in its resolution expressed deep concern about the fighting in
Yugoslavia and its consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the
border areas of neighbouring countries. 16 The Council considered the continuation of
this situation "a threat to international peace and security". Although the Council did
not refer to Article 39 of the Charter and used the words "continuation of the
situation", its finding fulfilled the requirement of Article 39.17
The Security Council in its resolution noted, under Chapter VIII, the efforts
undertaken by the EC and CSCE as regional arrangements to restore peace through,
inter alio, the implementation of a cease-fire, including the sending of "observers",
the convening of a conference on Yugoslavia, and the suspension of the delivery of all
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.
In Resolution 713, any territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about
by violence were considered unacceptable. This resolution supported the collective
efforts by the EC and the CSCE and also supported all arrangements and measures
resulting from such collective efforts, and invited the Secretary-General to offer his
assistance without delay. The Council in its decision referred to Chapter VII of the
Charter to implement a general and "complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons
and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise
following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of
Yugoslavia".
On 8 October 1991, Secretary-General Javier Perez De Cuellar announced that Cyrus
Vance from the United States had agreed to be his Personal Envoy. 18 On 25 October,
the Envoy reported that the de facto authority of the central government in Yugoslavia
had been seriously impaired and, as a result, JNA no longer had political direction
16- SC Res. 713, 25 Sep. 1991.
17-M. Weller, op. cit., p. 579.
18.. 	 Yearbook (1991), p. 216.192
from a civilian authority that enjoyed the support of all of the Yugoslav republics and
communities. 10 With regard to the humanitarian aspects, he stated that 300,000
persons were displaced and this figure could increase to 400,000.20
At the same time, five republics of Yugoslavia agreed to continue working on a draft
paper prepared by Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia, but Serbia did not agree.21
Establishment of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
International attempts to restore peace were not successful and the situation
deteriorated. However, the Security Council did not make a further decision at that
time, and on 27 November 1991 the Council adopted Resolution 721 noting again that
the continuation of the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international
peace and security.22 The Council noted that the disputant parties wanted to see the
deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation and confirmed that the
Secretary-General could present early recommendations to the Security Council
including the possible establishment of a UN peace-keeping operation. The resolution
endorsed the statement made by the Personal Envoy that the deployment of a UN
peace-keeping operation could not be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance
by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991.23
The Secretary-General, on 11 December 1991, reported that, despite wide-spread




22-The Yugoslav delegation again , at his request, was invited to participate without the right to vote.
23-The agreement of 23 November provided for the immediate lifting by Croatia of its blockade of
Yugoslav army barracks in Croatia of personnel and military equipment, and a cease-fire with effect
from 24 November. UN Yearbook (1991), p. 217.193
its establishment still did not exist.24 The Security Council in Resolution 724 of 15
December approved the Secretary-General's report, and states were requested to report
on the measures they had taken to implement the complete arms embargo against
Yugoslavia; and a committee was set up to gather information on the embargo.25 In
another resolution, the Council finally authorised the dispatch of 50 military liaison
officers to promote the maintenance of the cease-fire.26
By Resolution 743 of 21 February 1992 the Security Council established a United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which was recommended by the Secretary-
General on 15 February; and this was consequently deployed in March 1992.27
The Security Council in its resolutions referred to Chapters VII and VIII of the
Charter. It supported, with reference to the latter, collective actions of the European
institutions to restore peace in Yugoslavia. It implicitly referred to Article 39 and also
used its authority to impose economic sanctions stipulated in Article 41. However, the
Security Council in Resolution 743 did not refer to the UN Charter to create
UNPROFOR. It was stated in this resolution that UNPROFOR should "be an interim
arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation
of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis". UNPROFOR was an intra-state
peace-keeping force, though the Security Council did not refer to the suffering of
peoples within Yugoslavia but rather referred to the danger to the neighbouring
states.28 In fact, UNPROFOR was not deployed to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia and
its function was merely to implement provisional measures under Article 40 for a final
solution of the problem.
24-S123280.
25- SC Res. 724, 15 Dec. 1991.
26- SC Res. 727, 8 Jan. 1992.
27-S/23777.
28.. 	 Res. 713,25 Sep. 1991.194
By a referendum in March 1992, 63% of the population voted for independence of
Bosnia Hercegovina (hereinafter Bosnia).29 The three ethnic groups in Bosnia released
a Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements which declared that
the new state would maintain its existing boundaries and would recognise the rights of
all of the Muslim, Croat and Serb citizens.30 However, shortly after this statement, the
Bosnian Serb leader disavowed the statement. 31 EC recognised Bosnia in April 1992,
and in May 1992 Bosnia was admitted as a member of the United Nations.32
However, Serbia intensified attacks in Bosnia and occupied about seventy percent of
this country.33 Civilians became targets of Serb forces, being killed or terrorised by
every method; their only crime was being of a different ethnic group.34 Various other
human rights violations, including concentration camps, rape, torture, destruction of
entire towns, deliberate targeting of individuals and hospitals were frequently used as
a part of the war, the worst in Europe since World War 11. 35 In fact, the Serbs started
ethnic cleansing to uproot the Muslim and Croat populations to create a country with
a pure Serb population.36
The United Nations seemed powerless to find a peaceful solution to the dispute and
stop the killing. Efforts at humanitarian relief were no more successful and, although
convoys were directed toward Muslim areas, Serbian forces did not stop shelling
around Sarajevo and other cities, and humanitarian relief could not get through. 37 In
May 1992, Serbia purported to renounce authority over units of the JNA which
remained in Bosnia without the consent of the Bosnian Government, and thereafter.
29-M. Weller, op. cit„ p. 593.
30-Ibid, p. 589.
31-Ibid, p. 597.
32.. 	 Res. 755, 20 May 1992.
33-N.Y. Times, 27 Dec. 1993, p. 6.
34-N.Y Times, 5 June 1993, p. 1.
35- Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London, 1993), p. 191; Jane Olson et al, "Bosnia, War Crimes and Humanitarian Intervention", 15
Whittier L. Rev., 1994, p. 446.
36-Time, 24 Aug. 1992, p. 46.
37-P. F. Diehl, op, cit„ p. 191.195
the Security Council, which recognised the ongoing interference by JNA units, by its
Resolution 752 demanded that Bosnia's neighbours immediately cease all forms of
interference in Bosnia, including by JNA units, and that those units of the JNA and
the Croatian army within Bosnia be withdrawn, placed under the control of the
Bosnian Government, or disbanded and disarmed.38
The peace talks co-ordinated by Cyrus Vance and David Owen were not effective
since their plan did not attempt to maintain Bosnia as a single, unified state. Instead
the plan divided Bosnia into three ethnic provinces. 39 Although Serbian and Croat
leaders were willing to sign the plan, which granted them everything they wanted, the
Muslim leader was not willing to accept it because it left the Muslims with thirty-one
percent of the territory and no access to the Adriatic Sea, while granting the Serbs and
Croats the territories they had taken by force. 46' The Bosnian leader, Alija Izetbegovic
described the proposed settlement as a choice between "just war" and "unjust
peace".41
Bosnia sued Serbia both for acts of Serbian forces in Bosnia and for Serbian support
of genocide carried out by Bosnian Serb forces. 42 Because of the urgency of the
situation, Bosnia sought provisional measures from the ICJ twice in 1993. In response
to the first application, the ICJ ruled in Bosnia's favour, ordering that Serbia should
cease and desist from all genocidal actions.43 In response to the second application, in
which Bosnia claimed that Serbia was not complying with the first order," the Court
again ruled in Bosnia's favour.45
38- SC Res. 752, 15 May 1992.
39-L. A. Times, 20 Sept. 1993, p. 4.
49- Ibid, 30 Sept. 1993, p. 1.
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Legality of arms embargo against Bosnia
It is clear from Security Council's Resolution 752 that Bosnia as an independent state
had been interfered with and attacked by its neighbours including the Serbs. These
attacks were directly and indirectly carried out and encouraged by providing planes,
weapons and even manpower.46 Bosnia's admission to the United Nations means that
it enjoys the rights which all other Members of the UN do under the United Nations
Charter. Among these rights is the "inherent right to self-defence" under Article 51 of
the Charter. Although the Security Council in the case of Kuwait had affirmed the
right of self-defence47 for the victim state, this right was not recognised for Bosnia
against aggression. "What the Security Council must not do is impose measures (such
as the arms embargo) which seriously impair the ability of a state to defend itself from
an armed attack, without also undertaking effective measures to defend the state
itself."48
In 1993, Bosnia succeeded in having included in one of the three drafts of General
Assembly resolutions a request for an advisory opinion on the issue of the legal status
and effects of the arms embargo resolutions. However, later, Bosnia asked that the
clause requesting the advisory opinion be dropped.49 The Bosnian Government
decided that the best course of action was to secure a Court judgement that Serbia
violated the Genocide Convention and not to include any arguments pertaining to the
controversial and jurisdictionally uncertain issue of the arms embargo.5°
In the second Case of Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia) in 1993 Judge Lauterpacht in
46-N.Y. Times, 6 June 1992, p. 1.
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his separate opinion stated that "[Ole duty to 'prevent' genocide is a duty that rests
upon all parties .... The applicant obviously has here in mind ... the embargo placed by
Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) .... [I]t is not to be contemplated that the
Security Council would ever deliberately adopt a resolution clearly and deliberately
flouting a rule of jus cogens or requiring a violation of human rights. But the
possibility that a Security Council resolution might inadvertently or in an unforeseen
manner lead to such a situation cannot be excluded .... On this basis, the inability of
Bosnia-Herzegovina sufficiently strongly to fight back against the Serbs and
effectively to prevent the implementation of the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing is
at least in part directly attributable to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina's access to
weapons and equipment has been severely limited by the embargo. Viewed in this
light, the Security Council resolution can be seen as having in effect called on
Members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly and assuredly unwillingly, to
become in some degree supporters of the genocidal activity of the Serbs and in this
manner and to that extent to act contrary to a rule of jus cogens."51
It should be borne in mind that the primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security was granted by the UN members to the Security
Council. The members do not expect that a UN member be left in a defenceless state
against an act of aggression and the Council call on them to become "unknowingly"
and "unwillingly" supporters of the genocidal activities.
It is not understood why the Security Council did not change its decision 52 on the
embargo to allow Bosnia to defend itself, while in 1992 the Council had recognised
that there was interference with, violence towards and forcible change in the ethnic
composition of the population of Bosnia.53 The JNA units provided the Bosnian Serbs
31- Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
v. Serbia), I.C.J. Rep, 1993. pp. 436-41, (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
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with an ongoing supply of arms and other supports in direct contravention of the arms
embargo, an embargo which was rigorously enforced against Bosnia. 54 The one-sided
impact of the arms embargo made Serbia's flagrant violations of it all the more serious
and Bosnian Serbs received an advantage from Serbia which could not be balanced by
the Bosnian forces. This was consequently a decisive factor in the success of Bosnian
Serb military and its genocidal activities."
The question of lawfulness of Resolution 713 primarily relates to its effects on the
right of self-defence and its treatment of the aggression. There is an argument that
"[t]he Security Council resolutions that purport to apply and maintain an arms
embargo against Bosnia have fettered Bosnia's right of self-defence in a manner  ultra
vires the Security Council's powers under the UN Charter". 56 It may be argued that a
Council resolution which would fetter a member state's right of self-defence
contravenes the rules of jus cogens and Article 51 of the Charter.
Authorisation of use offorce and establishment of no-fly zones and safe areas
The Security Council by Resolution 770, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
called upon states to take nationally or through regional agencies all measures
necessary to facilitate, in co-ordination with the United Nations, the delivery by
relevant UN humanitarian organisations and others of humanitarian assistance to
Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.57 In further discussions, however, it was decided
that that task should be entrusted to UNPROFOR.58
54- Craig Scott et al, op, cit„ p. 47.
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The Council on 9 October 1992 passed Resolution 781 to impose a no-fly zone over
Bosnia.59 The Council in establishing "a ban on military flights in the airspace of
Bosnia" did not refer to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Serbian aircraft violated the
no-fly zone immediately after its imposition.60 To enforce this no-fly zone the Council
in Resolution 816 of 31 March 1993 authorised Member States to act nationally or
through regional organisations or arrangements to take, under the authority of the
Security Council and subject to close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia in the event of further
violations of the no-fly zone.
The Security Council did not expressly refer to any specific regional organisation but
implicitly envisaged that NATO would enforce the no-fly zone. Although NATO
accepted the enforcement authority, it was unwilling to support the use of military
force. Some European states feared that air strikes would prompt Serbian retaliation
against those troops.6I The first serious action taken under UN resolutions was on 28
February 1994 when NATO jets shot down Bosnian Serbs war planes over Bosnia.62
It is believed that the Security Council implicitly, under Article 24 of the Charter, is
allowed to decide on imposing and enforcing no-fly zones. 63 In performing its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security
Council must abide by the principles of the United Nations which are stipulated in
Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.64
Resolution 816 authorised the enforcement of no-fly zones by "Member States,
nationally or through regional organisations". Indeed, non-NATO states could also
59-SC Res. 781, 9 Oct. 1992.
60-N.Y. Times, 11 Oct. 1992, p. 10.
61-P. F. Diehl, op.cit., p. 191.
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participate in the enforcement of no-fly zones. NATO did not act under Article 51 as
collective self-defence since Bosnia did not fall within NATO's regional jurisdiction.
The Security Council used NATO as a regional arrangement for enforcement purposes
under Article 53,65 authorising it, within its limits, to enforce the peace beyond the
NATO area.66 Although this allows NATO to go beyond its original aims of simply
acting in response to armed attacks against one of its members, it does not allow
NATO to operate without UN authority.67
The Security Council, in its Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, authorised UNPROFOR
to perform its duties in the safe areas, to act in self-defence by taking the necessary
measures, including the use of force, and to reply to bombardments against the safe
areas by any of the parties. Member States were also authorised to take, under the
authority of the Security Council and subject to close co-ordination under the
Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures through the use of air
power in and around the safe areas. It should be noted that the safe areas were
established under Resolutions 81968, 82469, 83670 and 84471.
The Secretary-General stated that he would not hesitate to initiate the use of close air
support if UNPROFOR were attacked.72 At the same time, he distinguished between
"close air support" of UN personnel, involving the use of air power for self-defence,
and "air strikes" for pre-emptive or punitive purposes to protect safe areas, in
65-Article 53(1) says: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional
arrangements ... for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements ... without the authorisation of the Security Council ...
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accordance with Resolution 836. 73 NATO forces were not authorised to launch air
strikes without a decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).74
Until February 1994 no military action had been taken either by the UN or by
Member States or other organisations. In February 1994 Serb forces killed 68 civilians
in Sarajevo that lead to NATO threatening to use air strikes against Serb forces.
However, neither UNPROFOR nor NATO acted effectively with regard to violations
of no-fly zone. Moreover, the Security Council did not take any measure to lift the
embargo and allow Bosnia to defend itself. The inaction of both regional and world
organisations, though authorised by Resolutions 770, 816 and 836 to use force to
enforce no-fly zones and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, left
Bosnia as a defenceless state, while continuing the embargo worsened its situation.
The Rapid Reaction Force
By increasing the hostage-taking of UN personnel and the use of them as human
shield when the NATO aircraft were deployed, it became clear that UNPROFOR
should be provided with a military capacity to respond rapidly.
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali put four options for the future of UNPROFOR in
Bosnia. He rejected the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and the maintenance of the status
quo:75 He suggested the use of force as a means of carrying out the UNPROFOR
mandate, and in this case to be replaced by a multinational armed force which could
operate under the command of the countries supplying the troops, with the permission
of the Security Counci1.76
73- Ibid, pp. 85-6.
74_
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The Secretary-General in his fourth option suggested a revision of the mandate itself
and that UNPROFOR would restrict itself to those tasks which it could actually carry
out as a peace-keeping force, i.e. supervising compliance of the agreements reached
through the United Nations, and it would refrain from the use of force to protect safe
areas.77 In this case the UN forces would support humanitarian missions and would
only use force in self-defence. Following the consultations and an agreement in Paris
on the creation of "Rapid Reaction Force", France, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom proposed the creation of this force to the Security Council in June 1995.78
On 16 June the Security Council in Resolution 998 authorised increasing UN forces in
Bosnia in order to establish a "rapid reaction capacity" to enable UNPROFOR to carry
out its mandate.79 The Council demanded that the Bosnian Serb forces release all
detained UNPROFOR personnel. Stressing that there could be "no military solution to
the conflict", the Council reiterated its demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the
peace plan as a "starting point".80
The RRF would form an integral part of UNPROFOR, operate within its mandate, and
come under the command structure of the UN. The RRF would provide the UN
Commander with an extra operational capacity between "strong protest and air
strikes" 81
The RRF was intended to strengthen UNPROFOR with its greater military means
than UNPROFOR, that might act within the guidelines that were traditionally applied
to peacekeeping operations. Therefore, as far as its mandate is concerned, it may be
77_ ith
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concluded that RRF was not intended to introduce a fighting unit to bring the
hostilities to a quick resolution, rather it was intended without offensive or occupying
intentions, and to guarantee the security of UN personnel and the implementation of
the UN mandate.82
The Dayton Agreement and establishment of the multinational Implementation
Force (IFOR)
On 21 November 1995 the Balkan leaders at Dayton (Ohio) agreed on a settlement to
end the war in Bosnia. They agreed on a NATO military operation in Bosnia for
reinforcing the peace dea1. 83 A NATO force of 60,000 troops would have the fire-
power to enforce peace, act in self-defence, and carry out the accords." Under the
peace agreement most Serbian-held territories around the Bosnian capital would fall
under the rule of the Muslim-Croatian Federation in March 1996. 85 The Balkan
leaders also signed a peace agreement on 14 December 1995 in Paris, by which
60,000 NATO peacekeeping troops, in its largest ever operation, would try to rebuild
the country and make peace.86 On 20 December 1995 the UN peacekeeping mission
ended formally and, as the UN flags at Sarajevo were taken down, NATO took control
of UN military bases throughout Bosnia.87
The Security Council on 21 December 1995 passed Resolution 1035 in which it
decided to establish, for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the multinational Implementation
Force (IFOR), a United Nations police force to be known as the International Police
82- iL Leurdijk believes that "Nile use of force thus becomes a function of the UN mandate. The
ultimate aim of this is to get the parties around the negotiating table and to arrive at a political solution
to the conflict". 11.
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Task Force (IPTF) to be entrusted with the tasks set out in the Peace Agreement, and a
United Nations civilian office with the responsibilities set out in the report of the
Secretary-General. The Council noted that the IPTF and the United Nations civilian
office will be under the authority of the Secretary-General. IFOR's mandate has been
determined by the peace accord; its soldiers have fire-power for self-defence, peace
enforcement, and implementation of the accord provisions.
According to Article VI of the Agreement on Military Aspects, IFOR would have,
inter alia, the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement to help
create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks and to observe and
prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations and to respond
appropriately to deliberate violence to life and persons. 88 Its commander would have
the authority, without interference or permission of any party, to do all that the
commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force to carry
out the responsibilities of the force.89 In fact, the United Nations and in particular the
Security Council have no function in the direction of the operations of IFOR.
"Although the whole scheme is established by a treaty which involves all the parties
concerned, it was felt necessary that in addition to this treaty the military aspects
should be legitimised by an authorisation of the Security Council.""
However, the Dayton Agreement does not refer to the necessity of authorisation by
the Council for using force. Nevertheless, the consent of the parties to such operations
was obtained when they agreed to comply in all respects with the IFOR requirements,
explicitly, on the use of military force when deemed necessary by the IFOR
Commander to protect IFOR and carry out the responsibilities of IFOR.91
88- Text of Dayton Peace Agreement; Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.
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Nonetheless, the Security Council should have control over the use of force by States.
and IFOR should in general act with the authorisation of the Council, though not for
detailed operations for practical reasons.
Discussion
The conflict in Yugoslavia initially appeared to be a "civil war". By recognition of the
former republics of Yugoslavia, the conflict resembled a mixed, civil and
international, conflict.92 In this case, the United Nations and regional organisations
adopted several roles of mediation, sanction, peace-keeping, peace-supporting and
peace-enforcing.
UNPROFOR was initially deployed as a classic peace-keeping force whose task was
to be an interim arrangement to create the conditions for the negotiations leading to
the settlement of dispute.93 This mandate was clearly under Article 40 of the Charter
to create provisional measures. Later, UNPROFOR was given a new mandate to
supervise the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia.94
Furthermore, the Council in Resolution 836 authorised UNPROFOR to carry out its
mandate, i.e. to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor cease-fire and
withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces other than Bosnian governmental
forces, and delivery of humanitarian relief to the population, acting in self-defence
and use force in reply to bombardments against safe areas.95
In fact, the new generation of peace-keeping forces were dispatched for supporting
humanitarian relief and protecting safe areas. They could use force to perform the
92.. C. Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force. Be ond the UN
Paradigm, (Rutledge, 1993), p. 37.
93-SC Res. 743, 21 Feb. 1992.
94-SC Res. 770, 13 Aug. 1992.
95-SC Res. 836, 4 June 1993.206
mandate other than self-defence. During the Cold War, in case of Congo, UN peace-
keeping forces (ONUC) were authorised to use force other than in self-defence in the
last resort to perform their mandate.
The constitutional basis of mandate of multifunctional peace-keeping forces to use
force should be considered out of Article 42. Even the creation of Rapid Reaction
Force as part of UNPROFOR to engage force to enable the peace-keeping mission to
carry out its tasks, cannot be considered as enforcement measures under Article 42,
since UN forces had not been deployed to use force to settle the dispute. Governments
of Bosnia and Croatia initially adopted the position that the RRF did not come under
the "Status of Forces Agreements" as applied to other troops in the area.96 The
Council was in agreement with the Secretary-General's interpretation that "[o]nce a
peace-keeping operation has been established, the Council may reduce or expand it,
depending on operational needs, without concluding any additional agreements to the
relevant Status of Forces Agreement".97
It seems that military support for peace-keeping humanitarian operation and opening
the way to an enforcement element within peace-keeping operations was not
acceptable even to those parties most affected by the conflict. The reason was that
there was a fear that by the presence of UN forces with the multiple function of peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement the war would extend rather than settle.
The Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, with regard to combination of peace-keeping
and peace-enforcement, has stated that "... nothing is more dangerous for a peace-
keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament,
logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peace-
keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of
96- UN Press Release, SC/6087, 19 Aug. 1995.
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enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process
that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate."98
The Secretary-General further states: "Conflicts the United Nations is asked to resolve
usually have deep roots and have defied the peacemaking efforts of others. Their
resolution requires patient diplomacy and the establishment of a political process that
permits, over a period of time, the building of confidence and negotiated solutions to
long-standing differences. Such processes often encounter frustrations and set-backs
and almost invariably take longer than hoped. It is necessary to resist the temptation to
use military power to speed them up. Peace-keeping and the use of force (other than in
self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a
continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other."99
The Secretary-General proposed that the UN needed to give serious thought to the
idea of a rapid reaction force. mo In this respect the Special Committee on Peace-
Keeping Operations reported that some of its members expressed caution, arguing that
the use of such a force in internal conflicts would be unacceptable since that would
erode the principle of state sovereignty. 101 The report also pointed out that the efficacy
of an operation was not so much related to the speed of deployment, but more to its
political capacity. 102 Further, the establishment of such a force would duplicate the
capabilities of member states and give the UN an undesirable military image.103
The Bosnia experience shows that using military power to protect and support peace-
keeping operations was not fully successful. In this case, the United Nations preferred
98-Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, (1995), A150160 - S/1995/1,
para. 35.
99- bid, para. 36.




not to use force under Articles 42-48 to enforce peace and resolve the dispute, rather it
gave complicating mandates to the peace-keeping forces and the regional arrangement
(NATO) to deal with the violence.
In Higgins's view while it is "lamentable that states have failed to seize the
opportunity offered by the end of the Cold War, so far as effective UN enforcement is
concerned, the lessons that the United Nations itself seems to draw from the Bosnia
debacle (and indeed from the very different lessons of the failure in Somalia) are
disturbing".104
In the case of Bosnia, there was no agreement on case-fire and while hostilities were
in progress UN peace-keeping forces were engaged to perform humanitarian tasks.
However, UN forces frequently were prevented to perform their mandate by Bosnian
Serbs. Later, the Security Council authorised member states acting nationally or
through regional arrangements to use force to ensure compliance with its ban on
military flights in Bosnia's air space, to support the UN forces and to deter attacks
against safe areas.105 NATO was chosen to perform these tasks.
With regard to the legal basis for NATO action in Bosnia, reference should be made
to Article 53 by which the Council can utilise regional arrangements for enforcement
action under its authority; no enforcement action can be taken under these agencies
without authorisation by the Council. However, it should be noted that NATO has
been considered as a self-defence pact rather than a regional organisation, covering
Western Europe and North America with a defensive function. Unlike regional
organisations, NATO has no economic and social capacity, its main function being
collective self-defence in case of an armed attack against one of the members of the
pact under Article 51 of the Charter.106
104.. Rosalyn Higgins, "Second-Generation Peacekeeping", ASIL Proc., (1995), P. 278.
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In the case of Bosnia, there was no formal treaty amendment to allow NATO either to
act in circumstances when no member had been attacked or beyond the NATO area.
In fact, NATO adopted a new role, that of a peace support operation for the United
Nations.107 The commitment is not a generalised commitment to the UN, but
governed by NATO's own procedures and with an acknowledgement that the Security
Council has the primary responsibility. 108 In fact, NATO is not allowed to operate
when there is a threat to the international peace and security unless authorised by the
United Nations. White believes that redrafting the NATO treaty would enable NATO
to be categorised as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as
well as being a traditional defence pact so as to facilitate the use of NATO for military
enforcement action by the Council under Chapters VII and VIII.109
In the case of Bosnia, NATO was authorised to take four separate missions: to
monitor the no-fly zone, to enforce the no-fly zone, to offer "close air support" of UN
personnel, and to engage in "air strikes" for protection of safe areas. 110 At that time,
there was an explicit distinction between "air strikes" (air attacks intended to secure
safe areas) and "close air support" (air attacks intended to protect UN personnel).1
In fact, in the case of Bosnia two organisations with different mandates and
approaches to the maintenance of peace and security were given varying authorities to
use all necessary measures for their purposes. However, there was not even an
agreement on what might constitute a "combat situation", let alone a unified
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International Relations, Clingendael, 1994).210
command, clear rules of engagement, or a joint understanding on the use of air
power.112
Regarding decision making on use of force for both "air strikes" and "close air
support", there was a complex chain of command that made it militarily almost
inoperable. 113 "Close air support" required a request by those on the ground. However,
neither the UN commander nor the Secretary-General's Special Representative would
allow it if the attack was not still in progress, and the final decision to request it lied
not even with the military commander but with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-Genera1.114
For "air strikes" a "dual request/dual key" system was performed meaning that both
NATO and the UN could request "air strikes", and both had to agree, hence there was
a veto on the use of "air strikes" on both sides. 115 Even when "air strikes" were
authorised, there was the question of targets, because the tactical air control teams on
the ground were entirely under UN control, while the aircraft were under NATO
command.116
As a result of such confused and complex procedures regarding military action by
NATO and the UN in Bosnia, the forces remained inactive. The declared safe areas,
such as Serbrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo, were frequently
targeted by Bosnian Serbs and suffered from severe violations of human rights.
Furthermore, in some occasions the inaction of peace-keeping forces was because
forces believed that they should remain impartial. Impartiality of peace-keeping forces
required that they strictly and actively perform their mandate; the inaction of these
112- Rosemary Righter, "A Marriage Made in Hell", in: Ben Cohen and George Stamkoski, With no
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forces may be perceived as partiality in favour of the aggressor and against the
victims. The reluctance to use force, even to ensure the delivery of aid where it was
most needed, enabled Bosnian Serb forces to use the deprivation of essential supplies
as a weapon of war.117
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina had been recognised by the international community as
an independent state, and although the Security Council had recognised the
interference by Bosnia's neighbours (Serbia and Croatia)"8, the world organisation
refused to act under Article 42 to use force to end military action against Bosnia.
Monitoring safe areas and enforcing no-fly zones could not be considered as an
efficient action against unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the Council did not take any action to lift the "general and complete
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment" which had been
imposed a month before the collapse of former Yugoslavia."9 The Security Council
by Resolution 727 reaffirmed the embargo applied by Resolution 713.120 However,
the Council continued to apply the arms embargo imposed upon Yugoslavia, an entity
that no longer existed which was entirely distinct from the successor states. 121 It
seems that by disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the existence of the right of
self-defence for Bosnia as a Member State, the UN Member States were not obliged to
apply embargo on Bosnia, and there is doubt that the Security Council resolution on
embargo had any legal effect.
Higgins believes that the refusal to recognise the situation in the former Yugoslavia as
violence across state lines, recognised by the international community and requiring
117-This action led Bihac, Sarajevo, Maglia and the eastern enclaves all come close to starvation. B.
Cohen and G. Stamkoski, op. cit., p. 9.
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military enforcement measures was willful. 122 She concludes that it reflected a variety
of factors: "a desire not rapidly to repeat the Gulf experience, a sense that on this
occasion there was no national interest, and a despair about being able to 'impose a
political solution'. Insisting that situations manifestly calling for enforcement are in
fact situations calling for the new-style UN peacekeeping operations is simply a
turning away from unpleasant realities." 123 The new style of peace-keeping/peace-
enforcing is not what the Charter envisaged. The case of Bosnia shows that when
peace-keepers have a prime mandate of delivering humanitarian aid, then all realistic
prospect of enforcing the peace has gone.124
Indeed, the function of peace-keeping is quite different from peace-enforcement and.
generally, peace-keeping forces are much more welcomed by host states than peace-
enforcers. In a case of aggression or breach of a cease-fire by one of the parties, the
multiple function by peace-keepers as peace-enforcers may not be successful. In
Bosnia, most of the efforts of peace-keepers/peace-enforcers were directed to protect
themselves rather than humanitarian assistance or protection of civilians. Therefore,
peace-keeping operations must be distinguished from peace-enforcement clearly by
the Security Council in order that peace-keepers can perform their responsibilities
properly.
UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
Background
Occupying the tip of the Horn of Africa, Somalia was a valuable strategic estate to
the Superpowers during the Cold War. Since the Soviet Union and the United States
122.. R. Higgins, "Second Generation Peacekeeping", op. cit., p. 278.
123.. Id
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bought the allegiance of Somalia's leader, Mohammed Siad Barre, with economic and
military aid, Somalia was awash with weapons.I25
Clan clashes started in Somalia in 1988, and by the end of January 1991 Siad Barre
was ousted after 21 years leadership of Somalia, and the country was embroiled in a
civil war.I26
Although Ali Mandi Mohammad of the United Somali Congress (USC) was sworn as
the interim president, he soon faced opposition from the military leader of the USC,
General Mohammad Farah Aidid.I27 In November 1991 the hostilities resulted in
wide-spread death and destruction, forcing civilians to flee their homes.I28
By the deterioration of the situation in Somalia the UN Secretary-General, Javier
Perez de Cuellar, in co-operation with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the League of Arab States
(LAS), tried to bring the conflict to a peaceful solution. On 27 December 1991, he
informed the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to
restore peace in Somalia.I29
The United Nations involvement
The United Nations, which had already been involved in the crisis by its humanitarian
efforts, was fully engaged in Somalia by January 1992. The Security Council in its
resolution of 23 January urged all parties to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire.
It also decided that, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, all states should
125.. William J. Durch, "Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory", in W. J. Durch (ed.), op. cit., p. 472.
126_ UN Yearbook, (1992), p. 198.
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immediately implement a complete embargo on deliveries of weapons. I3c) The
Security Council, taking note of the appeals addressed to the parties by OIC, OAU,
and LAS, asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek the commitment
of the disputants to the cease-fire to permit humanitarian assistance to be
distributed.131
By early March a cease-fire was agreed by the two factions which eventually did take
effect. The two leaders agreed to a UN "monitoring mechanism" to oversee the cease-
fire and the distribution of food in the city of Mogadishu. I32 However, after one
month cease-fire, despite the two leaders' quick move, fighting resumed between
those units of the two factions the elements of which were not under the control of
either faction.133
Establishment of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)
The Security Council in its Resolution 746 of 17 March 1992 supported the Secretary-
General's decision to dispatch a UN technical team to Somalia to prepare a plan for a
cease-fire monitoring mechanism.I34 The Secretary-General in his report of 20 March
stated that he appointed a 15 member technical team including representatives of OIC,
LAS and OAU which obtained the agreements of the leaders of the two factions on
mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and effective distribution of humanitarian
assistance.I35 They also agreed on deployment of observers to monitor the cease-fire
and of security personnel to protect its staff and safeguard its humanitarian
activities.I36
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Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General, in his report recommended the
monitoring of the cease-fire and delivering of humanitarian assistance, and the
establishment of a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The two
factions also met to discuss the formation of a joint committee for relief assistance.
and finally on 24 April 1992 the Security Council, by Resolution 751, established
UNOSOM and requested the immediate deployment of 50 UN observers to monitor
the cease-fire in Mogadishu. 137 The Council referred to the human suffering caused by
the conflict and to the continuation of the situation in Somalia which constituted a
threat to international peace and security.138
The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint
Mohammed Sahoun from Algeria as his special Representative for Somalia.139
However, as the Secretary-General considered on 22 July, the situation was not safe
and the potential renewal of hostilities posed difficulties for an effective UN presence.
Independent armed groups, factions and individuals possessed a large quantity of arms
and they were the biggest threat.140 The Secretary-General believed that the conflict in
Somalia could be resolved only by the people of Somalia themselves in a process of
national reconciliation. 14i However, the energetic efforts of the international
community was needed to break the cycle of violence and hunger.142
On 12 August the Secretary-General reported that he obtained the agreement of the
two factions to deploy a 500 strong UN security force as part of UNOSOM. 143 The
Security Council in its resolution authorised the Secretary-General to increase the UN
forces in Somalia.144
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By November 1992 the situation in Somalia deteriorated and the Secretary-General, in
a letter to the Council, outlined the difficulties UNOSOM faced in implementing its
mandate, such as the absence of a government, the failure of the various factions to
co-operate with UNOSOM, looting of relief convoys, and the detention of expatriate
personne1.145
On 29 November the Secretary-General offered the Security Council five options on
how to create conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the
starving people of Somalia. 146 The first option was a continued deployment of
UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate under which force was to be used
only in self-defence; this was believed by the Secretary-General to be inadequate. The
second option was the withdrawal of UNOSOM's military elements and the retention
of humanitarian agencies to negotiate arrangements with the leaders of clans and
factions for the distribution of relief assistance. The other three options involved the
possible use of force, either by UNOSOM undertaking a show of force to discourage
attacks on relief efforts in Mogadishu, or by a country-wide enforcement operation.
Such an operation could either be under UN command and control (the Secretary-
General's explicit preference), or be undertaken by a group of member states
authorised by the Security Council. With regard to the last, the Secretary-General
noted an offer by the United States to organise and lead such an operation.147
The Secretary-General stated that, since experience showed that a UN operation based
on the accepted principles of peace-keeping would be successful, there was no
alternative but to resort to the enforcement provisions under Chapter VII of the




main factors that created the human emergency; such action would preferably be
under UN command and control.
Canada and Pakistan announced that as troop contributors they wished to be consulted
by the Council and the Secretary-General on any measure that might affect
UNOSOM's mandate.I48
The Secretary-General's letter was considered by the Security Council. The Permanent
Members moved a draft resolution on 3 December 1992 authorising the American
operation. The Security Council in Resolution 794 recognised the unique character of
the situation in Somalia and responded to the urgent calls from Somalia for the
international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Somalia. It noted the reports of violations of international humanitarian
law, such as violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial
humanitarian relief activities. I49 The Security Council authorised, under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, the Member States "to use all necessary means" to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.I50
On 4 December 1992 the United States directed the execution of "Operation Restore
Hope", and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) led by US Marines arrived at
Mogadishu on 9 December.I5I The President of the United States believed that US
objectives could and should be met in the short term. 152 The Secretary-General in his
letter to the Security Council proposed that, as soon as the immediate security
problem was resolved the US force would be replaced by a UN peace-keeping
operation. I53 However, by late February 1993 fighting among the Somali factions and
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the international force were the first signs that the original plan to be out within three
or four months was over-optimistic.154
On 26 March the Security Council passed Resolution 814 under which UNITAF
handed over responsibility to UNOSOM II, which was a force under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter and its mandate was expanded from the original UNOSOM.155
Discussion
The Security Council's action in Somalia reflects new consensus on the circumstances
which qualify as "threats to the peace", that now include mass starvation, justifying
military intervention. 156 The Security Council, in its broad construction of Chapter
VII, linked the internal humanitarian tragedy to a "threat to international peace and
security".
The Security Council, as its first action, imposed an arms embargo on Somalia under
Chapter VII (Article 41), and in its further action established UNOSOM to monitor
the cease-fire and to deliver humanitarian assistance. In the past, "the United Nations
has restricted its peacekeeping and relief efforts to those disputes where the parties
have expressed at least some willingness to negotiate with one another and where the
fighting has largely subsided." I57 UNOSOM was not created to monitor the cease-fire
in an international conflict as had been the case in previous peace-keeping operations.
Moreover, LTNOSOM was not authorised to enforce a political solution.
In a final assessment, it might be concluded that LTNOSOM could not meet its
purposes because UN officials did not understand the true nature and intensity of the
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Somali conflict. I58 Indeed, in the absence of peace or any agreement on cease-fire.
deploying small size and lightly armed peace-keepers would be a great mistake.
Before dispatching peace-keeping forces, a secured environment should have taken
place.
By continuation of the civil war in Somalia, the Security Council authorised member
states, again under Chapter VII, "to use all necessary means" for humanitarian relief in
Somalia. In other words, the Security Council in its decision utilised military means
for humanitarian purposes.
UNITAF, a US led coalition, arrived in Somalia to perform Council Resolution 794
and to establish a secured environment. However, the United States denied a duty to
disarm the elements that had created the problem in the first place and this assertion
created great consternation among UN officials. I59 It might be said that Resolution
794 had not determined how a secured environment should be created and this
vagueness caused a disagreement between the United States and the United Nations
on the meaning of the term "secured environment".160
Regarding the duration of the presence of UNITAF, the United States had no intention
of subjecting its troops to an extended stay in Somalia, and placed great pressure on
the Security Council to take over the security operations. I61 As a result, UNITAF
handed over responsibility to UNOSOM II in March 1993.
UNITAF was not a peace-keeping operation but an enforcement one. Constitutionally,
the United Nations has a power to use force when illegal acts of aggression are used
158-Frank Crigler, "Peacekeeping Tasks Demands Strong Hand", Christian Sci. monitor, 8 Mar. 1993,
p. 19.
159-Paul Lewis, "UN Chief Faults US Again on Disarming Somalis", N.Y. Times, 22 Dec. 1992, p. 15.
160.. Rajendra Ramlogan, "Towards a New Vision of World Security: The United Nations Security
Council and the Lessons of Somalia", 16Hous. J. Int'l L., (1993), p. 253.
161- Keith B. Richburg, "Top UN Officer in Somalia Says Tactics Were Apt-Pakistani Defends His
Troops But Says They were Too Few", Wash. Post, 23 Jan. 1993, p. 12.220
by one state against another state. It is not clear whether UNITAF was dispatched to
enforce provisional measures (under Article 40) or to enforce peace (under Article
42). UNITAF was authorised to use arms far beyond peace-keeping operations used
for self-defence.
UNOSOM II was not a traditional peace-keeping force. The force was responsible for
preventing the resumption of hostilities, monitoring the 8 January 1993 cease-fire,
controlling heavy weapons, disarming unauthorised holders of small arms and
generally taking steps necessary for the creation of a secured environment.I62
Although UNOSOM II was not restricted to use force in performing its mandate and
other than for self-defence, it may not be considered an action under Article 42 of the
Charter since its purpose was to create a secured environment as a first step to settle
the crisis.
In each conflict, either international or internal, there should be an assessment of the
nature and the extent of the conflict and then there should be an appropriate process
for restoring peace. Preventive measures, especially in cases such as Somalia in which
the structure of state authority had collapsed, should be taken either through the
United Nations or regional organisations. However, OAU, OIC and LAS which were
the regional organisations within the vicinity of the conflict, failed to assist the parties
to settle the crisis.
Another point which should be discussed is that the United Nations should have
control over operations which it would conduct. Uncontrolled mandates do not
improve the image of the Organisation and may undermine the legitimacy of its
operations. Furthermore, member states expect that their sovereignty should not be
violated by an uncontrolled action by a particular state although the operation itself is
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authorised by the UN. I63 It is necessary to ensure some level of UN control that is a
concern expressed even by some permanent members of the Council. In the case of
Somalia, the Chinese representative at the Security Council debate of Resolution 794
argued that strengthening of UN control was required before China would vote in
favour of the resolution.I64
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has said that there must not be "any attempt by
troop-contributing Governments to provide guidance, let alone give orders, to their
contingents on operational matters. To do so creates division within the force, adds to
the difficulties already inherent in a multinational operation and increase the risk of
casualties. It can also create the impression amongst the parties that the operation is
serving the policy objectives of the contributing Governments rather than the
collective will of the United Nations as formulated by the Security Council. Such
impressions inevitably undermine an operation's legitimacy and effectiveness"165.
In internal conflicts such as Somalia, using a realistic process with due consideration
of the facts of the dispute and the demands of the warring factions, to create a cease-
fire and a secure environment might avoid a tragedy or even the necessity of
multinational military intervention.
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
Background
Rwanda was administered by Belgium as a United Nations Trusteeship territory
which became independent in 1962. Conflict arose following independence that had
163- It has been asserted that some Third World countries are troubled by political implications of US
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its origin in the traditional tribal rivalry between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi
minority. 166 In a military coup in 1973 a Hutu leader seized power, who set up a party
two years later, and became the President of Rwanda after the 1988 elections, in
which he was the only candidate. Since about ninety percent of Rwanda's export
earnings came from coffee, it suffered an economic crisis following the collapse of the
International Coffee Agreement in July 1989. Despite assistance from international
organisations, the economic crisis weakened Rwandese government and resulted in a
political crisis.167
Fighting between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriot Front (RPF)
broke out in October 1990 along the border between Rwanda and its northern
neighbour Uganda. 168 Belgium and France sent troops to protect their nationals in
Rwanda. 169 The fighting resumed on 8 February 1993 in violation of the Cease-Fire
Agreement signed in July 1992 in Tanzania.m
The United Nations involvement
In support of the resumption of the comprehensive negotiations between the
Goverment of Rwanda and the RPF (Tutsi-dominated Rwandan refugees), supported
by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda in
separate letters to the Security Council on 22 February 1993 requested the deployment
of United Nations military observers along the common border to ensure that no
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military assistance reached Rwandese territory from Uganda. 171 By these letters the
Council was informed that the resumption of hostilities was by the RPF which was
composed essentially of Rwandese refugees in Uganda.172
Following consultations in the Security Council on 24 February, the Secretary-
General sent a goodwill mission to Rwanda and Uganda. 173 The Council in its
meeting of 12 March passed Resolution 812 by which it referred to the fighting in
Rwanda and its consequences regarding international peace and security.174
The Council noted that the army of the RPF would pull back to the positions it
occupied before 7 February 1993 and the buffer zone between the forces would be
considered as a neutral demilitarised zone used to monitor the implementation of the
cease-fire by an international force.175
The Security Council called on the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to respect the
renewed cease-fire, to resume negotiations and to allow the delivery of humanitarian
supplies and the return of displaced persons and to fulfil the obligations and
commitments the parties had made in the past.176
The Secretary-General was asked to examine the request of Rwanda and Uganda for
the deployment of observers along their common border.177
The Council urged the Government of Rwanda and the RPF to respect strictly the
rules of international humanitarian law. All states were requested to refrain from any
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action that could increase the tension in Rwanda and jeopardise respect for the cease-
fire.178
A company of French troops arrived in Rwanda to reinforce the French forces
stationed there since 1990. 179 However, the RPF accused the French of intervening on
the government's side in the conflict.180
Establishment of United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
In May the Secretary-General reported to the Council that peace talks between the
parties had resumed at Arusha (Tanzania) which focused on the composition and size
of the new army, arrangements related to security services, demobilisation,
international assistance and the establishment of an international neutral force."' The
report noted the requirements assessed by the technical mission which visited Rwanda
and Uganda, for the deployment of a United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-
Rwanda (UNOMUR).182 The Secretary-General recommended that the Security
Council authorise the establishment of the Mission only on the Ugandan side.I83
On 22 June the Security Council, considering the Secretary-General's report, adopted
Resolution 846 by which the Council decided to establish UNOMIJR on the Uganda
side.I84 UNOMUR was to focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks
which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and  ammunition across the
border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.I85
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In August the Secretary-General reported that the Government of Rwanda and the
RPF had signed a peace agreement at Arusha on 4 August. I86 The two parties had
agreed that the war had come to an end and that they would promote national
reconciliation.'" The Secretary-General indicated that the OAU Neutral Military
Observer Group (NMOG I), which had been dispatched from July 1992 to July 1993
to monitor the cease-fire in Rwanda was, replaced by NMOG II in early August
1993)88
Establishment of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
In September, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council authorise the
establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).189
According to the Secretary-General, the principal functions of UNAMIR would be to
assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the cease-fire
agreement including the establishment of an expanded demilitarised zone (DMZ) and
demobilisation procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the
transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; and assist with mine
clearance.IN
Finally, UNAMIR was established on 5 October 1993 by the Council Resolution 872.
Approving the UNAMIR's mandate proposed in the Secretary-General's report, the
Council stated that UNOMUR should be integrated within UNAMIR, and welcomed
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The Mission would also investigate alleged non-compliance with any provisions of
the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees
and displaced persons. It would also assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian
assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.192
However, the situation in Rwanda did not improve. On 6 April 1994 its president,
Habyarimana, died in an airplane crash which was caused by the firing of two rockets
at Kigali airport. 193 This incident inflicted a fatal blow on the Rwandan peace process
and a wave of violence caused killing of a large number of Tutsi people, the Prime
Minister, several Belgian contingents in UNAMIR, and resulted in the flight of a huge
population to the neighbouring countries. 194 Following attacks against UN personnel,
the Security Council, being unable to cope with the violence, decided to withdraw
most of the peace-keepers from Rwanda, and authorised a reduction in the size of
UNAMIR. 195 The RPF launched a new operation from Uganda and achieved a victory
in July 1994, and unilaterally declared a cease-fire on 18 July 1994.196
Earlier, France, fearing a revenge massacre of Hums by Tutsis had requested the UN
and its allies to send peace-keeping forces to the area. This led to the adoption of
Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994. The Security Council in its resolution, with
reference to Chapter VII, authorised Member States, through the establishment of a
temporary operation under national command, using all necessary means, to
contribute to the security of refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda. 197 The Council
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agreed that a multinational operation might be set up until UNAMIR would be
brought up to the necessary strength.198
The French named Operation Turquoise was launched on 23 June to establish a
"humanitarian protected zone" in south-western Rwanda. 199 However, after two
months and having learned from US experience in Somalia, despite UN and other
countries attempts to persuade France to refrain from withdrawal, it pulled its forces
out of Rwanda on 21 August 1994.200
Earlier in late July the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had met
with senior officials of the new government in Rwanda to discuss how humanitarian
aid could be delivered to all parts of Rwanda and the urgent steps required to re-
establish a climate conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons. The new
government had indicated its commitment to encourage people to return to the
country, to ensure their protection and to permit full access to all in need throughout
the country.201
Following the French withdrawal from Rwanda and expansion of UNAMIR by the
Council and the installation of the Broad Based Government of National Unity
(BBGNU) at Kigali on 19 July, the Rwandan peace process went back on its rails.202
The reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by
elements of the former regime from neighbouring states, resulted in adopting
Resolution 997 on 9 June 1995. Earlier, on 4 June 1995, the Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali had reported that despite the situation in Rwanda had changed radically
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since the civil war, the situation remained tense with a lack of significant advances in
national reconciliation.203 He said that the UNAMIR mandate should include "shifting
the focus from a peace-keeping to a confidence-building role"204.
The Council by Resolution 997 authorised UNAMIR to exercise its good offices to
help achieve national reconciliation within the framework of the 1993 Arusha Peace
Agreement.205 By undertaking monitoring tasks, UNAMIR would also support the
Rwandese government's ongoing efforts to promote a climate of confidence and trust.
The Secretary-General was asked to consult with the governments of neighbouring
countries, including Zaire, on deployment of UN military observers on their
territories. UNAMIR was also to help the government in facilitating the voluntary and
safe return of refugees and their reintegration into their home communities.206 In
addition, UNAMIR would assist humanitarian deliveries and would help to train a
national police force.
The refugee problem, however, remained a matter which required careful
considerations. In fact, returning refugees needed assistance of several parties:
Rwandese government, the UN and the neighbouring states. Yet, it was believed that a
military multinational force would help to resolve the refugee problem.207 Finally the
United States agreed to send troops to Zaire as part of a multinational force under
overall Canadian command with neither precise objectives nor rules of engagement
clearly defied.208 Britain also prepared to play its part in respect of military
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However, Rwanda's president, Pasteur Bizimungu, warned that if intervenors do not
negotiate this with the rebels who were trying to drove Rwandan refugees back to
their homeland, it would be declaring war and would be messy unless rebels in control
of eastern Zaire were consulted.210
Following the attack by Zairian rebels backed by Rwanda's government on the refugee
camps in Zaire, the United Nations estimated that the vast majority of the 700,000
Rwandans who came around Goma in Zaire since 1994 were on the move and were
persuaded that they were better off returning home.2I
Furthermore, United Nations stated that Tanzanian troops drove nearly 200,000
Rwandese Hutu refugees back to their homeland.2I2 The president of Rwanda
welcomed the reluctant returnees who feared persecution by the overwhelmingly Tutsi
army in revenge for the 1994 genocide.2I3 Yet, those refugees who were suspects of
taking part in 1994 genocide of Tutsis and Hutu moderates were arrested and tried for
their crimes.214
Discussion
The Rwanda case was another experience which demonstrates that humanitarian
intervention to create a secured environment in a civil war would not be successful.
French forces during their two months presence in Rwanda found that they should
avoid Somalia experience and withdraw from the area. Even most of the UN peace-
keeping forces of UNAMIR, who had arrived for monitoring the cease-fire agreement.
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were ordered to withdraw from Rwanda by increasing violence and inability to cope
with the violence.
Initially, UNOMUR was established at the request of the Governments of Rwanda
and Uganda. Taking note of the consent of the host states, UNOMUR and UNAMIR
were not despatched to use enforcement measures. Their mandate was to verify that
no military assistance reached Rwanda, to contribute to the security of Kigali, to
monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, and to assist in the co-ordination of
humanitarian assistance activities.
The Council did not determine that, in case of breach of the cease-fire agreement or
interruption of humanitarian assistance, whether UN forces were allowed to use force,
or whether they could use force only for self-defence. It seems that UNAMIR's
mandate was to perform peace-keeping tasks without having the ability to enforce the
peace, and that is why, when violence increased in Rwanda, the Council authorised a
reduction in the size of UNAMIR before it suffered heavy casualties.
In its next step, the Council in its Resolution 929 referred to Chapter VII and
authorised member states to use all necessary means for humanitarian objectives.215
France which initiated the operation could use force if it was necessary, but it could
not use force to enforce peace. French forces established a "humanitarian protected
zone", though the Council's resolution did not refer to such a protected zone. Despite
the UN attempt to prevent French withdrawal, the latter pulled its forces out of
Rwanda. Had France despatched its forces with UN authorisation, its withdrawal
would have also needed the UN consent.
UNOMUR and UNAMIR had the mandate to increase security in Rwanda and
monitor the cease-fire agreement. Even the authorisation of using all necessary means
215- SC Res. 929, 22 June 1994.231
by third states was only for humanitarian purposes. The legal basis of these operations
might be found in Article 40 in which provisional measures are envisaged as a first
step towards the ending of the crisis.
Peace-keepers and peace pacts are two elements of a security blanket and are not a
final solution to the problem. The case of Rwanda has shown that they can be quickly
pulled away with disastrous consequences. As it was in Somalia, there was a need to
focus on preventive diplomacy and greater understanding of the personalities and
underlying issues that could have led to diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions.216
Furthermore, organised actions by Governments of Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire
demonstrate that determination of the parties concerned to solve the problem plays a
key role to avoid any military operation by other states. It seems that more attempts
should be made to use peaceful means envisaged in Chapter VI rather than invoking
Chapter VII of the Charter where there is no clear act of aggression, breach of or
threat to the peace.
Conclusion
By the end of the Cold War, conflicts have been concentrated in the realm of civil
wars and internal crises. Besides, the Security Council has been involved in internal
conflicts rather than international ones. In the past, the use of veto power might have
prevented the Security Council from dealing with internal conflicts. The recent
Council's practice shows that the veto power has not been used for decisions on this
matter.
216.. Shawn H. McCormick, "The Lessons of Intervention in Africa", 94 Current History, (1995), p.
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The Security Council, in its extended interpretation of the concept of "threat to the
peace" in Article 39 (Chapter VII of the Charter), has recognised humanitarian
situations within a state as a "threat to the peace". Furthermore, this recognition has
been the basis of state authorisation to use force.
Yet, this matter created a fear in most countries as this practice might have special
consequences such as infringing their sovereignty, particularly when no guidance has
been given as to how the expanded doctrine of threat to the peace should be applied in
the future. Generally, it might be said that nothing in the present era of international
thinking supports a view allowing intervention in purely civil disputes where there is
no actual threat to international peace and security. 217 Intervention might take place
only where the conflict rises to the level of being considered a threat to the peace, at
which time it arguably may not be deemed humanitarian intervention. 218 Otherwise,
Article 2(7) of the Charter, as the drafters of the Charter intended, should be strictly
interpreted to prohibit UN intervention in states' internal affairs.219
In recent cases of humanitarian crisis there existed an inability of host governments
alone to respond to the crisis or a situation of collapsed structure of state authority. In
these crises, civilians are the main victims and often the main targets of internal wars;
and the warring parties make humanitarian efforts difficult or impossible because the
relief of a particular population is contrary to the war aims of one or other of the
parties; and there is a tendency for the combatants to divert relief supplies for their
own purposes.220
In such cases there is a need for an effective international response to break the cycle
of violence and hunger. However, the cases which have been discussed earlier in this
217..Mary E. O'Connell. "Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War" 67 Ind. L. J,, p. 903.
218..R. Ramlogan, op. cit., p. 243.
219..Aricle 2(7) has been discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.
220..An Agenda For Peace, (1995), op. cit., paras.12, 18.233
chapter show that military intervention in civil wars for humanitarian purposes cannot
be considered as the best solution for humanitarian crises, particularly when there is
the absence of consent of either the host government or the warring factions for the
presence of military forces. Military operation might even cause more problems, such
as increasing casualties for both forces and the population which, in turn, would
prompt further violence. In these situations, multinational forces which have been
dispatched for peace-enforcement and monitoring humanitarian deliveries very soon
become part of the conflict and their impartiality is undermined.
Furthermore, the costs of military operations are very high. A comparison of the costs
of the humanitarian program has been made in the case of Somalia with the costs of
the military program, and it turned out that the humanitarian program had a budget
one-tenth the size of the military budget. This shows that, for every dollar of
humanitarian assistance that the United Nations was able to provide, it paid ten dollars
for military protection of the humanitarian relief.221
It is believed that the United Nations should try to achieve a balanced presence from
the very beginning; this means that the humanitarian strategy complements the peace-
keeping and political strategies, and that the humanitarian strategy should be
underpinned by a massive humanitarian, economic, and developmental effort.222 Such
a massive humanitarian effort would have not only enormously positive effects on the
population, but also on security in the country.223 In fact, with proper implementation
of political, humanitarian and peace-keeping tools, the necessity of a full-scale
military presence can be reduced.
221.. The comparison was made by Jan Eliasson from Sweden who had the responsibility for the
humanitarian programs in Somalia. Jan Eliasson (interview), "The U. N. and Humanitarian
Assistance", 48 Journal of International Affairs, No. 2, (1995), P. 498.
222_ These efforts include building bridges, repairing roads, taking away mines and giving jobs to the
potential warriors. Ibid, p. 494.
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In recent years, the idea of having an enforcement element within peace-keeping
operations and setting aside the long-standing distinction between enforcement and
peace-keeping has grown. In this respect, Higgins argues that enforcement should
remain clearly differentiated from peace-keeping, and peace-keeping mandates should
not contain an enforcement function.224
In the case of Bosnia, the United Nations tried to separate peace-keeping from peace-
enforcement by authorising NATO to use force to support peace-keeping forces and to
protect safe areas. In seems that in the United Nations there is a tendency to entrust
enforcement tasks to regional arrangements. However, this mechanism has created
some concerns. In the Bosnia experience, two organisations with very different
mandates and approaches to the maintenance of peace and security were asked to deal
with security and humanitarian problems. They had no agreement on the combat
situation. There did not have a unified command, clear rules of engagement or a joint
understanding on the use of force.
Although in Bosnia the use of a regional arrangement to use military means for peace
support was not encouraging, the useful role of regional organisations in different
stages of conflict management cannot be ignored. It should be noted that NATO is
considered as a self-defence pact with a defensive function rather than a regional
organisation with economic and social capacity, and the Security Council under
Article 53 utilised it for enforcement action under its authority in Bosnia.
Regional organisations in many cases possess a potential that can be employed in
serving the functions of preventive diplomacy and mediation. Nevertheless, there
might be the possibility of supporting warring parties by some members of the
regional organisation, or the possibility that some interests lead these organisations to
inaction. With regard to the role of the EU in the crisis of Bosnia, Higgins believes
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that the EU blocked the UN from acting in Bosnia because the EU saw it as a prime
opportunity to pursue several of its objectives: first, EU action would make the EU
look decisive after looking weak in the Gulf War of 1991; second, EU management of
the crisis would demonstrate the independence of the EU from Moscow and
Washington; third, Bosnia would serve as the case on which the EU could finally
devise a common foreign policy; fourth, the various countries involved directly in the
crisis could, after the crisis was resolved, be brought into the EU under terms
established by the successful intermediary, the EU.225 She also states that the EU was
not structured to address the Bosnian crisis and only succeeded in buying time for the
Serbs. When the EU finally realised that it could not manage the crisis, it allowed the
UN to take up a considerably worsened crisis, at which point the Europeans used their
power in the UN to block effective and forceful UN action.226
In the Somali conflict, the role of regional organisations regarding conflict
management was brought into sharp focus. Although OAU, OIC and LAS were the
regional organisations within the vicinity of the conflict, they did not play their role
efficiently. In fact, regional organisations have a potential that, under the auspices of
the United Nations, can address a crisis within their region. In such situations, they
would act as localised versions of the United Nations, carrying forward the process of
restoring peace in the spirit of the UN Charter.
225.. Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia", 69 International Affairs, No.
3, July 1993, pp. 473-475.
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THE REDUCED ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
THE EXAMPLE OF THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR
The preceding chapters included an analysis of conflict management by the United
Nations regarding internal and international conflicts in various contexts that deemed
to be threatening international peace and security. The Organisation has been
delegated discretionary powers to maintain international peace and security through
its organs, the Security Council being the competent organ for dealing with disputes
and conflicts. The Council possesses recommendatory powers under Chapter VI and
mandatory powers under Chapter VII.
However, these powers have not always been used to their full capacity, and as the
Security Council's practice demonstrates, its potential has been hampered by some
considerations. The present chapter will discuss a case in which, despite the existence
of a prolonged international armed conflict and breach of the rules of use of force in
inter-state relations (jus ad bellum) on one side and rules of the law of war (jus in
hello) on the other, the Security Council played a reduced role to resolve the conflict.
The next chapter will analyse a case in which, on the contrary, the Security Council
used its powers to the full extent, both in imposing sanctions and in authorising
enforcement action against the aggressor state as well as adopting measures to curtail
its capabilities.
BACKGROUND
Following the unilateral denunciation of the border agreement by the Republic of Iraq
(Iraq) on 17 September 1980, that it had signed with the government of Iran in June237
19751, Iraq launched its massive invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980.2 Iraq in its
allegations accused the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) of violations of the 1975
Treaty's provisions.3 Because of these violations, in the Iraqi view, this Treaty with its
Protocols and Annexes were null and void. 4 Iraq contended that, since the Treaty was
no longer effective, the Iraq-Iran boarder reverted to its location prior to the signing of
the 1975 Treaty.5
Iran denied the Iraqi allegations and made clear that it never intended to admit the
possibility of denunciation in the 1975 Treaty and such termination was prohibited
and all agreements by Iraq were still in force and binding.6 Iran claimed that the Iraqi
abrogation violated the principles of pacta sunt servanda as well as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially Article 62 which prohibited a state
from invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus in regard to boundary agreements.7
Iran pointed to Article 5 of the Treaty which had provided the land and water frontiers
of the parties to be "inviolable, permanent and final".8 Iran argued that, even if Iraq
had difficulty with the interpretation or application of the Treaty, it should have
followed the procedures for the settlement of disputes specified in Article 6 of the
Treaty.9
Another set of Iraqi allegations was that Iran violated the Iraqi air space sixty-nine
times and attacked Iraqi targets 103 times before 22 September 1980. 1° Iraq stated that
the war started on 4 September 1980 when Iran used 175 millimetre cannons against
I- 14 ILM 1133 (1975), UNTS, Vol. 1017, No. 14903.
2.. 	 Williams, The United Nations and the Iran-Iraq War. A Ford Foundation Conference
Report, (Ford Foundation, New York, 1987), P. 9, and, N. Y. Times, 14 July 1982, P. 14.
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Iraq. However, Iraq never reported these incidents and the case was brought to the
attention of the United Nations by the Secretary-General after Iraq's massive invasion
of Iran on 22 September 1980."
The Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, on 9 December 1991, in performing
his mandate under paragraph six of Resolution 598, delivered a report in which he
confirmed that on 22 September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran "which cannot be justified
under the Charter of the United Nations, any recognised rules and principles of
international law or any principles of international morality and entails responsibility
for the conflict"." The Secretary-General specified that, to reach his conclusion, he
relied on the sources such as the letters of Iraq and Iran of August and September
1991 respectively to the Secretary-General at his request, giving their views on
paragraph six; consultation with the parties; information from independent experts;
and official documents of the United Nations since the beginning of the conflict."
In fact, 22 September 1980 has been universally recognised as the date that Iraq
invaded Iran at which it "launched air raids on at least ten major Iranian military
installations")4 The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq justified Iraqi large-scale
military action against Iran as an exercise of "the right of self-defence" necessitated by
circumstance." The untenability of the Iraqi position was later realised when Iraq
alleged that Iran started war on 4 September 1980 and Iraq "exercised preventive self-
defence to defend its people and territories". 16 These contradictory arguments, i.e.
claiming preventive self-defence which followed the earlier observation that Iran had
started the war, results from the fact that Iraq was unable to demonstrate that Iran had
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598
11-S/14191.
12-Further Report of the Secretary-General on the
(1987), S/23273, (1991), para. 6.
13-Ibid, para. 4.
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any military activity between 4 and 22 September 1980 to fulfil the requirements for
exercising the right of self-defence.17
In considering Iraqi military action as preventive self-defence, "it is well-known that
many authorities reject this doctrine as an admissible defence and do so for good
reasons"." A closer analysis of the literature and practice, e.g. the debate in the
Security Council in June 1981 concerning the Israeli-claimed preventive military
action against the nuclear reactor in Iraq, does not unequivocally support this view.19
Furthermore, Iraq, for its large-scale military action against Iran as preventive self-
defence, did not refer to a concentration of Iranian troops on the frontier as a threat of
attack neither in its communications to the United Nations nor in any other report.
Henlcin argues against the right of anticipatory self-defence stating "[n]othing in ... its
drafting ... suggests that the framers of the Charter intended something broader than
the language implied ... It was that mild, old-fashioned Second World War which
pursuaded all nations that for the future national interests will have to be vindicated,
or necessary change achieved, as well as can be by political means, but not by war and
military self-help. They recognised the exception of self-defence in emergency, but
limited to actual armed attack, which is clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not
easily open to misinterpretation or fabrication ... It is precisely in the age of the major
deterrent that nations should not be encouraged to strike first under pretext of
prevention or pre-emption."2° In fact, the security or national interests cannot be
invoked to justify preventive self-defence without an armed attack.
17-Ige F. Dekker, "Criminal Responsibility and the Gulf War of 1980-1988: The Crime of
Aggression", in, Ige F. Dekker and Harry H. G. Post (ed.), The Gulf War of 1980-1988, (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1992), P. 257.
18-Peter Malanczuk, "Comments", in, ibict, p. 275.
19_ id,
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The Secretary-General in his report stated that "[e]ven if before the outbreak of the
conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such
encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran - which was followed by
Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict - in violation of
the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus
cogens."21
In the Secretary-General's report, Iraq was recognised as the state that committed an
act of aggression as well as occupation of Iranian territory. Article 2(4) of the Charter
states that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". 22 The only
well-known exception to this principle is embodied in Article 51 which provides that,
in the case of armed attack against a member state, nothing in the Charter shall impair
the inherent right of self-defence until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.23 The military measures taken
by Iran in response to Iraqi attack and occupation to retake its occupied territories are
considered as self-defence against Iraq's aggression, and it was entitled for self-
defence until the Security Council took necessary measures.
During the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq accepted the Security Council's resolutions, but Iran
rejected most of them as being ineffective to restore its territory. The dispute between
the UK and Argentina in 1982 may be referred to as a recent example of the type of
arguments arising about the Security Council's necessary measures to end the act of
self-defence.
21-S/23273, para. 7.
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The UK argued that the right of self-defence continued until the Security Council
takes "measures which are actually effective to bring about the stated objective".24
The United Kingdom, which saw the Council's resolution as ineffective, stated that
the determination of whether a measure adopted by the Security Council under Article
51 must be an objective one, "reached in light of all the relevant circumstances", and
in this case because of ineffective action by the Council, the UK's right of self-defence
was "unimpaired".25
Argentina also invoked the right of self-defence and asserted that "Nile system of
collective security set forth in the Charter cannot be interpreted in a way that would
mean that provisions for legitimate defence would become inoperable .... The Charter
has provided that Members of the United Nations, when complying with its principles
and purposes, should not be left in a defenceless state against any act of aggression
perpetrated against its territory or population".26 The above arguments may be
considered as a test for the measures adopted by the Security Council to bring to an
end an act of self-defence.
With regard to the effective measures by the Security Council, its call to stop an
aggression cannot be a sufficient alternative to the victim state's right to repulse the
aggression. Also economic sanctions, specially on arms equipment, may be essential
to end the aggression, but the right of victim state to self-defence would remain
unimpaired. Even the authorisation or recommendation of the Security Council to use
force against the aggressor might not impair the right of self-defence on the part of the
victim state.
The author believes that there are three possibilities in responding to the call of the




are willing to contribute to military actions. Secondly, a group of states may decide to
contribute to enforcement action but have no political will to enforce the mandate, e.g.
in the case of Bosnia. Thirdly, there may be political will, in which case two
possibilities exist: enforcement action may be successful to end the aggression and to
meet the victim's rights, or it may fail leaving the victim probably in a situation worse
than the initial state of the conflict. It can therefore be concluded that only "effective"
action by the United Nations can suspend the right of self-defence; and the right of
self-defence for the victim state is reserved pending the outcome of the UN's action.
As mentioned in Chapter One, the drafters of the Charter believed that in the case of
flagrant aggression imperiling the existence of a member of the Organisation
enforcement measures should be taken without delay, and to full extent required by
circumstances, except that the Council should at the same time endeavor to pursuade
the aggressor to abandon its venture, by the means contemplated in Chapter VI and by
prescribing conservatory measures.27 The next section will examine the Organisation's
reaction to the conflict between Iraq and Iran, and consider whether this formula was
applied to the case.
THE UNITED NATIONS' RESPONSE TO THE AGGRESSION
Following the continuation of war on the land, at the sea and in the air, the Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim, under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, brought the
matter to the attention of the Security Council on 23 September 1980. 28 The Security
Council, six days later on 28 September, in its initial resolution merely called upon
the parties to refrain from further use of force and settle their disputes peacefully.29
The Council in its resolution did not clarify why it described this conflict the
27-UNCIO, Report of Rapporteur on Chapter VIII, Section B, Vol. 12, Doc. 881, 11113/46, p. 507.
28-S/14196.
29.. 	 Res. 479, 28 Sep. 1980. Earlier on 23 September, the Security Council took a presidential
declaration in form of a statement which is the weakest form of action the Council can take. S/14190.243
"situation" between Iran and Iraq. The Council, under Article 39, did not state that the
war would be a threat to international peace and security, nor did it identify the
aggressor state.30
The Council referred to Article 24 of the Charter, though there was no doubt that the
Council had primary responsibility for the maintenance of the international peace and
security. It should be noted that, while Articles 24-26 refer to functions and powers of
the Security Council, the specific powers are granted to the Security Council in
Chapter VII to determine the existence of threat to or breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, and make recommendation or take measures to restore peace.31
Iran rejected Resolution 479 and stated that the Security Council "should condemn the
premeditated act of aggression that has taken place, call for the immediate withdrawal
of the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and call upon Iraq to compensate Iran for
damages. It should also condemn the Iraqi authorities for war crimes."32
The Norwegian representative demanded withdrawal of all forces under international
supervision to the internationally recognised boundaries as a precondition for a cease-
fire, but Iraq rejected it• 33 Iraq argued that this was contrary to Resolution 479 which
it had accepted before34 and that its position was perfectly consistent with the spirit of
Resolution 479.35
In the Council's resolution, the Secretary-General was enjoined to offer his good
offices for the resolution of the situation.36 In October 1980, as a first step, he
3°- The Security Council has recognised the aggressor state in several occasions such as in its
Resolutions 455 of 1979, 475 of 1980, and 573 of 1985.
31 - Article 39 of the Charter.
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appealed to both governments that all commercial vessels leave Shatt Al-Arab
waterway with safe passage under the flag of the United Nations. 37 Iran accepted the
Secretary-General's proposa138, but Iraq did not accept it and stated that "these vessels
must fly the Iraqi flag as long as they are in Shaft Al-Arab, which is an Iraqi river".39
By the failure of the Security Council to stop the war, the Secretary-General, in the
exercise of his good offices, appointed Olaf Palme of Sweden as his representative in
the region.40 As a result of Palme's efforts, a number of prisoners-of-war were
released.4 1
In January 1981  the Islamic Conference Organisation, in response to the Secretary-
General, presented a plan including several measures such as: a cease-fire; withdrawal
of Iraq from Iranian territory; supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal by Islamic
'military observers'; the establishment of a committee of Islamic countries to decide
the sovereignty of the Shaft al-Arab waterway; pending the decision, administration of
the waterway by an agency set up by the Islamic countries, and establishing an
Islamic court to decide which side started the war.42
However, the plan was rejected by the both parties. 43 These terms, especially the term
about the sovereignty of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, was not acceptable to Iraq. Iran
required that the cease-fire and withdrawal of Iraqi troops be carried out
simultaneously, Iraq should be condemned as the aggressor, Iraq should agree to share
sovereignty over Shaft al-Arab as provided in the 1975 Treaty, and Iraq should pay
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The Security Council did not meet formally again to discuss the war for two years
until July 1982, by which time the situation had changed greatly because of Iran's
repeated success on the battlefield and it was able to push into Iraqi territory. 45 At
Jordan's request, the Security Council convened on  12 July 1982 and adopted
Resolution 514.46 The Council in its resolution called for several actions which it had
not mentioned in its previous resolution. It called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of
forces to internationally recognised boundaries under the supervision of a team of
United Nations observers.47 The Council considered that the prolongation of the
conflict endangered international peace and security. The Secretary-General was
requested to continue his efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable
settlement acceptable to both sides on the basis of the principles of the Charter
including respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. All other states were requested to abstain
from any action which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict."
Iraq accepted Resolution 594 while Iran argued that the Security Council was biased
in favour of Iraq.49 Iran stated that, while Iraq was in violation of specific articles of
the Charter by resorting to armed aggression and occupation, the Council in its
resolution of 1980 had deliberately failed to recognise that armed aggression and
occupation had taken place, so the Council had disqualified itself by its support of
aggression.50 Iran noted that the Security Council had been silent for twenty-two
months while the fighting continued on Iranian territory, but acted swiftly to protect
Iraq once Iraqi territory was threatened. Nevertheless, Iran affirmed its readiness to
45- Brian D. Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group", in: William J. Durch (ed.),
The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993), p. 239.
46-S/15141.




co-operate with the Council when the latter took its responsibilities seriously by
dealing with the realities of the conflict.5I
On 4 October 1982, at Iraq's request,52 the Security Council convened and adopted
Resolution 522. This resolution had similar provisions to Resolution 514. Iraq
accepted the resolution but Iran rejected it for the same reasons it had rejected
Resolution 514.53 The General Assembly adopted a resolution on 22 October 1982 on
the consequences of the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq.54
It may be argued that the Council, having been disqualified in Iran's view, would have
found itself ineffective in further attempts to end the war. However, the Council has
the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security among the states. A
conflict, in such a scale, cannot be left to continue with the possibility of escalating.
Having intensified the attacks on cities, commercial vessels and oil tankers, Iran
reported on 28 October that several parts of its populated residential areas had been
bombarded by Iraqi war-planes.55 Iran protested also the Iraqi attacks on Iranian
offshore oil fields, causing two oil spillages which had polluted the marine
environment.56 Iraq responded that the spillage from Iran's Norouz 3 oil well occurred
on 27 January when a merchant vessel collided with the platform and that the other
spillage was the result of military action in a war zone.57
In May 1983, in response to requests made by Iran and Iraq, the Secretary-General








damaged by the war.58 The mission's report devoted 26 pages to 'heavy damage and
intensive destruction' in eleven Iranian cities and 13 pages to 'light damage' in seven
Iraqi locations.59 The mission noted that the Iranian towns and cities close to the
border69 had been besieged or occupied by Iraq at the outbreak of hostilities and been
retaken in 1982.61
Although Iraq criticised the report, Iran argued that the possibility of a negotiated
settlement would depend on the Security Council's reaction to the report. 62 During
August and early September 1983 Iran reported attacks on mainly civilian targets and
use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the war zone. 63 On 28 October again Iran invited
the Secretary-General to dispatch his representative to the area for fact finding, stating
that Iraqi forces unable to gain the upper hand in the battle front had resorted to
inhuman surface-to-surface missile attack on civilians.64
It took five months for the Security Council to adopt Resolution 540 of 31 October
1983 in response to the report, more than a year after its last resolution (Res. 522).65
This resolution called for a comprehensive cease-fire, expressing its appreciation to
the Secretary-General for presenting a "factual, balanced, and objective account".66
The Council affirmed for the first time its desire for an objective examination of the
causes of the war.67
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In Resolution 540 all violations of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
were condemned. It called for cessation of all military operations against civilian
targets, including city and residential areas.68 By affirming the right of free navigation
and commerce in international waters the parties were asked by the Council to cease
all hostilities in the Persian Gulf region. The Secretary-General was requested to
consult with the parties concerning ways to sustain and verify the cessation of
hostilities including the possible dispatch of UN observers.69
Pakistan, Nicaragua and Malta abstained from voting, asserting that the resolution
lacked a guarantee of effectiveness and it could not engage parties in a process
combining immediate containment of hostilities with prospects for a comprehensive
peace settlement to follow." They argued that the resolution would leave Iran as
"disenchanted and aggrieved" as ever and would have no effect on the war because
such resolutions already existed.71
Iraq accepted the resolution stating that no partial implementation would be
accepted.72 However, Iran contended that Iraq should have been the party called upon
to stop attacks on civilian targets, and the conflict should not be described in terms of
'hostilities' because Iran had engaged in a painful defensive war to reverse the
consequences of the Iraqi aggression.73 However, Iran stated that it remained ready to
co-operate with the Secretary-General; and if the Security Council modified its biased








UN's response to the use of chemical weapons
The law of war, jus in bello, should govern the conduct of hostilities. The use of
chemical weapons with severe effects on humans and environment led the
international community to consider its prohibition seriously. This resulted in the
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (the 1925 Geneva Gas
Protocol). The concern over the use of such weapons relates in part to the effect that it
would have on escalating confrontation in the course of hostilities, and its provocation
of other states to consider the use of these weapons, which potentially threatens the
international peace and security. In such circumstances, it is vital that the United
Nations take immediate and effective measures to prevent further employment of such
methods.
In response to the repeated request of Iran to investigate the Iraqi use of chemical
weapons in March 1984,75 the Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar decided to send a
team of experts to Iran.76 According to the Secretary-General's report, submitted to
both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the specialists unanimously
concluded that chemical weapons had been used in the areas they inspected in Iran,
but they did not refer to Iraq as a user of chemical weapons. 77 Subsequently, the
Security Council, in a presidential declaration, strongly condemned the use of
chemical weapons without naming Iraq.78
In May 1984, Iran expressed appreciation for the Secretary-General's action for
having dispatched a mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons, asserting that
the Security Council had not taken action to stop Iraq from further use of these
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77-S/16433.
78-S/16454.250
weapons and it demanded that specific steps be taken to stop delivery and sale of
these weapons to Iraq.79
No decisive action was taken by the United Nations from June 1984 until March
1985, except that in January 1985 the Secretary-General dispatched a mission to
investigate the conditions in prisoner-of-war camps in both countries, and a medical
specialist to hospitals in Europe to examine Iranian patients who were suffering from
injuries caused by chemical weapons."
On 12 March Iran announced that Iraq was about to resume chemical attacks on a
large scale and warned that, unless the United Nations prevented the recurrence of
violations of international and humanitarian norms, the international body, along with
Iraq, would be held responsible for the consequences.81
On 13 March Iran informed the United Nations of the Iraqi chemical attack as
predicted, and urgently requested the Secretary-General to take steps to stop violations
of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and regretted that the UN had not agreed to the
stationing of a permanent expert mission in Tehran to investigate the use of chemical
weapons by Iraq.82
The Security Council, in response to the medical specialist's report, in which chemical
weapons had been confirmed as used against Iranian soldiers,83 adopted a declaration
that strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons without naming Iraq. 84 Iran
stated that the declaration lacked the required explicitness in its condemnation of Iraq,
and was not sufficient to end the continued use of chemical weapons by Iraq. 85 On the
79- S/16498.






other hand, Iraq criticised Iran in calling for the Security Council to prohibit the use of
chemical weapons, while it had ignored Security Council resolutions.86
On 14 February Iran had reported that, due to the apparent acquiescence of
international organisations, Iraq had used chemical bombs against Abadan twice on 13
February.87 Iran requested the Secretary-General to dispatch physicians either to
several cities in Europe where some of the victims had been hospitalised or to
Tehran.88 Immediately on the adoption of Resolution 582 by the Security Council, the
Secretary-General dispatched a third mission to Iran, visiting there from 26 February
to 3 March.89 The mission unanimously concluded that Iraq had used chemical
weapons against Iran.90 Both the United Nations and the US State Department stated
that there was no evidence that Iran had used chemical weapons against Iraq. 91 The
Security Council on 21 March, with a presidential declaration, strongly condemned
the use of chemical weapons and referred to Iraq as the guilty party for the first time.92
The Council stated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in the course of the
Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory.93 Iraq criticised the declaration for its 'lack of
balance'.94 However, Iran welcomed the declaration and urged the Council to uphold
its obligation to identify and condemn the aggressor that started the war.95
Following several Iranian claims of Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranians in
January, February, April, and May, on 8 May the Secretary-General reported the
conclusion of the fourth mission which had investigated allegations of the use of










repeated use of chemical weapons such as mustard gas and nerve agents against
Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran had also been injured by chemical
weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel had sustained injuries from chemical
warfare agents.96
The Security Council in its declaration of 14 May expressed dismay at the Iraqi
repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces and civilians. 97 Iraq
complained about the wording of both the Council's statement and the mission's report
concerning the injury of Iraqi military personnel without affirming that Iran had used
chemical weapons.98
Following the dispatch of the fifth investigation mission on chemical weapons by the
Secretary-General in April 1988,99 the Security Council in Resolution 612 condemned
vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict. 100 Iran strongly
criticised the resolution as it did not single out Iraq for using chemical weapons on
civilians. 101
In July 1988, following the requests from Iran to investigate the use of chemical
weapons, the specialists sent to the area concluded that chemical weapons continued
to be used by Iraqis against Iranian forces, and that their use had been intensified and
become more frequent. 102 In August another mission sent at Iran's request concluded
that mustard gas had been used in the air attack, affecting Iranian civilians.103 On 26









called upon all states to apply strict control of the export of chemical products serving
for the production of chemical weapons.104
UN's response to attacks on civilians
Among the prohibited methods during the armed conflicts is the prohibition of attacks
against the civilian population. Such prohibition has been reaffirmed in 1968 by the
UN General Assembly which provided that "[t]hat is prohibited to launch attacks
against the civilian population as such" and "that distinction must be made at all times
between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population
to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible". 105 Furthermore, Protocol I
of 1977 elaborates the purposes of the principles and rules on protection of the civilian
population against effects of hostilities. 106 However, despite the rules and restrictions
on the use of methods and means of warfare, civilian population were repeatedly
attacked by different warfare during Iraq-Iran war.107
On 9 June 1984 the Secretary-General called upon both parties to make a solemn
commitment to him to end and refrain from deliberate military attacks on purely
civilian population centres. m He referred to the 5 June aerial attack on the Iranian
town of Baneh which had been confirmed by ICRC. 109 Both parties accepted the
Secretary-General's proposal and were informed that he instructed Diego Cordovez to
contact them regarding verification measures.11o
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By the end of June 1984 the Secretary-General, on his initiative and by informing the
Security Council, dispatched United Nations observers to Iran and Iraq, including two
teams each consisting of three military officers drawn from United Nations Truce
Supervision Organisation (UNTS0) and one senior Secretariat official to monitor
compliance with the agreement."' It was the first presence of the United Nations in
the area during the conflict.
Although both parties had agreed to refrain from attacking cities, reciprocal attacks on
civilian targets occurred in March 1985, nine months after their acceptance. 112 On 9
March the Secretary-General announced to both parties that such attacks must stop."3
This was followed in mid-March by a statement by the Security Council requesting an
implementation of the moratorium regarding attacks against civilians.114
UN's response to attacks on commercial vessels
In 1984 the so-called tanker war began by Iraq to disrupt oil transportation, a
disruption that in fact increased after the US forces began to escort the reflagged
Kuwaiti ships.' 15 The reason of attacks against tankers carrying Iranian oil was that
Iraq sought to achieve on the seas the military momentum it was then losing in the
ground war and to deprive Iran of revenues from oil export. 116 Because Iraq exported
its oil through pipelines, not via tankers, Iran could not respond in kind against Iraqi
shipping.117
111_ S/16627, S/17017. The presence of these forces in the capitals four years later helped to expedite
the establishment of peace-keeping forces in the area. The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations




115.. R. K. Ramazani, "Peace and Security in the Persian Gulf', in, Christopher C. Joyner (ed.), The
pe i	 (Greenwood Press, USA, 1990), p. 237.
116.. Case Concerning Oil Platforms, (I R Iran v. U. S. A.), Preliminary Objection, (1996), CR 96/12,
P. 23'
117..LI255
With regard to attacking vessels belonging to other countries, on 11 May 1984, Iran
stated that Iraq by its action intended to internationalise the war and that the United
Nations should take immediate measures. 118 Iran further stated that it had allocated
considerable resources and manpower to guarantee the freedom and security of
navigation in the Persian Gulf and would not permit the Gulf to be closed to it and be
used by others against it. 119 Iraq replied that Iran committed aggression against
Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian vessels far from the war zone, and Iraq struck against
vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports as a preventive and defensive measure.120
Earlier, on 22 September 1980, Iran had established a maritime "war zone" which was
restricted to its territorial waters outside the Strait of Hormuz. 121 It was not a "total
exclusion zone" since Iran did not formally prohibit access to all vessels, regardless of
their hostile nature, but only subjected passage of foreign vessels to previous
authorisation for security reasons.122 Therefore, despite allegations to the contrary,
Iran's "war zone" did not affect waters in the Strait of Hormuz.123
Iraq also established a maritime "exclusion zone" on 12 August 1982124 which was
extended from Shatt-al-Arab into the high seas up to 65 km. from Kharg Island, on
which was an important Iranian oil terminal, and annonced that foreign shipping
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Six Persian Gulf nations prepared a draft resolution to condemn Iran for its attacks on
commercial ships to and from the ports of their countries. 126 Several countries
objected to the unbalanced nature of the draft, as it did not mention the Iraqi
attacks.127 Resolution 552 of 1 June 1984, which referred to the letter from the
representatives of the six countries, expressed concern about such attacks and
condemned attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia.128 Although more than sixty ships, two-thirds of which were neutral
commercial vessels, had been attacked up to that point in the war, the Security
Council implicitly condemned Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian ships.129
The Council acted more strongly against Iran that it had ever did against Iraq, even in
its responses to Iraq's aggression and use of chemical weapons.130
Iran rejected Resolution 552 and protested that the Security Council by its one-sided
resolution had given Iraq a licence for further aggression. 131 It referred to Iraq's 5 June
bombarding of civilian targets killing 400 civilians, and warned the Council to share
responsibility for the actions of Iraq perpetrated under its patronage.132
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ACTIVITIES
Secretary-General Prez de Cuellar's initiatives regarding the investigation of the use of
chemical weapons have been described earlier in this chapter. His activities in respect
of initiations related to restoring peace and resolving the conflict are discussed herein.
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The Secretary-General travelled to Iran and Iraq in April 1985. He reported a wide
gap between the positions of the parties. 133 However, he stated that he would try to
continue his communication and maintain his position as "the only go-between trusted
by both sides". 134 During the Secretary-General's visit, discussions had also been held
in both capitals on an eight-point proposal which he had presented to the both parties
in New York on 28 March. 135 The underlying premise of the proposals was that, as the
Secretary-General was responsible under the Charter to seek an end to the conflict and
until that was achieved he would try to mitigate its effects, both parties would enter
into sustained discussion in all those respects with him.136
In his report the Secretary-General stated that Iran believed that, since from the
beginning of the conflict the Security Council had not acted impartially or justly, that
in order to start a process towards peace, the Security Council should rectify its past
actions.137 He reported that he had communicated these views to Iraq.138 Although the
Secretary-General proceeded with his efforts to apply his proposals, having
increasingly become more important than the other organs of the UN to mediate
between the parties, the war continued.
In February 1986 Iran pushed its forces into the Iraqi Faw Peninsula. Iraq claimed that
Radio Tehran announced the liberation of more than 700 square kilometres of Iraqi
territory by Iranian forces. 139 This success had several benefits for Iran; first, it cut
Iraq off from Persian Gulf; second, it positioned Iran to attack Basra from the South;
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and third, it positioned Iran to cut off Iraq's main lines of communication to
Kuwait.140
In response, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 582 on 24
February, nearly two years after its last resolution (Res. 552). 14i The Council
emphasised the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,
which had not been referred to in previous resolutions. The Council expressed its deep
concern about the prolongation of the conflict for six years. It referred to the
prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and attacks on civilians and neutral
shipping. The Council deplored the initial acts which gave rise to the conflict. 142 It
called upon both parties to submit their conflict to mediation or other means of
peaceful settlement of disputes. The Council for the first time referred to a
comprehensive exchange of prisoners-of-war within a short period of the cessation of
hostilities.143
Iran in its comments on the resolution stated that, although unbalanced and inadequate
on the whole issue of the war, the resolution was a positive step towards condemning
Iraq as the aggressor and towards a just conclusion of the war. 144 Iran noted that it was
prepared to continue its co-operation with the Secretary-General in matters relating to
the rules of international law, and to prevent the expansion of the war and
involvement of other countries in it. Iran observed that, while the Council was under
obligation to condemn Iraq strongly by name for its repeated large-scale use of
chemical weapons, the Council had taken a milder position on that point than in the
14Q. Antony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-87, (Jane's Publishing,
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past. 145 Iraq expressed its readiness to implement the resolution in good faith provided
that Iran was ready to do the same.146
At the request of seven Arab countries, the Security Council held five meetings
between 3 and 8 October 1986 to consider the Iraq-Iran situation. 147 The states
participating in the debate viewed with increasing concern widening of the Iraq-Iran
war and its implications for the Persian Gulf region and the world at large.'" The
Secretary-General said that the current Council meetings had a special significance
because of the sharp escalation in attacks on commercial vessels of third countries and
the widening of area in which they occurred, with potential repercussions that could
draw in Powers from beyond the region. 149 He referred to six Council resolutions that
remained without satisfactory implementation for, while Iraq had been willing to
comply with them, Iran had not, on the grounds that the Council had not dealt with its
grievances. The Secretary-General said he had repeatedly urged Iran to present its
case before the Council. He said his efforts, including his 1985 eight-point plan, had
failed to achieve substantive progress towards ending the war. 150 Nonetheless,
repeated requests from many quarters that he take new initiatives made it necessary
for the Council to establish a basis on which both sides would find it possible to co-
operate with the United Nations and promote the prospects for a settlement. 151 By
these words, the Secretary-General indirectly expressed his view that the Council's
previous action was not sufficient to settle the dispute.
As a result of the Security Council's meetings, Resolution 588 was adopted on 8
October 1986. The resolution simply called upon Iran and Iraq to implement
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Resolution 582.152 The Council decided to consider the Secretary-General's report and
the conditions for establishment of a durable peace in conformity with the Charter and
the principles of justice and international law.153
It is an argument that the prolongation of war between Iraq and Iran had a cost also for
the United Nations itself. It contributed to worsening tension and discouraged co-
operation and progress in a highly sensitive area. It conspired against the
strengthening and credibility of the system of international relations and coexistence
that this organisation represents. I54 In fact, the Council was beginning to recognise
that the war had ramifications extending far beyond Iran and Iraq, and, even to the
United Nations itself. 155 After the Secretary-General's notes, the Council by adoption
of Resolution 588 tried to start more efficient actions to end the war.
Iran transmitted on 29 May 1986 a confidential letter to the Secretary-General which
was disclosed on 6 October, stating that the Iraqi war against Iran had reached a
complex stage due to outside interference, which international fora were not prepared
to confront. As it feared that a solution to the war was not soon to be attained, the
immediate goal was to prevent it from widening. I56 Accordingly, Iran was committed
to developing relations with countries of the region, despite the aid given by some to
Iraq. It would consider the Secretary-General's suggestions for maintaining peace and
security of the region on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
and non-interference. Although confining the war might prove difficult because of the
Iraqi provocations, an impartial representative on the scene would be useful in
adjusting the situation.I57
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Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 588, the Secretary-General, through his
identical cables, requested Iran and Iraq's position on Resolution 582 and his eight-
point plan.I58 Iraq in response referred to an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of
troops to the internationally recognised boundaries, exchange of prisoners of war,
submission of the conflict to mediation or other means of settlement. I59 However,
Iraq said that it did not consider the eight-point plan a balanced and practicable means
for achieving a settlement.160
Iran's position was that paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 582 fell short of explicitly
identifying Iraq as the aggressor or of measures to prevent Iraq from further using
chemical weapons, attacking civilians and third-party vessels, threatening civil
aviation, and violating international law.161 With respect to paragraph 3 Iran stated
that it was inoperative because Iraq had abrogated the 1975 Treaty, invaded Iran and
still sought to topple Iran's regime, therefore, Iran was determined not to sign any
agreement with the current Iraqi regime. I62 However, Iran was prepared to co-operate
in preventing the spread of the war, exchanging prisoners, and conducting the war in
accordance with international law. Regarding the eight-point plan, Iran considered
that it could serve as a suitable basis for future efforts.I63
The Secretary-General in his report concluded that the positions showed no degree of
coincidence that would provide a basis for giving effect to Resolution 582. He stated
that the Council must persevere in establishing a basis for Iran and Iraq to co-operate
in a peaceful settlement.164







In December 1986, the Council called for the implementation of Resolutions 582 and
588 in a presidential declaration. 165 Iran in its reaction declared that, until the Security
Council mustered the necessary political will to take a clear and unequivocal position
on Iraq's responsibility for starting the war, the paragraphs of Resolution 582 about a
cease-fire would remain inoperative.166
The Council members held consultations on the intensified hostilities in January 1987.
The Council in its presidential declaration reiterated its serious concern over the
widening of the conflict. 167 It referred to the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security which was conferred to it by the
Members of the United Nations.168
Iran, which had repeatedly attacked Iraqi positions during 1982 to 1986, showed in its
new attacks in 1987 that it was still fiilly committed to winning the war. 169 Most of
these Iranian operations were in Iraqi territory and Iraq faced an increasing threat to
Basra. 170 Iraq continued to strike at Iran's shuttle tankers and oil facilities. In February
1987 the United States renewed international pressure to bring Iran into negotiations.
It had moved its naval forces to the Persian Gulf to underpin its commitment to its
friends in the area."' In response, Iran warned that the United States had heightened
tension in the region by increasing its military presence and instability would increase
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CEASE-FIRE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIIMOG
On 20 July 1987 the Security Council adopted Resolution 598, expressing its
determination to bring to an end the conflict between Iran and Iraq.173 This resolution
was not similar to the previous resolutions in the sense that its mandatory aspect was
significant compared to the recommendatory nature of the previous ones; and, for the
first time, the Council referred to the "conflict between Iran and Iraq".174
The resolution explicitly referred to Articles 39 and 40 as the constitutional basis for
the Council's actions. In fact, it took seven years for the Council to recognise the
"situation" as the "conflict", and determine the existence of "a breach of the peace"
and its effect as the 'threat to international peace and security'.
Resolution 598 in paragraph one demanded, as a first step, that Iran and Iraq observe
an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air,
and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries without delay.175
In paragraph six of the resolution the Secretary-General was requested to explore the
question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the
conflict. The Council has, however, the authority to recognise the aggression and the
responsibility of the aggressor, and it is arguably an important decision which should
be made by the Council itself rather than an impartial body appointed by it. This
paragraph also falls short of the next step to be undertaken once the aggressor has
been recognised. The reasonable result of such inquiry should however be
compensation by the responsible state towards the loss incurred on the victim state,
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which in turn would have a deterrent effect. It should be noted that in 1990 the
Security Council not only determined the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 176but also
determined that under "international law" Iraq was "liable for any loss, damage or
injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and
corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq."177
By Resolution 598 the Council called upon all other states to refrain from any act
which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict. 178 The Secretary-
General was requested to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify,
confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal, and with co-operation of the two
disputants implement the resolution to achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable
settlement. 179 The Council urged that prisoners-of-war should be released in
accordance with Geneva Convention.'" The Secretary-General was requested to
examine measures to enhance the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region.181
The resolution in paragraph ten left open the possibility of further steps to be
considered for non-compliance with the resolution.182
Following the vote on Resolution 598, the Secretary-General stated that, with
adoption of the resolution, the work of achieving an Iran-Iraq settlement had just
begun.183 His view implies that in effect the previous resolutions did not entail
practical effectiveness, while the latter resolution, due to its explicit nature, would be
effective in resolution of the conflict.
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Iraq accepted the resolution. 184 Although Iran did not reject the resolution, it stated
that Resolution 598 suffered from fundamental defects and incongruities and lacked
the minimum balance necessary for further constructive activities. 185 Iran charged the
United States with preparing to widen regional turbulence by strengthening its
military presence in the Persian Gulf, and asked the Secretary-General and the
Council members to call on the United States to halt its expansionist policies. It also
asked that France end its policy of arming Iraq.186
The United States treated Iran's conditional acceptance of Resolution 598 as a
rejection, and pushed for an arms embargo on Iran. 187 The Permanent Members of the
Council agreed to postpone consideration of an arms embargo. In fact, France, China,
and the Soviet Union were opposed to any sanctions.188
On 31 July 1987 Iran reported two violations of its territory by the United States.189
Between August and November Iran claimed that the United States forces violated
Iranian territorial waters and airspace.'"
In October 1987 Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar tabled the implementation plan of
the resolution which he had originally presented to the Council, and in the spring of
1988 he met repeatedly with representatives of both countries in an attempt to reach
accord on the implementation of Resolution 598. 191 Iran demanded a formal cease-fire
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observe an informal cease-fire once the impartial body was created to investigate how
the war began.192
In December 1987 the Security Council in a declaration gave the Secretary-General
more flexibility by agreeing that the provisions of the resolution did not have to be
implemented exactly in sequence, i.e. creating a relationship between paragraphs one
and six, which was acceptable for Iran.193
Meanwhile, the naval vessels of the countries escorting merchant shipping in the
Persian Gulf were involved in incidents with the combatants. On 3 July 1988, the USS
Vincennes, a United States cruiser, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing
all 290 civilian passengers and crew on board.194
On 17 July 1988 Iran notified the Secretary-General of its formal acceptance of
Resolution 598, expressing the need to save life and to establish justice and regional
and international peace and security. 195 Immediately after Iran's acceptance of
Resolution 598, the Secretary-General suggested that he would announce that he was
arranging for the designation of an impartial body to determine responsibility for the
hostilities. He also contemplated that such a body would start its work no later than
twenty-one days after the day the cease-fire was to take effect, and would complete its
work no later than ninety days after that day, and report to the Secretary-Genera1.196
Unfortunately, the Secretary-General's proposals were not acted upon.197
The Secretary-General informed the Council that, as a result of his diplomatic efforts
towards achieving implementation of its Resolution 598 of 1987, and in exercise of
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his mandate, he was calling on Iran and Iraq to observe a cease-fire and to discontinue
all military actions. Both parties assured him that they would observe the cease-fire
and agreed to the deployment of the United Nations forces at that time. He invited
Iran and Iraq to direct talks under his auspices at Geneva.198
As the peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq began at Geneva on 25 August 1988,
having failed to achieve the control of the Shatt Al-Arab by invading Iran, Iraq sought
to achieve some territorial gain through the peace negotiations. 199 Iran rejected the
Iraqi claims of full sovereignty over the waterway and stated that no bargaining and
no compromise; and drew what it called a "red line". 200 At the second round of
discussions which made little progress, the Secretary-General suggested that the
question of sovereignty over Shaft Al-Arab be postponed until a formal treaty had
been concluded.201
In his report of 7 August 1988, the Secretary-General recommended that as soon as
the cease-fire date had been set, the Council would establish an observer team to be
known as the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), which
would also assist the parties in implementing Resolution 598 as might be mutually
agreed.202 In another report,203 the Secretary-General referred to the mandate and
provided more detailed terms of reference stating that UNIIMOG would establish
cease-fire lines in co-operation with the parties; monitor compliance with the cease-
fire; investigate violations; prevent, through negotiation, a change in the status quo;
and supervise withdrawal to internationally recognised boundaries. The Security
Council approved the report and decided to establish UNIIMOG for an initial period
of six months,204 which was renewed later.205
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CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS
This section concludes the discussions made in the preceding sections of this chapter.
Initially, the legal basis of the establishment of UNIIMOG is considered which was
created as a result of the consent of the parties as they realised the need to end the
conflict. Prior to its acceptance of Resolution 598, Iran pulled out from the lands it
captured during the last few years of the war. Iraq expressed readiness to release the
prisoners of war as Iran had in several occasions released Iraqi prisoners of war
unilaterally. The parties were prepared to take effective action to end military
hostilities in the light of realities of the conflict and the international situation.
The constitutional basis of UNIIMOG
Resolution 598 of 1987 was a mandatory call for a cease-fire within the context of
Chapter VII, Articles 39 and 40.206 This mandatory call for a cease-fire and
withdrawal of forces was made for the first time in the conflict by the Counci1.207
UNIIMOG was the first mission which was explicitly established under Articles 39
and 40. However, the mandatory call did not mean that UNIIMOG was authorised to
enforce a cease-fire. It was dispatched to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire
and withdrawal, as provisional measures.
It is believed that "in practice it can be expected that an attacked state which has
conducted a successful defence will not easily comply with a mere call for a cease-
fire. The Security Council will probably also hesitate in most cases to employ
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enforcement measures according to Articles 41 and 42 against the attacked state, even
when this state disregards an order under Article 40".208
Although UNIIMOG was created to assist the parties to implement provisional
measures, its presence without the consent of Iran and Iraq was impossible. Its
presence depended upon the consent of the both parties and its mandate depended on
an existing cease-fire. These facts make it clear that it was a typical consensual UN
observation operation.209 Therefore, by removing the consent of host states, the peace-
keeping forces should withdraw immediately.
As the Allied operations against Iraq began on 15 January 1991 the UNIIMOG
personnel in Iraq were transferred to Iran.2113 From this date until 28 February 1991,
which is the date of ending the mission, UNIIMOG acted only in Iran.211
The evaluation of the role of UN organs
In performing his mandate under paragraph six of Resolution 598 of 1987, Secretary-
General Javier Perez de Cuellar, in one of his final acts as the United Nations
Secretary-General, delivered one of his most important reports to the Security Council
on 9 December 1991.212 Paragraph six requested the Secretary-General to "explore, in
consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with
inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as
soon as possible". 213 The Secretary-General in his report noted that important
208.. Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1994), P. 620.
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paragraphs of Resolution 598 regarding the cease-fire, withdrawal of forces to the
international borders, and exchange of prisoners-of-war had been implemented.214
The Secretary-General in his report clearly referred to Iraq's aggression against Iran in
violation of the prohibition of the use of force which is regarded as one of the rules of
jus cogens.215 He explained that, to reach his conclusion, he relied on the sources such
as: the letters of Iraq and Iran of August and September 1991 respectively to the
Secretary-General at his request, giving their views on paragraph six; consultation
with the parties; information from independent experts; and official documents of the
United Nations since the beginning of the conflict.216
With regard to the violations of humanitarian law and the use of chemical weapons on
civilian population, the Secretary-General specified that he had to note with deep
regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons had been used against Iranian
civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center - lacking any protection against that
kind of attack".217
However, the Secretary-General's opinion in performing paragraph six of Resolution
598 was that it would not seem to serve any useful purpose to pursue that
paragraph.218 In fact, he decided not to recommend to the Security Council to set up
an impartial body to inquire into the question of who started the war because he
believed that the events of the Iran-Iraq war were "well-known to the international
community", and the position of the parties were "also public knowledge". 219 As
mentioned earlier, the Secretary-General identified Iraq as the aggressor and the
occupier of the Iranian territory.220
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Iran, having been convinced that under international law Iraq was liable to pay
reparations, frequently claimed as much as one trillion dollars for direct and indirect
damage.221 On 24 December 1991 the Secretary-General released a 191 page report
which attempted to specify the direct non-military war damages to Iran at a lower 97.2
billion dollars.222 However, the Secretary-General did not specifically call for Iraq to
pay reparations; instead, he suggested a UN-convened "round table" to undertake
international reconstruction aid to Iran.223 On the other hand, the Security Council did
not make any attempt to put pressure on Iraq to compensate Iran.
By sharp contrast, the Security Council, in the case of Kuwait, determined that Iraq
under international law was liable for any loss, damage or injury arising as a result of
the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait and invited states to collect relevant
information for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq. 224 Moreover, Resolution
687 (paragraph 16) referred to liability of Iraq "without prejudice to the debts and
obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990".225 This was reaffirmed in
Resolution 692, and furthermore, the Council decided to create a fund to pay
compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16.226 In addition, Resolution 706
provided that the full costs incurred by the United Nations in facilitating conditions
for appropriate payments should be paid by Iraq to the United Nations Compensations
Fund.227
The President of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui, referring to
the Kuwait crisis, stated that there is "absolutely no getting away from the comparison
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between the 1980-1988 Gulf War and the present crisis in the Gulf." 228 While the
Security Council in the case of Kuwait took effective measures to make Iraq
compensate for damages as the result of its aggression, in the case of Iraqi aggression
against Iran it did not take any measure in kind. Iraq remains liable for loss and
damage as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Iran.
In an evaluation of the Secretary-General's attempts during the Iraq-Iran war, it is
necessary to refer to the authority given to him by the Charter to participate in
attempts to end armed conflicts. Under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-
General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matters that may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. In a broad interpretation
of Article 99 the Secretary-General is empowered not only to engage in fact-finding
and investigation, but also is authorised to offer his good offices to engage disputants
to negotiate.229 However, it seems that the Secretary-General may undertake such
actions independently and outside of the formal institutional framework of the United
Nations.
The Secretary-General's performance during the Iraq-Iran war included mediation
efforts, fact-finding missions, efforts to end attacks on civilian populations by
establishing observer mission, action for the merchant ships to leave Shaft Al-Arab
safely, several reports with regard to the violation of humanitarian law and use of
chemical weapons, initiation of the eight-point plan to end the war, and his initiation
to prepare an operative plan to implement Resolution 598.
It is incumbent upon the Secretary-General to have a neutral role during conflicts.230
Indeed, his great impartiality was the main reason that Iran, while criticised the
228- Mohammed Bedjaoui, "The Gulf War of 1980-1988 and the Islamic Conception of International
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Security Council for its bias toward Iraq, emphasised its co-operation with the
Secretary-Genera1.231 It may be argued that, while the Security Council failed to
perform its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security,
the Secretary-General, during the course of the conflict, acted independently in
accordance with his duties under the Charter.
The General Assembly's performance was poor in relation to the Iraq-Iran war. Its
most important action was the adoption of Resolution 37/3 in 1982. 232 The General
Assembly in its resolution did not adopt any effective measures to settle the dispute
peacefully, and the prolongation of war did not move the members of the General
Assembly to take any initiative toward resolving the conflict or even adopt any further
resolution.233
The Security Council failed to act decisively in the face of a blatant act of aggression,
to identify the responsible state for the act of aggression and to force it to compensate
the victim. The Council even failed to provide a basis on which both sides could co-
operate with the United Nations and promote the prospects for a settlement as the
Secretary-General emphasised on it in 1986. 234 In fact, the Council in its actions
played a reduced role to resolve the conflict.235
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The Permanent Members of the Security Council, although adopted an official attitude
of neutrality, very soon increased their arms deliveries to Iraq. 236 For instance, after
the Iranian foray into Iraqi territory on 13 July 1982, Iraq received most of its arms
from Moscow.237 The United States also had declared that it would not supply arms to
either side either directly or indirectly. 238 However, this US policy was applied against
Iran only.239 US allowed the sale of transport planes and furnished intelligence
assistance to Iraq, and from July 1987 US forces engaged in a controversial quasi-war
with Iran in the Persian Gulf. 240 France has been considered as the Iraq's biggest
western arms supplier.24I
It is seen that, albeit the Security Council resolutions calling upon all states to refrain
from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict, the
Council's Permanent Members, especially the Soviet Union, France and the United
States, were the main Iraqi suppliers of arms and transport. This action is not only a
breach of the law of war on neutrality, but also the breach of the resolutions which
they themselves adopted in the Security Council.
The Security Council did not act under Chapter VII to determine the act of aggression
and to enforce measures to end the aggression and occupation. Had the Council
identified Iraq as the aggressor from the outset, as it did in the case of Kuwait, it
would have been better able to stop a war that raged for nearly eight years and
entailed nearly a million casualties. In fact, as the drafters of the Charter intended, in
the case of flagrant aggression imperiling the existence of a member of the
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Organisation enforcement measures should be taken without delay and to full extent.
The Council should at the same time endeavor to pursuade the aggressor to abandon
its venture, by the means contemplated in Chapter VI and by prescribing conservatory
measures. Given the Iraqi triumph at the Security Council deliberations, it calculated
that the Council would let the aggression stand. Otherwise, neighbouring states might
have been saved from another act of aggression by Iraq.CHAPTER SEVEN
SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISATION
OF STATE ACTION:
THE EXAMPLE OF THE KUWAIT CRISIS
In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Security Council reacted with unusual speed and
decisiveness. It imposed sanctions, naval embargo and finally authorised the use of
force to liberate Kuwait. Furthermore, the Security Council undertook a humanitarian
progromme in Iraq to deal with the humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the Iraqi
defeat. Thus, the involvement of the UN in this case has had two dimensions:
international and internal.
In this chapter a brief background to the case is presented, and the legal basis of
imposing sanctions and naval embargo before and after UN authorisation is examined.
The authorisation of use of force against Iraq is discussed following a review of two
other cases of the Council authorisation of state action. The legality of individual
states' intervention on humanitarian grounds after the cease-fire agreement is then
investigated followed by an analysis of the legality of establishment of no-fly zones
within Iraq.
BACKGROUND
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 raised a number of legal issues which could
be considered from several points of view. Reference should be made to the
background of the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait before dealing with these issues.
The grievances may be traced to territorial claims of Iraq over Kuwait, economic and
political problems which Iraq faced after its war with Iran, Kuwait's refusal to lease277
two strategic islands to Iraq, Iraq's anger over Kuwait's pumping of huge quantities of
oil from the Rumaila field lying underneath both countries, Kuwait's refusal to forgive
Iraq's debt incurred during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq's accusations that Kuwait had
waged economic warfare against it.'
Part of Iraq lying between the two rivers of Tigris and Euphrates (known as
Mesopotamia) was probably the earliest centre of human civilisation. It had been the
site of a number of civilisations, including the Sumerians (with first city-states and
inventors of writing), the Babylonians (with achievements in mathematics, astronomy
and law), and the Assyrians (credited with developing literacy and art forms). 2 This
history is perhaps a clue to the tendency of its present regime to seize what it
imagined that it had in the past.
Iraq was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century, came under Ottoman rule
during the sixteenth century, and under direct Turkish administration in the nineteenth
century.3 During World War I, Iraq was invaded by the British, and in 1924 the
League of Nations adopted the Mandate Agreement whereby, recognising the
provisions of the 1922 Treaty of Alliance which the British had concluded with the
King of Iraq, the United Kingdom became the mandatory over Iraq.4 In October 1932,
Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations and became an independent state under
British protection. In fact, by a further Treaty of Alliance, signed in 1930 for a term of
25 years, Britain was granted certain military bases in Iraq, enabling Britain to lead
Iraq into World War II as an enemy of the Axis. She then became a Member of the
United Nations.5
I- For more information see: Bishara A. Bahbah, "The Crisis in the Gulf- Why Iraq Invaded Kuwait",
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Similar to Iraq, Kuwait was under Ottoman rule. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century, Britain developed its interest in the Persian Gulf since the proposed Baghdad
railway scheme was much under discussion in the capitals of Europe. 6 The early
relationship between Britain and Kuwait which played a key part in these
considerations was the secret agreement concluded between both entities in January
1899.7 By this agreement, the Sabah family could run internal affairs and Britain was
responsible for Kuwait's defence and external relations. 8 Under the agreement, the
Sheikh of Kuwait bound himself not to receive the Agent or Representative of any
Power or goverment at Kuwait without the previous sanction of the British
Government, and not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation or any other
purpose any portion of his territory to the other entities without the previous consent
of Britain.9
In 1961 Britain and Kuwait terminated the 1899 Agreement and, by ending British
protection, Kuwait became an independent state. 10 However, when Kuwait declared
its independence, Iraq laid claim to the whole of Kuwait and threatened to annex it by
force. 0 Kuwait requested assistance from Britain which sent troops in 1961. These
troops were later withdrawn and replaced by troops from member countries of the
Arab League, which were in turn withdrawn in 1963 when Iraq formally recognised
Kuwait as an independent state.12
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IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES
In July 1990 Iraq and Kuwait became involved in a dispute over oil pricing and
production levels and over Iraqi debts to Kuwait. 13 Iraq felt that it had justifiable
grievances against Kuwait to renew its territorial claims, and thus prepared itself for
invading Kuwait. Although diplomatic efforts were made by members of the Arab
League, and Iraq and Kuwait agreed to talks in Jedda in August, and Iraq ensured
Egypt and Saudi Arabia that it had no intention of invading Kuwait, it invaded and
occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990, announcing its annexation to Iraq on 8 August.14
The international reaction, especially that of the industrialised world, was as
unanimous and strong as it was unusual. For most of the previous decade, for their
own benefit, the Great Powers actively manipulated the war between Iraq and Iran,15
which was started by the invasion of the territories of the latter. In confrontation
between Iraq and Kuwait, the United States to its credit decided to challenge the
invasion of Kuwait, and turned to the United Nations to seek sanctions under Chapter
VII of the Charter and to bring along much of the rest of the international
community. 16
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
Within hours of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the Security Council
held a meeting at the request of Kuwait and the United States." At this meeting most
of the Members of the Security Council condemned Iraq's action as an obvious
aggression and asked the Council to perform its responsibility to keep international
13 j
14_a
15- William J. Durch, "The Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission", in, William J. Durch (ed.), Th_g
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peace and security. I8 The British representative to the UN stated that Iraq's action was
the breach of the UN Charter and the Charter of the Arab League. I9 He added that this
was not the first time that Iraq had invaded the territory of a neighbour.20
The Security Council at the same meeting on 2 August adopted Resolution 660 in
which it condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined that there existed a
breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.2I
The Council expressly referred to Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter as the legal bases
for its action, and demanded Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.22
In its resolution, the Security Council used the word "invasion" instead of
"aggression". Two reasons may be considered for this wording: first, the fear of the
Soviet veto on Resolution 660, and secondly, the legal consequences that international
rules has envisaged for aggression.23 It seems at that stage the Council preferred to
leave room for negotiations.
Annexation of Kuwait
Following the invitation made by Saudi Arabia, on 7 August President Bush ordered
US ground and naval forces to go to Saudi Arabia, and nearly 50 warships from the
US, USSR, Britain and France converged on the Persian Gulf.24 Iraq's President.
Saddam Hussein, sent a message to President Mubarak of Egypt saying that Iraq
18.. 	 2932, 2 Aug. 1990, p. 19.
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would withdraw its troops according to a timetable and asked Mubarak to prevent a
foreign intervention which would obstruct such a withdrawal.25
On 8 August 1990, when Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait, the United States
called on NATO members for a "multinational" force to join in the Persian Gulf to
defend Saudi Arabia because independence of the latter was of "vital interest" to the
US and that a disruption of Saudi oil supply represented a threat to US "economic
independence" •26
The Security Council met on 9 August to discuss a draft resolution. That draft was
adopted unanimously as Resolution 662 in which the Council described the
annexation as "null and void" and called upon all states and international
organisations "not to recognise that annexation, and to refrain from any action or
dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of that annexation".27
In a Council's meeting on 9 August, the Iraqi delegation quoted some passages from
the Revolutionary Command Council's resolution in Iraq as follows: "[i]n the past, the
Arab nation was one and indivisible. The colonisers re-drew the geopolitical map of
the region in order to weaken the Arab States.. .They transformed the Arab nation into
22 Arab countries.. .In that way. ..Kuwait was separated from Iraq... [that is why the
Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council decided to restore to our country the portion
taken away from it..."28
At the same meeting the British delegation stated that on 4 October 1963 Iraq
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Indeed, the annexation of Kuwait was a clear violation of the UN Charter and the
basic norms of international law. The world has come a long way since the days when
states tried to expand and annex other states around them. The Council tried to restore
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait.
Foreign nationals and diplomatic missions
On 14 August, the five permanent members of the Security Council met to discuss the
US unilateral decision to enforce its embargo.3(1 At this meeting, the Soviet Union
proposed that naval forces should be placed under a UN urnbrella.31
On 16 August, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar announced that authorisation
for the use of force required a separate UN resolution because a military action to
enforce the embargo could breach the UN Charter.32 Meanwhile many foreign
nationals particularly from western countries were barred from leaving Iraq and
Kuwait. Some of these foreign nationals under Iraqi control were taken from Iraqi-
occupied Kuwait to Iraq and some were placed at strategic sites as human shields
against possible attack by the forces ranged against Iraq.33
On 18 August, the Iraqi representative stated that the departure of all foreign nationals
depended on the cessation of armed actions by the United States and the United
Kingdom and on the unhindered delivery of food and medicine to Iraq.34
3°- P. Bennis and M. Moushabeck, op, cit., p. 365.
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The Security Council, in Resolution 664 of 18 August, demanded that Iraq permit and
facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third
countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to them.35
Following the reported violations of diplomatic premises in Kuwait, the Security
Council held a meeting on 16 September. Iraq stated that "[t]he actual instructions
given to the local authorities in the province of Kuwait are very clear. These
instructions stipulate that these residences should not be entered, although they no
longer have diplomatic immunity".36 Iraq, by reference to the historical claims,
stressed that Kuwait was part of its territory and thus in a single territory two
diplomatic missions from one foreign country were unacceptable.37
In Resolution 664, the Council had demanded that Iraq rescind its orders for the
closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the
immunity of their personnel, and strongly condemned aggressive acts perpetrated by
Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel including the abduction of foreign
nationals in Resolution 667 of 16 September. The Security Council referred to the
Vienna Conventions of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations and 1963 on Consular
Relations; Iraq was a party to both.38
The Council considered Iraq's action as contrary to the Council's decisions, the
international conventions mentioned above and international law.39 Resolution 667
recalled that Iraq was fully responsible for any violence against foreign nationals and
demanded that Iraq fully comply with its international obligations.'"
35- SC Res. 664, 18 Aug. 1990.
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On 17 September, the European Community, in response to Iraq's violations of
diplomatic privilege, agreed to expel all Iraqi military attaches.4' Iraq in retaliation
took measures against diplomatic representatives from western countries in
Baghdad.42
The Security Council adopted Resolution 674 on 29 October by which it condemned
hostage-taking by Iraq and the mistreatment of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals,
destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis and
relocation of the population in Kuwait, and unlawful destruction of properties in
Kuwait.43 States were invited to supply the Council with information regarding the
violations of the legal rules by Iraq against their nationals.44
Resolution 674 stated that Iraq was liable under international law for any loss, damage
or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and foreign nationals and corporations as a result
of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.45 States were invited to collect information
regarding such claims, with a view to establishing arrangements for restitution or
financial compensation.46
Although women and children and some of the sick and elderly were allowed to leave.
Iraq continued to detain foreign nationals as hostages until December.47 On 6
December 1990 the Iraqi President announced that all foreign nationals held in Iraq
and Kuwait would be unconditionally released.48
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LEGAL BASIS OF UN ACTIONS PRIOR TO RESOLUTION 678
Imposition of sanctions
On 6 August, four days after the invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council met to
consider a draft resolution which had been substantially prepared by the United
States,49 and in a swift action determined that Iraq failed to comply with Resolution
660 for immediate withdrawa1.50 As a consequence, the Council adopted Resolution
661 and decided to impose a trade and financial embargo on Iraq with effect from the
same date, i.e. 6 August 1990.
Resolution 661 provided that all States should prevent import from Iraq or Kuwait of
exported goods therefrom after the invasion, and export or trans-shipment of any
commodities or products to Iraq or Kuwait.5i The Council also decided that all States
should not make available to Iraq any funds or other financial resources.52 Paragraph
9 of the resolution determined that the resolution should not prohibit assistance to the
Government of Kuwait, and did not recognise any regime set up by the occupying
power.53 The exceptions to the sanctions were payments exclusively for strictly
medical or humanitarian purposes in humanitarian circumstances and foodstuffs.54
Although the Security Council had imposed sanctions on several countries, the
sanctions it imposed on Iraq were unique in the United Nations' history. The Council
in its previous actions had imposed sanctions on specific products such as oil and
military equipment.55 This can be compared with the total sanctions imposed by the
Council on Iraq of all products and economic, financial and military relationship with
49-S/21441.
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Iraq except for medicine and foodstuff in humanitarian circumstances. The European
Community however had frozen Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and had imposed an
embargo on imports of Iraqi oil two days before the UN authorisation.56
At the Council meeting, during the discussion on the draft resolution, the Iraq
delegation stated that his Goverment on 3 August announced that it intended to start
the withdrawal of its forces on 5 August, and in fact they had started to withdraw.57
He believed that the draft resolution did not help to resolve the crisis nor did it help
the Iraqi troops to withdraw. 58 The US delegation stated that Iraq through its actions
rejected Security Council Resolution 660 and the calls from the region and from the
non-allied states; its response to the world community had been scorn.59
The Canadian delegation expressed the view that the draft resolution once adopted by
the Council would nevertheless impose one of the broadest set of sanctions ever put in
place against a State Member of the United Nations, covering all aspects of military,
economic and financial relations.60
The Cuban and Yemeni delegations who abstained from voting believed that the draft
would impede efforts of the Arab States to find a solution to the conflict. 61 The Cuban
delegate stated that the draft resolution would facilitate the interventionist actions
taking place in the region and it was far from contributing to progress in the
settlement of the conflict. The imposition of the sanctions, he said, at that time would
instead tend to complicate the situation.62
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Legal basis of sanctions
Although Article 41 of the UN Charter was not mentioned in Resolution 661, it is
clear from this Article that the Council is empowered to take measures not involving
the use of force to give effect to its decisions. The Members of the United Nations
should apply such measures since any decision adopted by the Security Council was
legally binding under Article 25. Before the crisis in the Persian Gulf, and during the
Cold War period, the Security Council had imposed mandatory measures under
Article 41 only twice, following an expressed or implied finding under Article 39.
These sanctions were imposed against Southern Rhodesia between 1966 and 1979 and
against South Africa in 1977.63 By the end of the Cold War, the use of economic
sanctions increased. Since 1990, economic sanctions have been used against Iraq,
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Libya, Haiti and parts of Angola.
In 1990, the Security Council imposed the widest set of sanctions, the implementation
of which had to be monitored by the Council. Excluded in Resolution 661 were the
sale or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and in humanitarian
circumstances, foodstuffs, and payments for the above purposes. However, the
Council did not determine how supplies for civilians would be sent to Iraq and, also.
the phrase "in humanitarian circumstances" added to the ambiguity. The Security
Council removed the ambiguities of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Resolution 661 as will be
discussed later.
63- For more information about the Council's resolutions in these cases see: 34 UN SCOR Resolutions
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Air embargo
Included in Article 41 of the UN Charter, among the measures not involving the use
of force, is the interruption of air communications to give effect to the decisions made
by the Security Council." As a precedent for an embargo, on 6 November 1962, the
General Assembly adopted Resolution 1761 by which States were asked to prevent
landing of the aircraft belonging to or registered in South Africa. This decision by the
General Assembly had a recommendatory impact. Also, the Security Council on 16
December 1966 by adopting Resolution 232, took the first mandatory enforcement
action in the organisation's history against Southern Rhodesia in accordance with
Articles 39 and 41.65 These actions included an air embargo against Southern
Rhodesia.
On 25 September 1990, an air embargo was instituted by the Security Council against
Iraq and Kuwait. By tightening the sanctions regime, the Council extended the
existing embargo on trade and financial dealing with Iraq and Kuwait to air traffic.66
To ensure respect for its decisions, the Council referred to Articles 25 and 48 of the
Charter.
Resolution 670, by reference to Article 103 of the Charter, determined that, despite
the existence of any obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or permission granted before the date of the resolution, all States should deny
permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory for Iraq or Kuwait, except to
carry food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorisation by the Council or
64-Article 41 of the Charter.
65-Joseph Murphy, "De Jure War in the Gulf, Lex Specialis of Chapter VII Actions Prior to, During,
and in the Aftermath of the United Nations War Against Iraq", N. Y. Int'l L. Rev., (1992) Summer, p.
74.
66.. 	 Res. 670, 25 Sep. 1990.289
the Committee established by Resolution 661 and in accordance with Resolution 666,
or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG.67
Resolution 670 provided that all States should notify in a timely fashion the
Committee established by Resolution 661 of any flight between its territory and Iraq
or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in Paragraph 4 does not apply. 68 The
Council in its resolution emphasised that, under Article 103, obligations of the
Members under the Charter should prevail on obligations under any other
international agreement. The Council implicitly notified that the provisions of the
resolution on air embargo prevail over the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation of
1944.
The Security Council also called upon all States to detain any Iraqi ships entering
their ports, except as necessary to safeguard human life. Resolution 670 affirmed that
the United Nations, Specialised Agencies and other international organisations in the
UN system were required to take measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
Council's decisions.
However, Paragraph 7 of the resolution stated that such measures should be consistent
with international law, including the Chicago Convention. It seems that the Council
implicitly determined that, in implementing the air embargo, force should not be used.
The Chicago Convention in Article 3 (amended in 1984) has provided that States
should not use military equipment against civil flights. It was not clear whether
passenger aircraft were included in the provisions on the air embargo. Because of the
existence of danger for such aircraft, and the Council's determination to implement air
embargo, States preferred to prevent such aircraft landing in Iraq and Kuwait.
67-  j , para. 3.
68_ j , para. 6.290
Blockade and enforcement of sanctions
A blockade is applied by a belligerent's warships preventing access to the enemy's
coasts, or part of them, for the purpose of preventing entry and exit of vessels and
aircraft of all states.69 The Declaration of Paris of 1856 laid down that for a blockade
to be legally operative, it should be effec t've. However, the Declaration of London of
1908 severely restricted rights of blockade, but was not ratified. 7° The League
Covenant did not envisage blockade as a measure to enforce economic sanctions.
The United Nations Charter, in Article 42, has provided that the Security Council may
take actions such as blockade to maintain or restore international peace and security.
In 1966 the first mandatory sanctions measures were established against Rhodesia by
Resolution 221 of 9 April 1966. 71 This resolution determined that the situation
constituted a threat to the peace, and called upon Portugal not to allow passage of oil
to Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, the United Kingdom was directed "to prevent , by
use of force if necessary, oil destined for Southern Rhodesia".72
A few weeks after the embargo resolution (Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990), the
Council found that Iraqi vessels were still being used to export oil and adopted
Resolution 665 on 25 August which aimed at ensuring stricter compliance with the
economic sanctions against Iraq. The Security Council called upon those Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which were deploying maritime
fu ces in the Persian Gulf area to use such measures commensurate to with specific
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt
all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes
69- Robert L. Bledsoe and Boleslaw A. Boczek, The International Law Dictionary, (ABC-Clio Inc.,
USA, 1987), p. 355.
7°- David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), p. 137.
71.. 	 Res. 221, 9 Apr. 1966.
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and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such
shipping laid down in Resolution 661.73
Although the Council referred to several states taking measures to halt shipping, later
Resolution 670 of 25 September called upon all states to detain any ships of Iraqi
registry which enter their ports and which were being or had been used in violation of
Resolution 661, or to deny such ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances
recognised under international law as necessary to safeguard human life.
Resolution 665 also requested those states referred to in paragraph 1 to use as
appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and, after consultations with
the Secretary-General, to submit reports to the Security Council and its committee
established under Resolution 661, to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation
of this resolution.
Resolution 665 was different from the embargo resolution (661) since it authorised
the use of force to halt shipping in the area. As mentioned earlier, the only example of
authorising use of force to enforce sanctions was a specific authorisation calling on
the United Kingdom to use naval force to block a particular vessel from delivery of oil
to Mozambique that was destined for Southern Rhodesia.74
The legal basis of Resolution 665
In an analytical discussion of the use of force authorised by Resolution 665, it is first
necessary to consider the arguments presented by several countries to the draft
resolution75. The US delegation, as one of the sponsoring governments of the draft
resolution, believed that "[t]he authority granted in this resolution is sufficiently broad
73-SC Res. 665, 25 Aug. 1990.
74-SC Res. 221, 9 Apr. 1966.
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to use armed force - indeed, minimum force - depending upon the circumstances
which might require it".76 The French delegation, by stating that "an embargo without
sanctions would be a fiction", emphasised that the resolution must not be understood
as a blanket authorisation for the indiscriminate use of force. 77 The British delegation
reminded the Council that sufficient legal authority to take action existed under
Article 51 of the Charter.78
There were several objections to Resolution 665. The Chinese delegation stated that
"we are in principle against military involvement by big powers and are not in favour
of using force in the name of the United Nations and therefore measures must be
taken within the framework of Resolution 661 which did not provide for the use of
force.79 He stated that the Chinese delegation had proposed a deletion of the reference
to "minimum use of force" from the previous draft resolution. The present draft
resolution, he continued, was amended and its reference to using "such measures
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary" did not contain the
concept of using force.8° Although China, Colombia and Malaysia had objections to
the resolution, their votes were affirmative.
The delegate of Yemen, who abstained from voting, explained that Resolution 665
moved too quickly towards the use of force to impose the embargo. He thought that,
according to paragraphs 6 and 10 of Resolution 661, the Security Council should wait
for the report of the Secretary-General on the progress of the implementation of
Resolution 661 (the first report should have been submitted within thirty days), and
the report of the Committee, established by the Council, with its observations and
recommendations.8i
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The Cuban delegation pointed out the ambiguity of the resolution with regard to the
unknown members of those forces imposing the blockade. 82 In Resolution 221 of 9
April 1966, the Security Council expressly determined that the United Kingdom could
use naval force to enforce the blockade against Southern Rhodesia.
Another question which arose in adopting Resolution 665 was whether the air and
land forces could use force to implement Resolution 661. However, Resolution 665
did not determine that naval, air and land forces could work together.
The Security Council in Resolution 665 did not refer to specific articles of the Charter
and it provided that States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait could use
force to enforce the blockade. This resolution did recall Resolutions 660 and 661
which contained references to Chapter VII and Article 51. However, these recalls in
previous resolutions do not make clear the legal basis of Resolution 665.
In fact, adopting this resolution was the first in the UN's 45-year history by which
such sweeping military authority had been conferred without a UN flag or
command.83 The United States and the United Kingdom invoked Article 51 to
contribute forces to a multinational effort to institute embargo or blockade."
However, the Soviet representative cautioned that it was against reliance on force and
against unilateral decisions, and that the wisest way to act in conflict situations is to
make collective efforts and to make full use of the machinery of the UN, and declared
himself prepared to undertake consultations immediately in the Security Council's
Military Staff Committee.85 The Soviet representatve implicitly referred to Articles 42
and 43 of the Charter.
82_ Ibid, p. 11.
83-Sciolino, "Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How US Convinced the UN", N. Y. urns, 30 Aug. 1990,
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During the discussions on Resolution 665, upon insistence by the Soviet Union.
supported by China, the US accepted two modifications to the draft resolution. It was
agreed that the "use of minimum force" be substituted by "measures commensurate to
the specific circumstances", and other states were invited to cooperate to ensure
compliance "with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures". 86 However,
the legal basis of the blockade remained unclear.
The establishment of a blockade by the Council should be under Article 42. However,
a blockade established under Article 42 by the Security Council has direct relevance
to Article 43. This article has provided for special agreements between the Council
and groups of member states contributing force necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security. Such agreement has never been concluded in the
history of the United Nations, and thus, arguably, the preconditions for Article 42
have never been satisfied.
Retrospectively, the blockade in Resolution 665 should have been under Chapter VII,
though none of its articles, in particular Articles 42 and 51 (which are the only
exceptions to use of force) was referred to in this resolution. As mentioned earlier,
applying collective self-defence needs to meet certain conditions, and there is doubt
that all those conditions have been met in the case of Kuwait.
States' practice
Within a few weeks of adopting the embargo resolution (661) the United States
ground, naval and air forces were present in the Persian Gulf, and on 16 August 1990
the United States formally informed the Security Council that, under Article 51 of the
Charter, at the request of the Government of Kuwait, the US military forces joined
86.. 	 op. cit., p. 1.295
this government in taking action to intercept vessels seeking to engage in trade with
Iraq or Kuwait in violation of the mandatory sanctions imposed by Council
Resolution 661. The US declared that its military forces would use force only if
necessary.87
[here were countries which had objections to the US action in the Persian Gulf.
Libya, in a letter to the Secretary-General stating its concern, argued that US actions
to intercept and inspect shipping in the Persian Gulf and the neighbouring maritime
areas were legally void and constituted a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, as no
state was entitled to act alone in such a situation, and orders should be issued by the
Security Counci1.88 France and Italy, despite their naval presence, stated that they
would not take part in the naval blockade unless its implementation was authorised by
the Council.
The legality of the blockade prior to Resolution 665
The United States, on 16 August, in its formal declaration of use of force to prevent
vessels from violating trade sanctions contained in Resolution 661, expressly referred
to Article 51 and the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defence, in response to the Iraqi armed attack on Kuwait.89 In effect, the United States
announced a blockade against Iraq just two weeks after the invasion of Kuwait and
before authorisation by the Security Council, although the Council had provided in
Resolution 661 that the Secretary-General should report to the Council the progress of




The UN Secretary-General argued that a "blockade" as such required the approval of
the Security Council since it fell under Article 42.90 In response to the press, he said "I
understand that the word 'blockade' from a United Nations point of view is not the
right one. What we are seeing is that in agreement with the Governments of Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, some decisions have been taken by the United States, France.
Britain and other countries - and even Arab countries - but not in the context of the
United Nations resolution. Only the United Nations, through its Security Council
resolutions, can really decide about a blockade. That's why I think we have to avoid
the word 'blockade"'
In order to consider the legality of the blockade in the context of self-defence prior to
Resolution 665, the conditions of self-defence should first be explained. According to
Article 51 of the Charter, if "an armed attack" occurs, the victim state may exercise its
right to self-defence. To limit the use of force by states, because of its serious
consequences, the justification of self-defence must be carefully investigated and its
conditions fully examined. Article 51 says "[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Member States in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security." In the case of Kuwait, except an armed attack which had occurred.
other conditions for the existence of the right to self-defence need to be discussed
with reference to previous law and practice.
90-United Nations Press Release, 16 Aug. 1990.
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In the Caroline case, where an American ship, used by Canadian rebels to harass the
authorities in Canada, was attacked and destroyed by the British, questions were
raised about the legality of the British action. The Webster formulation is regarded as
the locus classicus of customary self-defence. He stated that Britain should show a
necessity of self-defence "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."92 In the case of the Corfu Channel the International Court
of Justice emphasised necessity and proportionality. 93 The International Court of
Justice in the Nicaragua case also referred to specific conditions which have to be met
for the exercise of collective self-defence such as necessity and proportionality."
To justify the inherent right of self-defence in the case of Kuwait the existence of all
conditions should have been established. Perhaps the use of force to inspect ships with
military cargo constituted the condition of necessity, while the use of force to inspect
trade ships or vessels carrying food stuffs and medicine lacked the condition of
necessity required for self-defence, although it may be argued that without inspection
of a cargo its category as military, food or medicine cannot be established. In fact, in
the middle of August, the US spokesman had stated that "it appears far too early to
consider any food stuffs as being in the humanitarian need category". 95 Thus, in the
view of US authorities, both supply of military and food stuff cargoes would imply
the condition of "necessity" to apply the right of self-defence.
The embargo resolution (661) referred to economic sanctions which are provided for
in Article 41. This article allows measures "not involving the use of armed force"
which might be decided upon by the Council. Therefore, the blockade imposed on
Iraq after Resolution 661 would come under Article 42. However, this resolution did
not provide that States could use force for a blockade under Article 42.
92-29 BFSP 1132-1138; 30 BFSP 195-196.
93-Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Rep. (1949), pp. 4-35.
94-Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep., (1986),
para. 194.
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Supervision and limitation of blockade
Under paragraph 1 of Resolution 661, Member States co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait which were deploying maritime forces to the area were called
upon to use such measures under the authority of the Security Council to impose a
blockade.
Several countries, including Yemen, Cuba, Colombia and Malaysia, had objections to
the mechanism by which the blockade should be applied. The Cuban delegation asked
which Member State should use force, who should command them, and against whom
these forces should operate.96 The delegation stated that, if the Security Council was
really acting responsibly and seriously, then it should have drawn on those articles of
Chapter VII that clearly spell out how this responsibility and authority should be
exercised.97
The Colombian delegation stated that the Security Council must implement Article 43
and be prepared to deal with situations of this kind. 98 The Malaysian delegation, with
reference to the realities of the world community, believed that an international force
would be under a blue flag enforcing United Nations injunctions.99
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 665 had envisaged using, as appropriate, mechanisms of
the Military Staff Committee. The Soviet delegation had earlier announced that its
country would co-operate with other countries using the machinery of the Military
Staff Committee.wo However, such a committee did not play an effective role in the
course of the blockade because the powers involved were unwilling to surrender their





individual right of action in this way, and their forces remained under their individual
commands. They co-ordinated their efforts primarily by dividing the area to be
controlled in accordance with the advice of the United States fleet commander. m It
would have been more appropriate if the Security Council had provided special
measures to control the blockade under its supervision.
The limitation of the area in which the enforcement of the blockade had to be
exercised was not clarified in Resolution 665. Although in the case of Southern
Rhodesia the United Kingdom was authorised to use force to impose blockade on a
specific port, the Council in the Kuwait crisis did not determine the limitation of
imposing the blockade. It is therefore understood that maritime forces could use force
to inspect and verify the cargoes even out of the Persian Gulf. It seems that the
Security Council preferred to implement the blockade rather universally, while in the
only precedent, namely the case of Rhodesia, the United Nations restricted the
blockade to one port.
AUTHORISATION OF THE USE OF FORCE
Before an analytical discussion of Resolution 678, it is necessary to discuss initially
the instances of the Security Council's permission to use force in its history. The first
instance of use of force by the United Nations was the case of Korea in 1950. The
case of Kuwait is the second instance of the use of force by the United Nations. The
third and the last instance of authorisation of use of force by the UN is the case of
Haiti. The cases of Korea and Haiti are explained first, and then the case of Kuwait
will be discussed in more detail.
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First instance of use of force by UN: Korea
On 25 June 1950 by a letter from the United States and a cablegram from the United
Nations Commission on Korea, the Secretary-General was informed of the 25 June
invasion by North Korean forces of the territory of the Republic of Korea. 102 On the
same day the Security Council convened a meeting at the request of the United States.
At this meeting the Secretary-General declared that the actions of the North Korean
forces were in direct violation of the General Assembly Resolution 293(IV) of 21
October 1949. He characterised the situation as a "threat to international peace" and
called on the Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in the area. 103 The
Security Council in Resolution 82 of 25 June noted that the armed attack on the
Republic of Korea constituted a breach of the peace and called for the immediate
cessation of hostilities. 104 In this resolution the Council requested the UN
Commission on Korea to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the
38th paralle1.105
On 27 June, US President Truman in an official statement stated that invading forces
from North Korea had not withdrawn to the 38th parallel and also that he had ordered
the United States air and sea forces to give the (South) Korean Government troops
cover and support. 106 On the same day, the United States proposed a draft resolution
which was adopted by the Security Counci1. 107 The Council in Resolution 83 of 27
June, with reference to the appeal from South Korea to the United Nations for
102_ S/1495, S/1496.
103- SCOR, 5th Sess., No. 15, 473rd Mtg., p. 3. By Resolution 293(IV) the General Assembly had
authorised the United Nations Commission on Korea to appoint observers and to utilise the services of
good offices to observe and report any developments that might lead to military conflict in Korea and
to assist in bringing about the unification of Korea. GA Res. 293(IV), 1 Oct. 1949.
104.. SC Res. 82, 25 June 1950.
105_ id
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1945. for more information see: Louis Fisher, "The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman
Act?", 89 A. J. I, L„ (1995).
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immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, "recommended" that the
Members of the UN furnish military measures to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in
the area.108 Seven states voted in favour, while Yugoslavia voted against, and Egypt
and India abstained from voting. The Soviet Union which was absent from the
Council at the time of voting, contested the legal validity of Resolution 83,
contending that such an important decision could be made only with the concurring
votes of all five permanent members of the Security Council.' 09
By adopting Resolution 83, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, the
Security Council recommended the use of force. At the 475th meeting of the Council,
on 30 June, the representative of Egypt stated that, for two reasons, he abstained from
voting. He stated that the conflict was a new phase in the series of the divergences
between West and East which threatened world peace and security; and several acts of
aggression against peoples and violations of the sovereignty of member states had
been submitted to the Security Council, which had not taken any action to end those
aggressions and violations as it was doing in the case of Korea. 110 At the same
meeting the US representative informed the Council that the US President authorised
the US Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in North Korea and
had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.111
On 7 July, the Council adopted Resolution 84 with three abstention (Egypt, India,
Yugoslavia) and one absence (the Soviet Union). It recommended that the nations
providing military forces and other assistance to this action make them available to a
unified command under the United States.112 The Unified Command was authorised
to use at its discretion the UN flag in the course of operations against the North
108_ SC Res. 83, 27 June 1950.
109.. S/1517, 29 June 1950.
110_ UN Yearbook, (1950), p. 224.
111-i
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Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.I13
General Douglas MacArthur was designated by President Truman on 8 July 1950 as
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea.H4
It might be said that the military action in the case of Korea was an enforcement
action by the Security Council. However, the Council made no reference in
Resolution 83 to a specific article of the Charter in its "recommendation" to use force.
At the 476th meeting of the Security Council, the representative of the United
Kingdom stated that Article 39, standing on its own, was a sufficient basis for
establishment of this force. 115 Article 39 permits the Security Council to make
"recommendations" to maintain or restore international peace and security after
determining the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression. It is not clear that the provisions of Chapter VI and VII of the Charter may
be enforced by such recommendations. Some lawyers, including western jurists,
believe that "recommendations" under Article 39 are limited to those pacific measures
to settle disputes in Chapter VI, since enforcement measures in Chapter VII were
meant to be the result of binding "decisions".16
As discussed in Chapter One, the drafters of the UN Charter intended that a
"recommendation" of the Council, so far as it relates to the peaceful settlement of
dispute or to situations giving rise to a threat of war, breach of the peace, or
aggression, should be considered as governed by the provisions contained in Chapter
VI.117
113_ Lth
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Consequently, it is difficult to accept that the Security Council may "recommend"
enforcement measures. "Recommendation" or "authorisation" of enforcement action
does not mean that these are mandatory decisions of the Security Council. It seems
that it does not make sense to require a mandatory decision where a recommendation
or authorisation would suffice to achieve the desired action.118
However, it should be noted that there are two parties in an enforcement action, the
enforcing and the party against whom enforcement action is taken. For those who are
enforcing, a recommendation will suffice as far as they voluntarily cooperate with it.
But those who are enforced against, have no legal obligation to tolerate the
recommended action which lacks binding force toward them.H9
Higgins believes that, the action directed against North Korea, might be deemed
enforcement action, even though taken by means of recommendation, since in the
Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, the criteria adopted for
enforcement action by the Court were that it should be directed against a state, and
not based on its consent; and the Court did not make the concept turn on whether it
was authorised by a decision or recommendation, •120 In her conclusion, Higgins
states that action against Korea was an enforcement action taken under Articles 39
and 42, although the latter was not specifically mentioned in the resolutions.121
There is another view that the Council did not use the language of "decision" which
would have activated Article 25 and the resolutions simply recommended states to
furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be nece5sary. 122 According to this
118.. Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 A. J. I. L„ (1991), p. 462.
119- Yoshiro Matsui, "The Gulf War and the United Nations Security Council", in, Ronald St John
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view, the forces dispatched to Korea were national forces carrying out a mission of
collective self-defence under American direction, not a Security Council enforcement
action.I23 In response, it is believed that, in spite of the predominance of the American
role, the participating nations did regard their action as falling within an authorisation
by the Security Council, and not as merely an individual action or self-defence.I24
The Soviet Union argued that action in Korea was not a UN action, but it was an
action by the United States which was seeking to secure a cloak of legality.125
According to this view, which had some support in the western world,I26 the UN was
not legally entitled to authorise the use of its flag, based on this belief that nothing is
lawful unless expressly authorised by the Charter. I27 On the other hand, there are
some lawyers who prefer the view that implied powers are lawful so long as they are
consistent with the general and express powers conferred upon particular organs by
the Charter.I28
However, the Security Council could "recommend" the use of force, in the absence of
the Soviet Union. According to White, this absence enabled the United States to use
the Security Council to confer legitimacy on its policy of containing communism
wherever it threatened to expand. I29 Article 27(3) of the UN Charter states:
"Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members..."
123..Id
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There is a question of the legality of adopting a resolution in the absence of a
Permanent Member; prima facia and in accordance with the precise wording of
Article 27(3), this should have meant that the resolution failed in validity. There is
room for debate here, but it should be noted that in 1962 the International Court of
Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Certain Expenses case stated that "abstaining"
or "being absent" of one of the permanent members from voting would be considered
as implicit consent. 130 Therefore, a permanent member could not negate a resolution
by abstaining or being absent from the vote.
With the return of the Soviet representative to the Security Council on 1 August 1950,
it became clear that the Council would be prevented by the use of the veto from acting
in connection with measures in Korea. The United States proposed that the General
Assembly assume the responsibility of dealing with threats to the peace, breach of the
peace and acts of aggression when the Council was paralysed by the veto. 131 This
proposal was finally adopted in a modified form by the General Assembly as the
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 3 November 1950. 132 This resolution provided that,
in case the Security Council is prevented from exercising its primary responsibility by
failure of the permanent members to agree, the General Assembly shall consider the
matter with a view to making appropriate recommendations for collective measures
including the use of armed forces.133
In fact, by the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, some power was
transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembly. It was clear that, in
the presence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, the Council could not pass
resolutions recommending military assistance to South Korea. The Council's call for
military assistance was a recommendatory call and it was not obligatory for the
130-Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. 1962, p.291.
131-Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations, (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1960), pp. 122,
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member states. Sixteen states provided armed forces and military facilities to assist
South Korea in response to a recommendation and no legal argument was made by
any government that a mandatory decision was necessary. I34 Although nations
contributed to the United Nations' force and although the force used the United
Nations flag, the action was essentially directed by the United States and US General
MacArthur took his orders from Washington, not the United Nations. I35 The United
Nations flag was only a decor for the forces.I36
Third and last instance of use of force by UN: Haiti
A military coup on 30 September 1991 ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's
president who had taken office in an election which its validity was upheld by the
United Nations, the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the Caribbean
community. I37 On the day of the coup, the Security Council met but it declined to
convene formally. The president of the Security Council in response to Haitian
officials, who had described the Council's reaction as "unfair and a denial of Haitian
rights", stated that a majority of the delegations felt there should not be a meeting on
what was seen as "an internal matter".I38
It was stated that the Council did not "formally" convene because a majority of the
members felt that the situation in Haiti was entirely a domestic matter and therefore
beyond the competence of the Security Council to consider, since the coup was not
thought to constitute a "threat to the peace".I39
134-Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 A. J. I. L., (1991), p. 464.
135-N. D. White, op. cit., p. 86.
136-Ernest Van den Haag and John P. Conrad, The U.N. in or out? (Plenum Press, New York, 1987),
/3. 176.
137-The United Nations and the Situation in Haiti, (Department of Public Inforrnatio, New York,
1995), p. 1. (hereinafter the UN and the situation in Haiti)
138.. Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti and Refuses to RecogniseJunta", N.Y,
lima, 2 Oct. 1991, p. 1.
139- Andrew Deutz, "Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: International Organisations' Responses to
Kurdistan, Yugoslavia and Haiti "(28 Apr. 1992) p. 27, quoted in, Anthony Clark Arend, "The United
Nations and the New World Order", 81 Geo. L. J. (1993), p. 501.307
However, OAS on 2 October 1991 at its ad hoc meeting adopted Resolution 1/91
condemning the coup and recommended that OAS members impose economic and
diplomatic sanctions on Haiti. 140 The Council in its meeting of 3 October, made a
statement supporting the OAS action and called for the immediate reversal of the
situation.141 The Council did not adopt a formal resolution dealing with the situation
in Haiti. It has been stated that the United States and other Western supporters of a
resolution were unable to convince China and certain Non-Aligned states to support a
resolution because these states were worried that the Council, at the urging of Western
nations, was becoming increasingly involved in domestic issues that are the private
affairs of member states.142
On 11 October, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/7, in which it
condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional president of Haiti, the use of
violence, military coercion and the violation of human rights in Haiti. 143 Furthermore,
the Assembly demanded the immediate restoration of the legitimate government of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the application of the Constitution and the full observance
of human rights in Haiti.'"
The UN Secretary-General actively supported the intensive efforts by OAS and its
mediator, aimed at finding a political solution to the Haitian crisis.145 On 15 July
1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, informed the Security
Council that he had accepted the offer of the Secretary-General of OAS to include a
UN participation in a mission to Haiti. 146 On 3 November, the Secretary-General, in a
140_ UN Doc. S/23109, p. 3.
141-S/PV. 3011
142-Paul Lewis, "UN Stops Short of Haiti Resolution", N. Y. Times, 4 Oct. 1991, p. 8
143_ GA Res. 46/7, 11 Oct. 1991.
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145.. The UN and the situation in Haiti, op. cit„ p. 2.
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report to the General Assembly cited a pattern of gross and widespread human rights
abuses during the year since the coup in Haiti.I47
Following further diplomatic efforts by both the United Nations and OAS, on 16 June
1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted
Resolution 841 by which it decided to impose an oil and arms embargo against Haiti
as part of the continuing international effort to restore constitutional rule to that
country.148 The Council decided that the sanctions would enter into force on 23 June
1993 unless the Secretary-General reported to the Council that in the light of the
results of negotiations, the measures were no longer warranted.149
On 21 June, the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, Cedras, accepted
the Special Envoy's earlier invitation to him to initiate a dialogue with former
president Aristide with a view to resolving the Haitian crisis. 1513 Following an
agreement (Governor Island Agreement) between two parties to appoint a new
Commander for military forces and early retirement of Cedras and Other arrangements
regarding Haitian parliament and nominating a Prime Minister, the Security Council,
on the Secretary-General's recommendation, decided to suspend the oil and arms
embargo against Haiti.I51 However, since the Secretary-General noted that both sides
continued to be divided by deep mistrust and suspicion and also continued existence
of violence in Haiti, the Council by Resolution 867, authorised the establishment of
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).152
After a number of setbacks, such as continued obstruction of the arrival of UNMIH,
breach of the Governors Island Agreement, and the assassination of the Minister of
147.. Ldn
148.. SC Res. 841, 16 June 1993.
149.. Ld.,
150- The UN and the situation in Hiti, op, cit., p. 5.
151.. SC Res. 861,27 Aug. 1993.
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Justice, and following a request153 by Aristide to the Security Council to call on
member states to take the necessary measures to strengthen the embargo, the Council
decided to reimpose its embargo against Haiti. 154 In addition, the Council adopted
Resolution 875 by which under Chapter VII, called upon member states acting
nationally or through regional arrangements to use measures under its authority to
ensure strict implementation of embargo.155
Yet, since proper environment for the deployment of UNMIH and the departure of
military leaders could not be provided, the Secretary-General presented three options
to the Security Council in mid-July 1994. 156 The first option was the expansion of
UNMIH with a revised mandate under Chapter VII. 157 The second option was
authorisation of a group of member states under Chapter VII to establish a stable and
secure environment throughout Haiti in order to facilitate the restoration of the
legitimate authorities (phase one) and to "modernise" and professionalise the armed
forces and the police (phase two). The third option was the authorisation of a group of
member states, under Chapter VII, to carry out phase one, and of UNMIH, under
Chapter VI, to undertake phase two.158
The Security Council chose the third option, and on 31 July 1994, adopted Resolution
940 with 12 votes and 2 abstentions (China and Brazil; Rwanda did not participate in
the meeting). The Council by this resolution authorised member states to form a
multinational force under unified command and control, and in this framework  to use
all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership,
the prompt return of the legitimately elected president and the restoration of the
legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a
153-S126587
154- SC Res. 873, 13 Oct. 1993.




secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors
Island Agreement.159
On 15 September 1994, the president of the United States announced that all
diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and force might be used to remove the military
leadership from power in Haiti.160 Two days later, he sent a mission to Haiti, headed
by Jimmy Carter, for a final diplomatic effort, and after two days of talks, the Haitian
military leaders agreed to resign. 161 The first multinational military forces,
spearheaded by US troops arrived in Haiti without opposition, and after the departure
of the military leadership, the former president returned to Haiti.162
The Security Council on 30 January 1995 authorised the Secretary-General to take
steps for the full transfer of responsibility from multinational force to UNMIH. 163 The
multinational forces handed over its responsibility to UNMIH on 31 March 1995.164
This capped more than five years of UN involvement in Haiti, including overseeing
the country's first election in 1990, the negotiations after the coup in 1991, human
rights verification, provision of humanitarian aid, imposition of sanctions, and
dispatching of a multinational force in 1994.
In the case of Haiti the sanctions not only were imposed, but also were enforced. This
is similar to the case of Kuwait where sanctions against Iraq were imposed, and then
er ced. Resolution 875 in the case of Haiti was modelled after Resolution 665 in the
of K wait, calling upon member states to use measures to enforce sanctions.
though mposing sanctions might have an effect on the non-elected military
leadership in Haiti, it is the population of the country that would suffer the most, and
159- SC Res. 940, 31 Jul. 1994.
160-The UN and the situation in Haiti, op. cit., P. 14.
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as Leigh states, the sanctions would depoil the poor and fail to unseat dictatorial
regimes.165
A consequence of imposing and rigorously enforcing sanctions was increasing the
waves of desperate Haitian boat people who sought asylum in the United States.166
This would lead to creating a refugee problem that has come in the recent cases,
namely Yugoslavia and Iraq, to be considered as a threat to the peace to qualify for
international action. Therefore, care should be taken of the consequences of imposing
sanctions before any decision on the matter. Boutros-Ghali has said that the purpose
of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international
peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution. 167 He further
states, sanctions "raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on
vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on
political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their
subjects. Sanctions also always have unintended or unwanted effects".168
The case of Haiti is significant in that Chapter VI was referred to as the basis for the
establishment of a UN peace-keeping mission. 169 UNMIH did not have any traditional
peace-keeping or observation component and was authorised to undertake the
functions of modernisation and professionalisation of the armed forces and the
creation of a separate police force in Haiti.170
165- Monroe Leigh, "The Political Consequences of Economic Embargoes", 89 A. J. I. L., (1995), p.
74.
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The case of Haiti is also the first case where Chapter VII was invoked to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure of a leadership that took office by coup,
with no reference to possible implications of such situation for the international peace.
Basically, an act of aggression, a breach of or a threat to the peace is characterised by
some violation of sovereignty or cross-border intervention causing armed conflict,
that would imply a matter of international concern. Whether the situation in Haiti
comes under the provisions of Chapter VII is doubtful.
However, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, in the post-Cold War period the
boundaries of what constitutes a threat to international peace has been extended. The
cases of Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrate that, for instance,
humanitarian feature of the crisis within a country has been the basis for states
authorisation to use force. Yet, the case of Haiti is unique in that the states were
authorised to use all necessary means not for protection of humanitarian assistance,
but for facilitating the restoration of an elected president which would traditionally be
considered as an internal matter and not within the scope of UN action)71
The legal basis of use of force by UN in Kuwait
Almost four months after Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait, on 29 November 1990,
the Security Council approved Resolution 678 by which it authorised the use of
military force against Iraq if its forces were not withdrawn from Kuwait by 15
January 1991) 72 This resolution offered Iraq one final opportunity as a pause of
"good will" to comply with the Council's resolutions. If Iraq did not do so by 15
171-Glennon states: "Of the 185 governments in the world, at least 50 could be fairly described as
undemocratic.... In the Philippines, Chile and Iran, brutal dictatorships that floated community values
were left alone by the world community..., however, much international law may have disfavoured the
breach of international agreements, breach of an agreement has never been seen as grounds for the use
of force. Yet breach of the Governors Island Accords was also relied upon by the administration to
justify the use of force against Haiti." Michael J. Glennon, "Sovereignty and Community after Haiti:
Rethinking the Collective Use of Force", 89 A. J. I. L„ (1995), pp. 71-74.
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January, the resolution authorised UN member states co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security
Council Resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area".173
This was the first resolution since the beginning of the Kuwait crisis that did not
receive the unanimous support of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. It
was opposed by Yemen and Cuba with China abstaining. As discussed in the Korea
case, regarding the Soviet absence from voting, the "abstaining" or "being absent" of
one of the permanent members would be considered as an "implicit consent". It has
become clear in the practice of the United Nations developed over some 40 years that
a permanent member is presumed to have "concurred" in a resolution unless it
expressly casts a negative vote.174
The Chinese delegate in the Security Council's meeting on 29 November stated that
the United Nations, as an international organisation for the maintenance of peace and
security, was responsible both to international security and to history and that it
should act with great caution and avoid taking hasty action on such a major question
as authorising some Member States to take military action against another member.I75
Emphasising the need for a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis, he stated that
it might take longer but the cost would be lower and the outcome less serious,
whereas a solution through the use of force would lead to serious consequences.I76
The Cuban delegate expressed his great concern over the enormous concentration of
military forces from the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf, and over the
danger of the outbreak of a war which, even if conventional, would bring enormous
173. id , para. 2.
174.. L. C. Green, op, cit„ p. 575.
175..S/PV. 2963, 29 Nov. 1990, P. 61.
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destruction to the countries of the region. 177 He stated that it would not be advisable to
adopt a resolution which was a virtual declaration of war.178
The delegate of Yemen considered Resolution 678 as a "war resolution", stating that
in addition to a strict sanctions regime, a peaceful approach to the crisis should, by
necessity, involve active diplomatic engagement.179 He added that "Nile war option
would deprive humanity of a historic opportunity to make a smooth transition to a
new world order, one that is not characterised by the military victory of one country
or group of countries over others".180
It is believed that, since a variety of states had doubts as to the legality of the use of
force without Security Council authorisation, the Council at the urging of the United
States adopted Resolution 678.181
The Security Council in its "final opportunity" resolution did not mention the legal
basis of its "authorisation" to use force. The word "authorisation" is not used in the
Charter and it is not clear whether it should be considered as a "decision" or
"recommendation". The Security Council in its previous resolutions had
unambiguously referred to Articles 39, 40 and 51, though in Resolution 678 it
generally stated "[a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations". It
was important at this stage, being a matter of life and death, that the Council clearly
determine the article of the Charter under which it authorised member states to use
force.
177- Ibid, p. 52.
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The Iraqi delegation, stated on 29 November with regard to the legal requirement for
the Council's use of force, stated that under the Charter any use of force was deemed
to be an act of aggression, except in three cases, under Articles 51, 42 and 106.182
Finally, on 16 January 1991, the war in the Persian Gulf broke out as the US forces
launched a massive air bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait. In this operation British.
Saudi and Kuwaiti air forces took part. 183 On 17 January, Israel imposed a total 24
hour curfew on the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Iraq launched four scud
missiles that landed in Israel. On the same day, US bombers destroyed an Iraqi
nuclear research centre near Baghdad. 184 Coalition forces with the total number of
700,000 (including 500,000 US troops) announced that by 23 January they had flown
more than 12,000 bombing missions over Iraq and Kuwait. Meanwhile, the Soviet
Foreign Minister and later President Gorbachev expressed concern that the US was
exceeding the 111\1 mandate, warning that US should not destroy Iraq.185
By 28 January, according to the Saudi Oil Minister, Iraqi troops had dumped more
than 11 million barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf, creating the most serious
pollution of the Persian Gulf waters in history.I86
Iran and Pakistan separately proposed a five point peace plan for solving the crisis.187
On 14 February, the UN Security Council met in a closed door formal session without
any result. At this meeting, China put forward a proposal for a peaceful settlement of
the crisis, and Yemen and Cuba circulated a cease-fire plan for an Iraqi withdrawal.188
By 21 February the Soviet plan, which involved a timetable for Iraqi withdrawal from
182.. S/PV. 2963, 29 Nov. 1990, pp. 19-20.
183_ Wang Lishan, "Backgrounder: Chronology of Gulf War up to March 1", The Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, Lexis, News Library.
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Kuwait, was accepted by Iraq. However, the US rejected the conditions and demanded
a shorter period for withdrawa1. 189 On 23 February, despite the Soviet announcement
at the UN that Iraq had agreed to US demands and while the UN Security Council was
to discuss integrating US and Soviet proposals to prevent a ground war, the US
launched a large scale ground, air and sea war against Iraqi troops in Kuwait and
Iraq.190
On 24 February, the Security Council held a meeting without any result. On 25
February, Iraq announced it had begun withdrawal from Kuwait early in the morning,
but the US President said that a cease-fire would only come after Iraq laid down its
arms and left military equipment behind. 191 Iraq announced that the coalition forces
stepped up air raids against Iraqi cities, the most fierce since the eruption of the
Persian Gulf war.192 Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti Government spokesman declared the
Kuwaiti capital liberated.193
On 27 February, the date on which Kuwait was liberated, Iraq informed the President
of the Security Council and the Secretary-General that all Iraqi forces had withdrawn
from Kuwait but the United States and other forces continued to attack the
withdrawing Iraqi forces.194
Two main possibilities may be considered as the legal bases for the use of force
against Iraq. First, collective action by the Security Council under Article 42, and
secondly, collective self-defence under Article 51. These possibilities are discussed in
the following sections.
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Collective action by the Security Council
It has been argued that the authority of the Security Council to apply armed force
under Chapter VII can only be found in Article 42: this article is the only provision in
the Charter that empowers the United Nations to take action by air, sea or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
However, the Security Council must first determine the existence of a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Article 39. The Council might
recommend or decide on measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. Although
there is no evidence that Article 39 has been claimed as the basis for Resolution 678,
it has to be noted that, "recommendations" in Article 39, as the Charter drafters had in
mind, were understood to refer to Chapter VI provisions to call for peaceful
settlement of disputes, to be pursued either alone or in tandem with economic and/or
military decisions taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42. 195 Consequently, the
"authorisation" in Resolution 678 could not be a "recommendation" under Article 39.
Article 42 in its first part states that the Security Council should consider that the
"measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate", before deciding on the use of force. There was a view that, with the
comprehensive sanctions regime which the Security Council had imposed on Iraq, it
would not take long for sanctions to hurt seriously and eventually Iraqi forces would
comply with the resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait.196
195- Burns H. Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
Precarious Legitimacy", 85 A. J. I. L., (1991), p. 521.
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However, several states emphasised that by 15 January the military option should be
used. 197 Some authorities believed that it was wrong "to negotiate with a burglar".198
But it was also said that when the burglar was armed and the fate of millions was at
stake it seemed as a irresponsibility and self-destructive manner to refuse to negotiate
peace unambiguously and respectfully. 199 It was also reported that the sanctions were
having an increasingly useful bite m and Iraq was not far from taking practical steps
towards withdrawing troops from Kuwait."'
Although there were comments on the prematurity of the US decision to forego
primary reliance on Article 41 in favour of the military option, it is not clear how long
the sanctions would have to continue to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
However, in the case of South Africa, the United Nations and the United States had
been extremely patient about UN sanctions. Nevertheless, according to Article 42, it is
at the Security Council's discretion to decide on the effectiveness of the sanctions and
whether and when to take enforcement action subsequently.202
Another requirement to apply Article 42 is that the force should be used in accordance
with a mechanism provided for in Article 43. Under Article 43 "[a]ll Members of the
United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and
security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
197-Ibid, pp. 5,78.
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facilities, ...". Although there is no reference in Chapter VII that such agreements are a
condition precedent to implementation of Article 42, Article 106 clearly states that
"pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in article 43 as
in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its
responsibilities under Article 42, ...
Nevertheless, the Soviets believed that, as a result of the non-implementation of
Article 43, the Security Council was not able to establish United Nations forces and it
denied the Council's ability to establish a UN force by recommendation under Article
39.204 However, Bowett argues that "[while the wording of Article 39 does not seem
to necessitate that recommendations thereunder refer to Articles 41 or 42 it equally
seems untenable to argue that Article 42 can only be applied on the basis of
agreements concluded under Article 43"•205 With regard to Article 106, he believes
that it is generally accepted that Article 106 was intended to be of a temporary nature
and failure to implement Article 43 cannot be said to have extended indefinitely its
application.206
In its advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses
case, rejected the argument that the Security Council could not take action in a
situation threatening the peace without agreements having been concluded according
to Article 43.207 Consequently, Article 42 does not require troops to have been placed
at the disposal of the Security Council under Article 43. It is believed that, although
Article 43 is drafted in obligatory language, it has never been applied and it has
become a dead letter.208 Without such agreements between the Security Council and
203- Article 106 of the Charter.
204.. D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, (Stevens and Sons, London, 1964), p. 276.
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member states, problems may arise when the Council, in performing its function,
needs armed forces and facilities; no country would provide appropriate force and
assistance as there is no obligation to do so.
Collective self-defence
Following the invasion by Iraq, the concept of collective self-defence was invoked by
both the Security Counci1209 and countries such as the United States and the United
Kingdom which were asked for aid by Kuwait.2I0 It was the first time that the Security
Council affirmed "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence"
response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter.212 However, in Resolution 678 the Council declared that it was acting
under Chapter VII, but did not specify which article of the chapter. One possibility is
that the Council acted under Article 42 as discussed earlier. Another possibility is that
military action against Iraq was authorised under Article 51. Both these articles are
included in Chapter VII. The Security Council in Resolution 678 only authorised the
member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary
measures, and requested the states concerned to keep the Council regularly informed
of the progress of action. However, the Council did not determine that military actions
should be under its control. Perhaps this omission is evidence of the Security
Council's intent to leave the choice of means, timing, command and control to the
participating states.213
It may be argued that, if the right of self-defence is an "inherent right", it does not
legally require the Council's approval. As mentioned earlier in the case of Korea, the
participating states preferred to regard their action as falling within the authorisation
209..e.g. Resolution 661 confirmed by the next Council resolutions.
210..S/21492, 10 Aug. 1990.
211..SC Res. 661, 6 Aug. 1990.
212- Id
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by the Security Council and not as a mere individual action or self-defence. 214 In the
case of Kuwait, those states supporting military action against Iraq believed that it
was important to have UN authorisation for domestic political reasons.2I5
Before adopting Resolution 678, the two countries with the largest military
contribution in the area, the United States and the United Kingdom, had contended
that the resolutions already adopted by the Council, together with the right of self-
defence recognised by Article 51, were sufficient authority to resort to military force
to expel Iraq from Kuwait or to defend Saudi Arabia or any other country threatened
by Iraq.216
If the Allies' action in the Persian Gulf is to be considered within the framework of
"collective self-defence", rather than a United Nations action, it merits further
comments. Article 51 and general international law have provided that the right of
self-defence would be applied in certain conditions. In fact, the principle of non-use of
force governs international relations, the exception being the use of force in self-
defence by a country or a group of countries. Even such a use of force does not imply
the matter as being at the discretion of the co-operating states, nor does it mean that
the Council lacks authority to place limits on the military action. Article 51 expressly
recognises that, in case of self-defence, the Council retains the authority and
responsibility to take such action as it deems necessary to restore international peace
and security. "This language makes it clear that the Council may decide on the limits
and objectives of the military action authorised as collective self-defence".217
214_ R. Higgins, op. cit., p. 178.
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217..O. Schachter, op. cit„ p. 460.322
Armed attack
Article 51 has provided that, if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence may be
applied. Kelsen believes that it is hardly possible to consider the right of a non-
attacked state to assist an attacked state as an "inherent right". He argues that the use
of the expression "collective self-defence" in Article 51 of the Charter is not quite
correct, and it is certainly collective "defence" not collective "self-defence". 218 In the
opinion of Kunz, collective self-defence is not really self-defence but defence of
another state.219
Countries might conclude treaties to protect their territories against external
aggression. However, the consent of states, either being parties to such treaties or not,
is necessary in case of attack to exercise collective self-defence by other states. The
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case stated that there was no rule of
customary international law that permitted another state to exercise the right of self-
defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation. When collective self-
defence is invoked, it is to be expected that the state for whose benefit the right is
used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack and there is no rule
permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by that
state. The Court expressly said that under international law in force today - whether
customary international law or that of the United Nations system - states do not have
the right of collective armed response to acts which do not constitute an armed
attack.229
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The Security Council, by affirming the applicability of collective self-defence in the
Kuwait crisis, recognised implicitly that third states had the right to use force to aid
Kuwait, even though those states themselves had not been attacked and had no treaty
or special links with Kuwait, an opinion which was rejected earlier by scholars such
as Bowett and Kelsen.221 However, one of the conditions of self-defence, i.e. the
consent of the attacked state, existed in this case, since Kuwait had requested third
states' assistance.
Another question is whether the right of self-defence could extend to action to defend
Saudi Arabia. Did sufficient authority exist to resort to military force to defend Saudi
Arabia or any other country threatened by Iraq? An armed attack against Kuwait had
occurred which was an important condition for the applicability of self-defence. But
in the case of Saudi Arabia, the legality of resort to self-defence to counter an
anticipated attack would be doubtful.
Fawcett in his examination of the conditions for self-defence writes, there is some
evidence that the drafters of the Charter used the precise and restrictive notion of
'armed attack' in case of of 'aggression' or 'threat to the peace', because they wished to
avoid giving too much latitude within the Charter system to the recognised right of
self-defence.222
Judge Nagendra Singh and E. McWhinney have concluded that "the right of self-
defence as such is recognised both in customary and conventional law, though its
exercise according to the latter, which overrides the former, is permissible only in the
event of an armed attack".223
22L Both quoted in: 0. Schachter, op. cit., p. 457.
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Although some authors interpret Article 51 as confirming anticipatory self-defence,
the majority of international lawyers believe that Article 51 has to be interpreted
narrowly as containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-defence. 224 Consequently,
Article 51 could not be invoked for anticipatory self-defence and thus defending
Saudi Arabia.
Necessity, immediacy, and proportionality
Article 51 has not expressly referred to the limits of the right of self-defence. The
limits and conditions of self-defence were affirmed in the Caroline case where it is
provided that the situation must be an overwhelming situation, "leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation".225 The International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case expressly stated that, other than an armed attack, additional
requirements would be the conditions imposed by general international law such as
necessity and proportionality.226
It is important that any action of self-defence is taken within a very short time of the
first attack and it is vital that self-defence is proportionate to the initial act.227 Thus, an
immediate reaction to the first attack is necessary in order to establish the act of self-
defence. That is why the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, announced that Kuwait's right of individual and collective self-defence had
expired because of the delay - ultimately of more than five months - in fighting
back.228
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Although Rostow believes that, as a matter of customary international law the right of
self-defence should be exercised as quickly as is reasonable under the circumstances,
and to the extent necessary to curb the breach of international law, he has criticised
the Secretary-General's statement.229 He states that, in Korea, the United States was
able to move a few troops from Japan immediately after the North Korean attack; but
in the Persian Gulf, it took months to bring American and European forces to the area,
and the United States should not have lost its right to fight back. 230 It may be argued
that, even though the presence of the American Rapid Reaction Force and the
increasing military build up during and after Iraq-Iran war is ignored, the
technological progress since the Korean war, as became evident to some extent in the
Persian Gulf war, would have provided appropriate means of deploying such forces
without delay.
The necessity and immediacy of action in self-defence has a special relation to the
measures taken by the Security Council. If the Council did not act in the case of
armed attack or was slow to act as it was in Iraq-Iran war, at least temporary right of
action might revert to the member states.231 In such cases the United Nations has
shown lack of decision and leadership, which enables member states to take action by
themselves.232
The Security Council and the inherent right of self-defence
Article 51 has provided the right of self-defence would be applicable if an armed
attack occurs, "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security". According to the Charter, the first action in the case
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of an armed attack would be by the aggrieved state. In fact, the Charter has implicitly
affirmed this point that, since the consideration of the Security Council might take
time and since the victim state should defend itself immediately, it is not acceptable
that states should wait and lose their rights to defend themselves "until" the Security
Council takes action. Thus, when an armed attack occurs, the victim state can resort to
self-defence without prior permission by the Security Council. Furthermore, the right
of veto by the Permanent Members would jeopardise permission for self-defence.
In the case of the Iraq-Iran war, Iran resorted to the right of self-defence because it
was faced with an overwhelming situation and had "no choice of means", "no moment
for deliberation" or authorisation from the Security Council.
Resolution 661 contained provisions both affirming self-defence by "states" and
imposing mandatory economic sanctions by the "Security Council". While the
Council in Resolution 661 adopted mandatory economic sanctions to bring about the
withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, it affirmed the inherent right of self-defence. 233 It
was an ambiguous decision because, if the Council wanted to terminate the right of
self-defence by adopting economic sanctions, why did it affirm the right of self-
defence in the same resolution?
In the meeting of the Security Council to adopt Resolution 661, the British delegation
referred to the military action and stated that economic sanctions were designed to
avoid the circumstances in which military action might otherwise arise. 234 It has been
said that some participating states made it clear that the failure of economic sanctions
would automatically involve permission to use force as self-defence without further
authorisation by the Counci1.235
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It seems that, although the Council affirmed Article 51 (which was not necessary), it
desired to control action taken against Iraq, and the discussions in the Council show
that its members desired the use of economic sanctions in lieu of military measures.236
Article 51 states that self-defence should be terminated by necessary measures taken
by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The question is
what the "necessary measures" would mean, and what their limitations would be.
The necessary measures could be defined as a consideration of a situation, seeking
peaceful means, or taking practical action by the Security Council. Some international
lawyers believe that the right of self-defence no longer applies when the Security
Council has adopted measures it considers necessary to repel the armed attack.237
Schachter believes that a Council's decision to call on an invader to withdraw and to
cease hostilities is certainly a necessary measure, but it does not deprive the victim
state of its right of self-defence. 238 He believes, as Resolution 661 contained, even
economic sanctions under Article 41 did not terminate the right of self-defence.239
In this respect, Mullerson has stated when the Security Council puts a conflict on its
agenda to determine whether it constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace.
or an act of aggression, the inherent right of self-defence becomes "dormant", to be
revived later in the unlikely event that the Security Council votes that it has failed to
resolve the conflict.240
Franck also says that the Charter, in creating the new police power, intended to
establish an exclusive alternative to the old war system. He believes that the old way
is licensed only until the new way begins, when the Security Council accepts
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jurisdiction of a conflict, i.e. when the new system is activated, the injured party's
right of self-defence is "suspended" until the Council affirmatively decides it cannot
deal effectively with the problem.24I
However, it is not acceptable that, by acceptance of jurisdiction of a conflict, the
injured party's right to self-defence is "suspended". Bowett also rejects the view that
the Security Council's consideration of a conflict can he deemed to suspend the
injured party's right of self-defence. He even concludes that the aggrieved state may
act in conflict with the Security Counci1. 242 In fact, a mere call to negotiate does not
terminate the right of self-defence since the consideration of the situation by the
Security Council takes time which, by the existence of an overwhelming situation for
the victim state and its loss of rights during that time, self-defence is the only way to
react to the aggression. Furthermore, the possibility of Permanent Members' veto is
another fact that should be considered by the injured party. Although the right of self-
defence should not be impaired by the Charter, the Security Council can, through
military action, restore peace, or pass a resolution determining a self-defence as an
aggression, to end self-defence.
In the Kuwait crisis, the Security Council adopted economic sanctions under Article
41 and a blockade to enforce sanctions.243 Adopting Resolution 678 would be the end
of the right of self-defence, since the Security Council "authorised" the use of "all
necessary means". It might be concluded that the authorisation of the use of force in
Resolution 665 was sufficient, and the adoption of Resolution 678 was not necessary.
It should be noted that the Security Council in Resolution 678 allowed Iraq a final
opportunity which meant the right of self-defence during that period was "suspended".
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If the Security Council "decided" to use force, and in "obligatory" language ordered
the use of force, there would be no doubt that the action taken against Iraq should be
considered as a United Nations action and not self-defence. However, it is not clear
that the "authorisation" of the use of force should be deemed as a "necessary measure"
taken by the Security Council under Article 51 to end the self-defence.
Another point is that, if the coalition forces claimed that they had the right of self-
defence, why did they wait for the Security Council to enforce economic sanctions
through blockade and until the deadline for use of force envisaged by Resolution 678
expired? Weston in his discussion has concluded that the Security Council created a
precedent, seemingly on the basis of some assumed penumbra of powers available to
the Council under Chapter VII, an "Article 42 1/2" authorisation as some UN watchers
have called it.244 He believes that when human life (specially innocents) and other
fundamental values are at stake, as was the case when Resolution 678 was adopted, "it
seems not inappropriate to insist upon unambiguously articulated war-making
authority as a de minimus requirement of 'right process', and that "the Security
Council did not choose such a course ...
In fact, the Security Council had neither applied a control as a UN action, nor limited
the coalition's actions as self-defence by monitoring the requirements envisaged in the
Charter and general international law. Thus, the "authorisation" of the use of force
should be considered as an unlimited permission to use force which does not comply
with the spirit of the Charter.
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Limitation and supervision
Resolution 678 had an "unrestricted character".246 The precise source of its authority
was unstated, and it neglected to restrict the destructive weaponry and other means of
accounting to or guidance from the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee or
any other UN institution that might have been appropriate, and it set no time limits on
the use of "all necessary means".247
The Yemeni delegation at the Security Council meeting stated that the resolution was
"so broad and vague", and added that the Security Council had no control over those
forces, and nations were allowed to make war independently which was a classic
example of "authority without accountability" •248
In fact, during the war in the Persian Gulf, no part of the United Nations had even
minimum control over military operations. Any attempt by the Security Council to
limit or end the war against Iraq would almost certainly be vetoed by some of the
Permanent Members involved in the war.249 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on the Mutual
Defence Treaty with Korea, when asked in the case of self-defence who would decide
when the Council had taken the "necessary measures", said: "the determination as to
that adequacy ... would be ours to malce".259 According to commentators of the
Charter, "it is not clear whether he meant that every nation had that right, or that as a
practical matter, the veto power would not permit the Security Council to take a
decision with which the United States disagreed".251
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On 10 February 1991, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar reported that the
United Nations war in the Persian Gulf was not "a classic United Nations war in the
sense that there is no United Nations control of the operations, no United Nations flag,
blue helmets, or any engagement of the Military Staff Conunittee". 252 He added "what
we know about the war.. .is what we hear from the three members of the Security
Council which were involved - Britain, France, and the United States - which every
two or three days report to the Council, after the actions have taken place. The
Council, which has authorised all this, is informed only after the military actions have
taken place."253 He said, "Ms I am not a military expert, I cannot evaluate how
necessary are the military actions taking place now ... I consider myself head of an
organisation which is first of all a peaceful organisation and secondly a humanitarian
organisation".254 These statements further emphasise that the war in the Persian Gulf
was not a United Nations war, but the coalition's war against Iraq.255
The International Committee of Red Cross, in its outline of legal aspects of the
conflict in the case of Kuwait, considered Article 2 of Geneva Convention of 1949. It
stated that "Nile fact that military action has been authorised by Security Council
Resolution 678 does not affect this definition or the application of the laws of armed
conflict. The fact that there has been no formal declaration of war does not affect this
definition either. In this respect, it may be pointed out that the Geneva Conventions
'shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them' (Article 2)."256
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However, it is the Security Council's responsibility in any kind of military
confrontation to order the termination of war and take appropriate measures.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the United Nations was established pre-
eminently, as proclaimed in the Preamble of the Charter, "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war".
Another point which should be discussed is the application of the laws of war and the
principle of proportionality on the coalition's war against Iraq, since the most tragic
aspect of war in the Persian Gulf was the extensive destruction of civilian lives and
property resulting from the coalition's aerial bombing and long-distance missiles.
Should the army and inhabitants of the aggressor states be denied the protection of
laws of war? Although there has been a suggestion that armed forces resisting
aggressors were not frilly bound by the requirements of the jus in bello, the Institut de
Droit International concluded in 1971, after several years of study, that UN forces
engaged in hostilities even against an aggressor must comply in all circumstances
with humanitarian rules of armed conflict including the rules for protection of civilian
persons and properties.257 "While this conclusion concerned UN forces, it would
surely apply equally to national forces opposing an aggressor".258
In the Persian Gulf war, the principles of proportionality and the distinction between
military objectives and civilian did not have practical effect. The bombing by the
coalition forces of Iraqi civilians and what the UN survey 259 found as destroying most
means of modern life support including food supply, water purification and other
essentials were not compatible with the humanitarian legal rules of war. 260 Starvation
of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited by Article 54(1) of Protocol I of
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1977.261 Under this Protocol it is also prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.262
LEGAL BASIS OF UN ACTIONS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE
The continuation of sanctions
The Security Council in its Resolution 687 (paragraph 20) allowed for some sanctions
on Iraq to be lifted. However, the Council in paragraph 21 decided to review sanctions
every sixty days "in the light of the policies and practices of the government of
Iraq" .263 It should be noted that sanctions should be applied on the target state with a
specific aim. When this aim (which should be clarified by the Council) was achieved,
the sanctions should be lifted.
The Security Council in Resolution 661 had clarified that it imposed comprehensive
sanction to secure the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. It is not clear what objective the
Security Council was pursuing by continuing economic sanctions after the withdrawal
of Iraq from Kuwait. Certainly, the suffering of civilians in Iraq is unlikely to affect
the policy of the political leaders. The imposing of economic sanctions as a
punishment, even if it led to removal of the Iraqi government, has a long-term effect
on the infrastructure of the country. Such comprehensive sanctions, accompanied by
tight control and destruction of armaments, would result in a weak, poor and
defenceless country after the present regime.
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Article 41 of the Charter provides that measures not involving the use of armed force
are to maintain or restore international peace and security. Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali has said that "... the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party
that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish ... while
recognising that the Council is a political body rather than a judicial organ, it is of
great importance that when it decides to impose sanctions it should at the same time
define objective criteria for determining that their purpose has been achieved".264
The Secretary-General referred to sanctions as raising "ethical question of whether
suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of
exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the
plight of their subjects... They [sanctions] can complicate the work of humanitarian
agencies ... They can conflict with the development objectives of the Organisation and
do long-term damage to the productive capacity of the target country. They can have a
severe effect on other countries that are neighbours or major economic partners of the
target country. They can also defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic
response against the international community, symbolised by the United Nations, and
by rallying the population behind the leaders whose behaviour the sanctions are
intended to modify."265
In the case of Iraq the Security Council should have clarified its objectives after the
Iraqi withdrawal. If the purpose is modification of political behaviour, suffering of
vulnerable groups should be avoided. This suffering has not so far led to a change in
the policies of Iraqi government; rather it has resulted in some internal support for the
present regime. Where the objectives of the Council's measures are not clarified, it
may even be implied that the status quo is what the Council had intended.
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Furthermore, sanctions with their long-term damage to the economy and industrial
development of Iraq as a member of the UN is not compatible with the UN's
programmes for economic and social development. Therefore, measures taken by the
Council should have maximum influence on the behaviour of a government and
minimum effect on the basic life of ordinary people and the infrastructure of a nation.
That is why the author believes that monitoring and assessment of the effects of
sanctions are crucial for the follow up decisions by the Security Council.
In fact, the Security Council by Resolution 687, involved itself in the internal affairs
of Iraq. This is in contrast with its decision in the first case of enforcement measures
by the UN, as it did not attempt to regulate internal affairs in North Korea when peace
terms were reached with North Korea in the Armistice Agreement of 1953.
Establishment of United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)
A few weeks after the declaration of cease-fire by the United States, the Security
Council passed Resolution 687 which mandated the destruction of all Iraqi chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, materials and production facilities as well as all
ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. 266 The Security Council by
its resolution established a Special Commission to deal with inspection and
destruction of the non-nuclear weapons and facilities and delegated responsibility for
nuclear elements to the International Atomic Energy Agency.267 Resolution 687
reaffirmed that Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and obligations arising prior to 2
August 1990 which would be addressed through the normal mechanisms, was liable
under international law for any direct loss and damage including environmental
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments and
corporations.268 It also decided to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that
266..SC Res. 687, 3 Apr. 1991.
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fall within the above debts and obligations, and established a commission that would
administer the fund.269
The Security Council by Resolution 687 reaffirmed economic sanctions against Iraq,
including an arms embargo.271) By this resolution the Secretary-General was requested
to submit a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to
monitor a buffer zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border. In fact, Resolution 687 was
deemed as a formal cease-fire which Iraq had accepted on 6 Apri1.271
Pursuant to the Council's request in Resolution 687 for a plan for the immediate
deployment of a United Nations observer unit to the demilitarised zone (DMZ) along
the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, the Secretary-General proposed a plan for a
unit to be called the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) to
monitor the DMZ, to deter DMZ violations through surveillance and to observe
hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the
other.272 Furthermore, the Secretary-General clarified that UNIKOM would "be
required to monitor and observe and would not be expected and, indeed, would not be
authorised to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or
equipment into the demilitarized zone".273 Iraq and Kuwait accepted the plan.274
Approving the Secretary-General's proposal, the Council referred to Chapter VII of







The constitutional basis of UNIKOM
In fact, UNIKOM is unique as part of a package developed by the Council to end a
war. The Security Council in Resolution 689 affirmed that the observer mission was
not a peace-keeping operation in the traditional sense, as it can only be terminated by
a decision of the conflict, i.e. its existence is not exclusively dependent on the consent
of the host state.275 UNIKOM is a non-enforcement force and should remain neutral.
It is believed that Iraq had little choice, not only because of its defeat, but formally
because Resolution 687 appeared to be adopted under Chapter VII and Iraq had to
agree to all its terms.276 It seems that, although the termination of LTNIKOM's
mandate should be by the decision of the Security Council, in the absence of consent
and co-operation of Iraq with UNIKOM, UNIKOM would not have an effective
function and therefore the Security Council should decide to withdraw UNIKOM. In
fact, the most important element of peace-keeping forces has always been considered
to be the consent of host state; otherwise, the force cannot be deemed as a peace-
keeping force.
UNIKOM, like other peacekeeping operations, is authorised to use force in self-
defence and without infringing the sovereignty of any state. Since UNIKOM was
established by a Chapter VII resolution to monitor the DMZ, its constitutional basis
would be Article 40 to create provisional measures for further steps towards peace
between Iraq and Kuwait.
Resolution 688 and humanitarian assistance
Following the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, uprisings took place in the
north and the south of Iraq to overthrow the Iraqi regime, and by early March 1991
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fighting broke out in the Iraqi cities between anti-government and pro-government
troops.277 In the north, the memories and fear of mass slaughter among Kurds were
strong, especially as chemical weapons had been used against civilians in Halabja in
1988. The severity of the Iraqi repression led to panic and a mass exodus of up to two
million Kurds who fled via the mountains towards the Turkish and Iranian borders.278
At the request of Turkey and France, the Security Council met on 5 April 1991 to
discuss the serious situation arising from abuses committed against the population in
several parts of Iraq, particularly in those inhabited by Kurds. 279 At this meeting
Turkey stated that Iraq's armed forces caused more than 200,000 Kurds, Arabs and
Turkomans to flee to the north near the border with Iran and Turkey. However,
Turkey objected to the landing of shells on its territory and did not allow its border
provinces to be overwhelmed by such a flood of displaced persons.280
Iran stated that it was providing refuge to some 110,000 Iraqi civilians who had
crossed into the country. Iran added that the implications of the situation for Iran and
other neighbouring countries made it urgent for the Council to take steps to put an
early end to the Iraqi people's suffering.281
However, Iraq stated that some neighbouring states were trying to destabilise the
country and even to partition it into mini-states. It announced that all Iraqi citizens
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could return home at any time. It also welcomed the dispatch to Iraq of an
international mission.282
At the same meeting on 5 April, the Council adopted Resolution 688 which in its
preamble referred to its responsibilities under UN Charter for maintaining
international peace and security.283 It referred to Article 2(7) of the Charter the
significance of which will be considered later in this chapter.
Resolution 688 reaffirmed the commitment of all member states to respect the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all states in
the area.284 It also condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilians including Kurds,
"the consequences of which threatened international peace and security", and
demanded that Iraq end this repression.285 The Council in its resolution insisted that
Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those
in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for
their operations.286
The Secretary-General was requested to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and
also to use all the resources at his disposal to address urgently the critical needs of the
refugees and displaced Iraqi population.287 All member states and all humanitarian
organisations were appealed to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts.288
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The jurisdictional competence of the Council on human rights questions
Normally, the General Assembly and other organs related to it (such as the Economic
and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights) have exclusive
competence in the human rights or humanitarian fields and the Security Council is
thereby excluded from all involvement in these fields.289 However, increasing
awareness in recent years of the victims of non-international armed conflicts who are
internally displaced in their country, and the tendency of the Council to intervene in
such situations, raised several issues concerning the legality of the Security Council's
decisions on humanitarian intervention.
In the Council's debate over Resolution 688 some member states questioned the
Council's decisions on humanitarian grounds. The Cuban delegation argued that the
Council was disregarding its obligations to act strictly in accordance with the
functions granted to it by the Organisation and not for the interests of a transitory
majority.290 The delegations of Ecuador and Yemen had similar arguments. 291 The
former stated that if human rights' related measures were the only issue at stake, no
matter how grave the violation, the Security Council would not be the competent body
to take them, given that Chapter IX of the Charter says that it is the General Assembly
or the Economic and Social Council which would be the competent bodies in such
situations.292
Another point which was considered by the member states in the Council's meeting
on 5 April was the content of Article 2(7) prohibiting the United Nations from
intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, which
has been seen as equally applicable to relations between states. In this respect, the
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delegation of the United Kingdom stated that Article 2(7), while being "an essential
part of the Charter, does not apply to matters which, under the Charter, are not
essentially domestic" such as human rights.293 Germany asserted that it is the
legitimate right of the international community to call for respect for human rights.294
Several states expressed their anxiety that the human rights-based decisions led the
Council to interfere in domestic affairs of states. Romania asserted that "[q]uestions
pertaining to the situation of various segments or components of populations from the
ethnic, linguistic or religious points of view are matters of the national jurisdiction of
states. In this respect no one can disregard the imperative nature of Article 2,
paragraph 7 ... We are indeed very happy to see this fundamental provision of the
Charter well reflected in the draft resolution [688] . 2295 Turkey stated that Article
2(7) "should be scrupulously observed".296
Pakistan argued that as a matter of principle it was opposed to "any form of
interference in the internal affairs of any country, and this is especially so in the case
of a brotherly, Muslim country". 297 Both China and India abstained in the voting and
rejected the proposals contained in Resolution 688 on the grounds that they clearly
transgressed the prohibition laid down in Article 2(7). 298 Yemen objected that
references to "political developments within Iraq" and to the need for "internal
dialogue" were in violation of Article 2(7).299
The arguments concerning the Council's competence to consider human rights issues
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Human Rights300 concluded in his report (up to August 1992) that human rights
situation in Iraq amounted to a violation of Resolution 688, immediate steps needed to
be taken, and a credible mechanism to monitor compliance needed to be put into place
urgently.301 The Security Council was asked by Belgium, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States to invite the Special Rapporteur to appear before  it.302
This request caused considerable debate and there was an argument that the Council
was completely lacking in the competence to consider human rights issues. The
Chinese delegate asserted that the competence of the Security Council was to deal
with matters bearing upon international peace and security; questions of human rights
ought to be dealt with by the Commission on Human Rights. 303 The delegate of
Ecuador stated that the Council could neither examine the report of the Special
Rappurteur nor take a stand on it.304
However, an exception was accepted by some countries. For example, India stated
that "[t]he Council can focus its legitimate attention on the threat or likely threat to
peace and stability in the region but it cannot discuss human rights situations  per se or
make recommendations on matters outside its competence" P305 India considered such
action as a deviation from the Charter in relation to the different organs which could
erode confidence in the United Nations and have grave consequences for the future of
the organisation as a whole. 306 The delegation of Zimbabwe warned that, if the
tendency of the Security Council to encroach on the mandates of other organs was
permitted to continue, it would lead to a serious institutional crisis.307
300..He was appointed by the Commission to investigate alleged human rights violations in Iraq by
Commission Resolutions 1991/74 and 1992/71.
301..A/47/367, 10 Aug. 1992, paras 5, 27 and 28.
302..S/24393, S/24394, S/24395 and S/24396.
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304.. Ibid, p. 8.
305..Jj2i, p. 6.
306..
307. LW, p. 12.343
The delegations of Australia, Belgium, France, Japan, the Russian Federation and the
United Kingdom supported the view that the Council was fully entitled to consider
human rights violations whenever it considered it appropriate in the circumstances.308
The proposal was eventually adopted by the Security Counci1.309
In August 1992, the Non-Aligned Movement in its final Declaration adopted by the
Heads of State and Government in Jakarta, "emphasised the importance of ensuring
that the role of the Security Council conforms to its mandate as defined in the United
Nations Charter, so that there is no encroachment on the jurisdiction and prerogatives
of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies".310
In an analytical consideration of Resolution 688 and the disputed issues regarding the
competence of the Security Council to deal with human rights issues and the
prohibition of the UN to intervene in internal affairs of states, Articles 2(1), 2(7), and
39 of the UN Charter should be discussed together.
Article 2(1) refers to the principle of the sovereign equality of all UN Member States
while in Article 2(7) a guarantee is envisaged so that the United Nations is not
authorised to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state except for enforcement measures under Chapter VII. According
to Chapter VII, when the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, it would decide on measures to
restore or maintain international peace and security.311
Although Resolution 660 had referred to Articles 39 and 40 and Chapter VII was
invoked by the Council in its further resolutions, e.g. Resolution 687 (cease-fire
308.. Ibicl, pp. 47, 41, 51, 46,42 and 54.
309.. Ibid, p. 12.
310.. Non-Aligned Movement document NAC 10/Doc. 1/Rev. 1(1992), para. 31.
311..Article 39 of the UN Charter.344
resolution), the Security Council in Resolution 688 referred to Article 2(7) and
"reaffirmed" the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of all states in the area.312 In fact, by these
references the Council recalled the obligations of both the United Nations and
individual states. Furthermore, the Council "insisted" that Iraq allow access to
international organisations. This language does not specifically contemplate forcible
action. In fact, prior to Resolution 688 Iraq had permitted some humanitarian
organisations to operate within its territory.313
It might be said that the United Nations may intervene in situations of humanitarian
need of subjects of a sovereign state in certain conditions. It is believed that "threat to
the peace" and "consent" are two legal bases which allow forcible intervention by the
United Nations.314 With regard to the latter condition, it should be noted that
intervention is an act much stronger than mediation or diplomatic suggestion, and in
opposition to the will of the particular state that would impair the political
independence of that state.315
During the Cold War, UN policy was to secure the consent of a target state before
intervening as a peacekeeping force, as it did in the Congo case for instance.316
However, the United Nations bypassed the consent of the host state or the parties to a
conflict for the first time in Somalia. Council Resolution 794 justified the use of all
necessary means by claiming that there was no government in Somalia, because the
country was in a civil war between several warlord factions.317 By contrast, the United
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Nations received the consent of the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia in
1992.
With regard to the other condition for UN intervention on humanitarian grounds,
namely threat to the peace, the Security Council would act to restore the peace where
a breach of or threat to the peace or act of aggression has taken place.318 The
application of Article 39 in the cases of civil war or violation of human rights depends
on the narrow or expanded interpretation of what constitutes a "threat to the peace".319
White believes that the finding of a "threat to the peace" is to a large degree a political
decision on the part of the Council and such a finding as regards a wholly internal
situation is not precluded. 320 He further says that "however, the permanent members
are not going to exercise this discretion unless the situation has potential international
repercussions which could affect their interests, or even involve them in an escalating
conflict" 321
It should be said that the Security Council must act in conformity with the overall
objectives of the Charter, even though it is not obliged formally by the Charter to act
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. 322 However, since
the Council's permanent members' interests may not be necessarily in line with the
principles of justice and international law, the Security Council should act strictly
within the powers and limitations which the Charter expressly conferred upon it.
318-Article 39 of the Charter.
319-France was the only country that sought to establish the principle that human rights violations in
and of themselves warranted a response by the Security Council. S/PV. 2982, (1991), p. 92. However,
Resolution 688 did not endorse the French proposal.
329-N. D. White, op. cit., p. 36.
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The establishment of safe areas (no-fly zones)
The response of individual states to help the refugees was different. As mentioned
earlier, Turkey was unwilling to host the refugees or grant them asylum. 323 The
Turkish government was concerned that the massive influx of Kurds from Iraq might
stir unrest in the country. 324 In these circumstances the Kurds were facing serious
insecurity and widespread grievances.
"Iran, a country already host to about two million Afghans and several hundred
thousands Iraqi Shiites, was more open to allowing the Kurds to cross the border for
temporary relief, a response which initially received minimal support from the west.
As Roger Winter, Director of the US Committee for Refugees, remarked to the US
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on 23 April 1991, 'Iran is the
only one of the countries bordering Iraq that has - to date - acted in a consistent,
admirable humanitarian fashion'."325
On 10 April 1991 the United States announced that France and the United Kingdom
would join in the imposition of a no-fly zone over Iraqi territory north of the 36th
paralle1326 and on 19 August 1992 the United States announced the imposition of a
second no-fly zone over Iraqi territory south of the 32nd paralle1.327
Another plan by the United Nations was to cover all of Iraq for humanitarian
assistance. On 18 April 1991, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the
Secretary-General's Executive Delegate Sadruddin Aga Khan and the Iraqi Minister
of Foreign Affairs, by which both sides formally recognised "the importance and
323.. Lawyers. Committee for Human Rights, Asylum under Attack: A Report on the Protection of Iraqi
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urgency of adequate measures, including the provision of humanitarian assistance, to
alleviate the suffering of the affected Iraqi civilian population".328
According to the Memorandum, a basic framework for United Nations humanitarian
action was intended to facilitate the task of co-ordination, effective implementation
and monitoring of humanitarian assistance and relief operations. 329 Iraq welcomed
UN efforts to promote the voluntary return home of Iraqi displaced persons and to
take humanitarian measures to avert new flows.330
According to the Memorandum, all measures of implementation were to be "without
prejudice to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, security and
non-interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Iraq". 331 By the agreement of
the government of Iraq, the UN was permitted to have a humanitarian presence,
wherever such presence may be needed. 332 The Iraqi authorities denounced the
American-led plan as an illegal infringement on Iraqi sovereign authority.333
However, President Bush of the United States announced the initiative to establish
safe havens for the refugees and stated that it was consistent with Resolution 688.334
The legality of no-fly zones
On 15 April in a parliamentary statement, Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary of the
United Kingdom, stated that the aim of Britain's proposal for safe havens in Iraq was
not to create a territorial enclave or a separate Kurdestan or a permanent UN
328_ Iraq-United Nations Memorandum of Understanding of 18 April 1991, S/22663 (1991), reprinted
in 30 ILIA (1991), pp. 860-2, para. 1.
329.. Thid, para. 10.
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presence.335 Earlier, on 8 April 1991, Britain had proposed a plan under Resolution
687 and 688 to establish a safe haven in northern Iraq under UN contro1.336
By 18 April 1991, two major plans, different in a number of respects, were created to
help the refugees in Iraq. It is not clear whether UN authorities were totally unaware
of the American-led plan and whether the West were totally unaware of the
negotiations between UN representative and Iraqi authorities. Two possibilities could
be considered. The first is that the two plans were intended to be complementary, and
the second that the UN Secretary-General disagreed with the intrusion on Iraqi
sovereignty entailed by the American-led plan.337
The legality of the Secretary-General's initiative could be found in Resolution 688.
According to paragraph 5 of the resolution, he was requested by the Council to use all
the resources at his disposal, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and
the displaced Iraqi population. However, although Resolution 688 condemned Iraqi
action as a threat to the peace, it did not call for intervention or the use of force to
protect the Kurds. Even this resolution did not establish any flight bans as the Council
imposed in Bosnia. In fact, the Security Council by adoption of Resolution 781
established "a ban on military flights in the air space of Bosnia".338
In the Iraq case by contrast, the Security Council did not itself establish any flight ban
by adoption of Resolution 688. The Council appealed for states "to contribute to ...
humanitarian relief efforts".339 This language "almost certainly contemplates material
and financial assistance, rather than state action to enforce a demand to cease civilian
repression".34° Furthermore, Resolution 688, with reference to the Council's
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responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, referred to Article 2(7)
of the Charter. Consequently, Resolution 688 does not justify the Allied intervention
in Iraq.341 It should be referred to the statement of the Secretary-General's Legal
Counsel's which emphasised that Resolution 688 "was not adopted under Chapter
VII" and therefore "the Secretary-General ... could not legally undertake or participate
in humanitarian intervention and/or send to Iraq United Nations 'Blue Helmets' to
protect the Kurdish population without Iraqi consent or explicit Security Council
authorisation" 342
Another resolution which might be invoked for the legal basis of safe-havens is
Resolution 678. It could be said that since the coalition (US, UK and France) had the
authority to use force to liberate Kuwait under Resolution 678, such authority could
be used to enforce Resolution 688 for humanitarian intervention. Three points should
be considered regarding this argument.
The first point regards the language of Resolution 678, particularly the terms
"subsequent relevant resolutions" and "to restore international peace and security".
Although Resolution 688 follows Resolution 660 and 678 in numerical terms,
"Resolution 688 does not pertain to Resolution 660 within the meaning of Resolution
678".343 In fact, the "relevant resolutions" addressed the "breach of international peace
341.. August 1996, hostilities between Kurdish groups were resumed. As the Iraqi government
dispatched considerable troops and equipment in support of a fraction of the Kurds, the United States
considered this action as a violation of no-fly zones, and attacked, with the assistance of the UK, a
number of targets in the south of Iraq where civilians were reported to have been killed. This attack
was justified under Resolution 688; yet there is no mention of authorisation of use of force in the
resolution. As discussed earlier, the no-fly zones themselves were not created by a decision of the
Security Council. However, there was no Iraqi flights over the area, and the US reaction seems
unjustified as the Iraqi government was moving ground forces in its own territory. Furthermore, the
selected targets were stated to be anti-aircraft sites in the south implying no relation to the activities on
the ground in the north. Finally, there is a question whether the US reaction was proportionate to the
Iraqi action.
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of the Role of the Security Council, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993), p. 103.
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and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait",344 and the need to "restore the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait"; 345 in these resolutions
there was no concern for Iraqi civilians or condemnation of Iraq's repression of its
civilians.346 The Council adopted Resolution 678 "to restore" the peace which had
been breached by the invasion of Kuwait, but Resolution 688 only determined that
Iraqi actions "threatened" international peace and security, and since these
determinations are distinct, the chosen action must be distinct as wel1.347
Consequently, Resolution 678 which authorised force to "restore international peace"
does not justify use of force to "maintain international peace".348
The second point is that Resolution 686 demanded that Iraq "[c]ease hostile or
provocative actions by its forces against all Member States, including missile attacks
and flights of combat aircraft."349 It seems that this demand by the Security Council
was about attacks against coalition forces and not against Iraqi civilians. Moreover, a
ban on Iraqi attacks on coalition aircraft flying in Iraqi airspace was only effective
until the formal end of hostilities, i.e. until 3 April 1991; by that time the Council
adopted Resolution 687 which set conditions for a formal cease-fire.350
The third point in consideration of the legality of Allied action in Iraq relates to the
general principles of international law. It should be noted that, generally, international
law treats civil wars and conflicts as purely internal matters. Articles 2(1) and 2(4)
refer to the sovereignty of individual states and the prohibition of threat or use of
force in international relations. Furthermore, the General Assembly's Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty of 1965 has special legal significance on this
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matter. The Declaration provides that "no state has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements are condemned".351
Nonetheless, Lillich argues that despite the doctrine of absolute sovereignty of states,
a decent respect for human dignity permits intervention on humanitarian grounds.352
However, as Lillich points out: "two provisions make it very doubtful ... whether
forcible self-help to protect human rights is still permissible under international law.
In the first place, all states by Article 2(4) renounce 'the threat of use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state', subject of course to the
self-defence provision contained in Article 51. Secondly, Article 2(7) prevents
intervention by the United Nations 'in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state, except for the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII'."353
Thornberry has argued that "humanitarian intervention by individual states could
hardly serve as a model for the future. It is something of a blind alley, dangerously
destabilising the international society, and ultimately counter-productive for its
intended beneficiaries. International law could hardly afford such a doctrine in the age
of advanced technological wars".354
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The International Court of Justice expressed the view that non-intervention is a rule of
customary international law and that intervention without state consent would be
illega1.355 The Court in the Nicaragua case considered and rejected the idea that there
was a right of intervention by the use of force to support the "political or moral
values" of a rebellion.356
In fact, "genuine instances of humanitarian intervention have been rare, if they have
occurred at all".357 In this respect, reference should be made to the intervenor's non-
humanitarian interest or motives, or other political or economic considerations
involved, in addition to the fact that no intervening state has used the pure rationale of
humanitarian intervention to justify its use of force. 358 By involving one of the
Council's Permanent Members in unilateral intervention, the veto power would
prevent the Security Council to take any action to end the intervention and to restore
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the target state.
Although the unlawful acts of the Iraqi government against its population were not
acceptable, it was not expected that the coalition would respond with unauthorised
action against Iraq. As discussed earlier, none of the Security Council's resolutions
authorised military intervention and the creation of a Kurdish quasi-state within Iraqi
territory. Also, no rule of the international law permitted such actions by a group of
states within another state.
The Bosnian no-fly zone was legally established since not only it was based on the
consent of the Bosnian government, but also the Security Council Resolution 781
which clearly authorised "a ban on military flights in the air space of Bosnia" .359 As a
355- Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, E.J_Re42,. (1986),
p. 263
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commentator concludes, the Bosnian no-fly zone was an example of the ineffective
enforcement of a legally imposed air exclusion regime, while the Iraqi zones represent
the effective enforcement of illegally imposed air exclusion zones.360
This United Nations actions regarding Iraq-Kuwait crisis had two different parts. The
first was in the context of an international conflict where the Security Council adopted
various resolutions to deal with it. The other part was UN involvement in an internal
conflict, i.e. offering humanitarian programme to deal with the humanitarian crisis.
This case demonstrates that humanitarian assistance (not intervention) should be
followed by a proper and clear mechanism through the United Nations. The model of
Memorandum signed by the UN and Iraq and acceptance of its arrangements by a
goverment which is prepared to abide by international legal rules would secure
access for humanitarian organisations.
360_ Timothy P. McIlmail, "No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion Regimes
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CONCLUSIONS
The idea of a new international organisation for maintaining and restoring
international peace and security found its first expression almost from the beginning
of World War II. It was thought necessary to create an international organisation,
more effective than the League of Nations, based on the principle of sovereign
equality of all peace-loving states. The initial planners of the new organisation were
opposed to an international organisation with the characteristics of a world
government or a supranational organisation. Therefore, the new organisation was to be
structurally in many respects like the League of Nations, with more powers regarding
world peace, and with a permanent dominant position of five nations in its council.
The United Nations was created following the ratification of its Charter by signatories
participated at the San Francisco Conference. Participating delegates made
tremendous efforts to amend the original proposals to minimise the differentiation
between the Security Council and the General Assembly and to include principles of
justice and international law as an assurance for peace. The original proposals
prepared at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference were adopted with minimal change. Yet,
the United Nations Charter contains important provisions regarding the functions of
the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the regional
arrangements in dealing with conflicts. The efficient implementation of these
provisions could prevent or end the hostilities among nations.
The UN Charter has provided ways in which action relating to international peace and
security can be initiated. The Security Council has supremacy over other organs of the
United Nations on matters coming within Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and has355
primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. The Security Council may
call upon the parties to settle their disputes, and may investigate any dispute or
situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the international peace and
security. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security but, if action is required, the
Assembly should refer the matter to the Security Council. The Secretary-General has
the right to draw the attention of the Security Council to any matter which in his
opinion may threaten the international peace and security. The Secretary-General may
act independently regarding a fact-finding operation, and establishing good offices
through conciliation and mediation within the framework of the UN Charter. Regional
arrangements or agencies can also deal with matters relating to international peace and
security. If the parties to a dispute failed to use peaceful means in order to settle their
differences, the Security Council, according to its determination of an act of
aggression, breach of or threat to the peace, could use enforcement measures,
including military and non-military measures, for restoring peace.
However, the division between two Permanent Members of the Security Council and
the defensive measures taken by them within the first few years of the establishment
of the Organisation put an obstacle in the way of the Organisation to undertake its
tasks mainly in relation to Chapter VII of the Charter. Consequently, the institution of
"peace-keeping" emerged which had not been envisaged in the Charter, and became
the most concerted effort by the United Nations in the area of the international peace
and security.
Peace-keeping forces and observer groups have carried out missions of varying scope,
duration and degree of success. Their mandate has differed according to the nature of
the conflict concerned. The basic principles essential to their success are the consent
of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence.356
The constitutional basis of peace-keeping and observer missions might be investigated
within the context of either Chapter VI or Chapter VII. Regarding Chapter VI it can
be said that this chapter deals with peaceful settlement of disputes, while peace-
keeping is a technique that normally does not lead to a settlement or solution of a
dispute per se. Besides, peace-keeping was created as a result of Council's failure to
take action under Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI. However, there have been
peace-keeping and observer missions such as UNOGIL and UNCIP with a mandate of
investigation, derived from Article 34 of Chapter VI.
The reference to Article 42 as a constitutional basis of peace-keeping is also
questionable, since, as discussed in Chapter Two, it was agreed at the San Francisco
Conference that the application of Article 42 should be dependent on the entry into
force of the special agreements provided for in Article 43. The link between Articles
42 and 43 is specifically indicated in Article 106. Since the forces which carry out the
peace-keeping operations are not established under Article 43, they cannot be
considered to apply enforcement measures under Article 42.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in Certain
Expences case confirmed that peace-keeping operations are not enforcement measures
within the compass of Chapter VII, and the General Assembly, which could make
recommendations regarding peace and security, could establish a peace-keeping force
for this purpose. Therefore, Article 42 may not provide the constititional basis for
peace-keeping operations. Indeed, the opinion of the World Court removed any
doubts about the legality of peace-keeping and it became a supportive basis for
developing this institution.
Peace-keeping forces are usually only deployed following a cease-fire agreement by
the disputant parties to supervise and monitor provisional measures, such as cease-fire
or withdrawal of forces. On the other hand, the consensual nature of these forces357
would imply that they are not categorised as enforcement measures. Therefore, Article
40 may provide the constitutional basis for peace-keeping. This Article requires that
the Security Council may, before making a recommendation or deciding on measures
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with provisional
measures as it deems necessary; such provisional measures should be without
prejudice to the rights or claims of the parties. However, the Council may take
account of a party's failure to comply with provisional measures.
Although provisional measures are not considered as enforcement actions, and should
be applied without prejudice to the rights of the parties; non-compliance with them
may be taken into account by the Council. This proves that provisional measures
should be taken more seriously than a mere recommendation. The Council in few
cases, such as the Palestine case, stated that the failure to comply would demonstrate
the existence of a breach of the peace. In the case of ONUC, the Council took strong
action to obtain compliance with its measures. However, the provisional nature of
these measures to prevent the worsening of a situation demonstrates that they must not
prejudice the rights and claims or positions of the parties concerned. It seems that a
mandatory call for provisional measures would be inconsistent with the "without
prejudice" clause. In fact, the recommendatory or mandatory nature of the call for
provisional measures depends on the Council's determination of the consequences of
states' failure to comply with such measures. However, in most cases the Council has
not determined the consequence of failure to comply with provisional measures.
Provisional measures can include measures such as cessation of military hostilities.
Since Article 40 relates to measures that prevent an aggravation of the situation before
making the recommendations or deciding upon measures under Article 39, the
creation of peace-keeping forces in relation to provisional measures is compatible
with Article 40. Peace-keeping forces are not dispatched for enforcement measures to
end the hostilities and often have limited functions regarding provisional measures,358
and their constitutional basis can be derived from Article 40. Peace-keeping
operations may of themselves constitute provisional measures under Article 40. In this
case, they might be complementary to and conditional on the existence of other
provisional measures, and should be organised under the same conditions which are
set forth in Article 40 for provisional measures.
In evaluating peace-keeping operations, it has to be said that normally they are
dispatched to keep order which has been created by a cease-fire, but long-lasting
peace-keeping operations without leading to a final and definite settlement of disputes
are contrary to these purposes. The cases of UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNMOGIP in
Kashmir, UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNTSO in the Middle East are instances of such
operations. These peace-keeping forces were set up originally with a limited mandate
and for a short period, but they have lasted for a long time. There is a feeling that
peace-keeping operations in these cases tended to sanctify the status quo and give the
impression after a number of years that their deployment is permanent.
There should be a combination of peace-keeping to maintain order and, at the same
time, active steps taken to establish a just settlement of disputes. In fact, open-ended
peace-keeping operations, apart from being expensive, would not only be ineffective,
but also in some circumstances counterproductive and harmful to the overall
settlement process. If peace-keeping forces are given precise and achievable
mandates, they can be used as an effective tool for settlement of disputes. Among the
peace-keeping and observing missions, UNEF I, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG and
UNAVEM have been considered as successful missions because of the parties' co-
operation, clear and achievable mandates and favourable political conditions.
Until the 1980s, most United Nations peace-keeping operations were concerned with
inter-state conflicts. In recent years, and particularly after the Cold War, the
Organisation has been involved in intra-state conflicts for humanitarian purposes. The359
basic principles of peace-keeping have evolved in the post-Cold War era as conflicts
concentrated in the realm of civil crises, and the Security Council has increasingly
become involved in internal conflicts rather than international disputes, partly because
the veto power no longer prevented it from dealing with internal crises.
The Security Council has extended its interpretation of the concept of "threat to the
peace" to internal matters such as humanitarian problems and human rights concerns.
This interpretation has been, in cases such as Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Libya, the
basis of economic sanctions or authorisation to use force. The Security Council in its
resolutions has recognised that the refugee problem, the non-action per se by a state,
the existence of a dictatorship regime, constituted a "threat to the peace", and
therefore qualified for international action.
It has been explained in Chapter Two that there is a tendency to consider even non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social and ecological fields as a "threat
to the peace". An imminent outcome of this idea would be the demise of Article 2(7)
regarding the limits of the United Nations' delegated powers, which is the touchstone
of the Organisation's legitimacy. In fact, the United Nations has been prohibited from
all forms of intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state, except in case of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
When a bona fide "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" is
discovered by the Security Council, the Charter empowers the Council to take action.
There must be an explosive situation which constitutes an actual and persistent threat
to the peace to be considered under Article 39 of the Charter. Otherwise, as  An
Agenda for Peace suggests, preventive diplomacy may be utilised through the
Security Council or the Secretary-General, and by regional organsations in360
cooperation with the UN. Although such attempts in inter-state conflicts are fully
within the Charter, they must be reconciled with Article 2(7) in internal conflicts.'
United Nations action on the ground of human rights violations is questionable, since
any situation within a given state which is injurious to human dignity, from adoption
of particular social and economic policies to gross violations of human rights during
civil wars, could become subject to UN action, whether or not there has been violation
of any international obligation threatening the world peace. It should be noted that
human rights rules would differ according to the cultural practices within different
nations and, accordingly, careful consideration should be given to any suggestion of
UN action in this regard.
Yet in cases such as Somalia, where there was a humanitarian crisis and a collapsed
structure of state's authority, something had to be done to break the cycle of violence
and hunger. The United Nations considered military intervention as the best solution
for a humanitarian crisis. In the absence of the consent of warring factions, the
military operation not only did not resolve the problem, but also undermined the
credibility of the United Nations and resulted in a high cost for the Organisation.
The cases of Somalia and Rwanda demonstrated that a mixed operation of peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement might not be successful. The United Nations tried to
separate peace-keeping from peace-enforcement by authorising NATO, United States
and France to use force in supporting UNPROFOR, UNOSOM and UNAMIR
respectively. However, in cases where there is no peace to keep, the United Nations
should try to achieve a secure environment and then deploy peace-keeping forces.
I- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-
. General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, (United Nations, New
York, 1995), A150/60 - S/1995/1, para. 27.361
The Security Council failed to seize the oportunity created by the end of the Cold War
to implement Chapters VI and VII effectively. In the case of Bosnia, the Security
Council refused to act under Articles 42 to 48 to recognise the situation as a breach of
the peace and an act of aggression against an independent state, requiring military
enforcement measures, to end the hostilities. Instead, the UN and NATO undertook
different mandates with confused and complex procedures, without a unified
command, clear rules of engagement or a joint understanding on the use of force.
These led them to remain inactive, and most of the efforts of peace-keepers/peace-
enforcers were directed to protecting themselves rather than humanitarian assistance
or protection of civilians.
Imposition of sanctions by the Security Council, in the absence of a clear objective,
would cause serious consequences for states and their population. The legitimacy of
sanctions may be questioned if they deprive a state of capacity to defend itself in case
of aggression. Moreover, sanctions can be applied to modify the behaviour of a
government, but they may cause long-term damage to the productive capacity of the
target country. An Agenda for Peace stressed that "the purpose of sanctions is to
modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security
and not to punish ... while recognising that the Council is a political body rather than a
judicial organ, it is of great importance that when it decides to impose sanctions it
should at the same time define objective criteria for determining that their purpose has
been achieved".2
In the case of Kuwait, because of political will and national interests, the Security
Council acted rapidly to use its full potential to respond to Iraq's aggression. In the
absence of forces at the disposal of the United Nations, the enforcement task was
delegated to a coalition of states. However, after authorising use of military force, the
Security Council lost its control and supervision over the events subsequent to the
2- [bid, paras. 66-68.362
main enforcement action. This matter has increased doubt among nations regarding
the authorisation of a multinational force to act on behalf of the Organisation. An
Agenda for Peace has rightly stated that entrusting enforcement tasks to groups of
member states not only can have a negative impact on the Organisation's stature and
credibility, but also there is the danger that the states concerned may claim
international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that were not in fact
envisaged by the Council when it gave them its authorisation.3
In retrospect, it is very important that operations authorised by the Security Council to
restore peace be thoroughly discussed, analysed and controlled by the Council.
Concluding agreements under Article 43 and re-establishing Military Staff Committee
would be necessary for institutionalised enforcement action in case of aggression and
to prevent unilateral actions by states or moving back towards the conduct as a
traditional exercise of the right of collective self-defence.
By sharp contrast to the UN action in Kuwait, during the Iraq-Iran war, the United
Nations played a reduced role regarding Iraq's aggression and its use of prohibited
weapons. During eight years of war between the two countries, the Security Council
neither sought to identify and condemn the aggressor, nor did it show its
determination to end the hostility either by peaceful means under Chapter VI or
forceful means under Chapter VII. The only reference by the Council to Chapter VII
was when both parties became exhausted and Iran had recovered most of its occupied
territories. As discussed in Chapter One, the drafters of the Charter determined that in
case of flagrant aggression imperiling the existence of a member of the Organisation,
enforcement measures should be taken without delay, and to the full extent required
by the circumstances, except that the Council should at the same time endeavour to
pursuade the aggressor to abandon its venture, by the means contemplated in Chapter
VI.
3- Ibid, para. 80.363
Although the Security Council, except in the cases of Korea and Kuwait, did not take
effective action concerning clear acts of aggression, it has taken significant decisions
in respect of internal crises. The Council has focused on Chapter VII in dealing with
internal crises and has authorised the use of force on humanitarian grounds in recent
years. This practice has created a fear in most countries as it might have special
consequences, particularly when no guidance has been given as to how the expanded
doctrine of threat to the peace should be applied in the future.
In case of disputes among nations, preventive measures are preferable to enforcement
measures, as An Agenda for Peace emphasised'', and fact finding missions and good
offices should be used increasingly by the Organisation. The means envisaged in
Chapter VI has to be utilised before any use of force in both inter-state and intra-state
crises. Where an explosive humanitarian crisis exists, attention should be paid to
humanitarian assistance rather than humanitarian intervention with the United Nations
having a balanced humanitarian, political and peace-keeping presence.
The new technique of establishing safe areas or protected zones has been used in the
cases of Bosnia, Iraq and Rwanda. This technique was not envisaged in the UN
Charter and was utilised to protect the population from outside aggression and to
supply them with humanitarian aid. In establishing safe areas, not only the
authorisation of the Security Council is required, but also the consent of the parties is
necessary for their effectiveness. The Bosnian no-fly zone was an example of an
ineffective but legal exclusion zone, while the Iraqi zones represent effective but
unauthorised exclusion zones. The protected zone established by France in Rwanda
was also without the Security Council's authorisation. In fact, since obtaining consent
for establishment of these areas, especially in intra-states conflicts, is unlikely, and
controlling these areas has caused problems, it seems that establishing safe areas may
not be the best solution.
4- Ibid, para. 26.364
Regional organisations, as localised forms of the United Nations, may deal more
efficiently with a dispute within their region than the United Nations. An Agenda for
Peace has regarded regional organisations as a matter of decentralisation and co-
operation with UN efforts to contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus
and democratisation in international affairs.5
The idea of a supranational role for the United Nations is not compatible with the
structure, principles and purposes of the Organisation. The main drafters intended that
the UN should be founded on the same basis as the League. It would be a great
mistake to recognise the UN as a supranational government with supranational
jurisdiction on the basis of the rules and principles of international law. Since
international law govern on the relations of sovereign states, while the idea of
supranational government needs an ultimate unity of the legal systems of the world.
Considering the role of the Security Council in maintaining and restoring peace, it
should be noted that, although the Security Council is considered as a political organ
of the United Nations, it is necessary that it put the legal basis for its decisions as the
prime objective, and political considerations should fall within the framework drawn
by legal considerations. It is primarily essential that the legal basis of Security
Council decisions is clearly identified in its resolutions. In fact, the Organisation, as a
creature of a treaty which is a legal instrument, is obliged to deal with disputes "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law". The significance of
the law is undeniable in the quasi-judicial role of the Council. Indeed, respect for the
law not only does not affect the efficacy of the Council inversely, but also it will
provide the basis of a long-term interest in maintaining and restoring international
peace and security.
5- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy. Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of
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